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 A b s t r a c t 
A number of studies regarding Public Financial Management (PFM) in Indonesia, 
especially those conducted after the major PFM reform in 2004, have shown the PFM 
legal framework to be robust and adequately designed. Nevertheless, a number of 
problems that hinder the achievement of PFM objectives also have been highlighted 
in many studies. This creates a concern regarding actual PFM practices in Indonesia 
and curiosity about how those practices support or retard the effectiveness of PFM. 
This study investigates non-compliance within the context of the operational 
components of PFM in local government. It utilises documentation analysis of the 
external auditor’s reports to understand the context, and to identify the systemic 
problems arising from, non-compliance across local governments in Indonesia. 
Specifically, this study aims to examine non-compliance from the perspective of PFM 
actors, or those who are involved in various stages and components of PFM 
operations. It examines the extent to which the individual motives of the PFM actors 
and the bureaucratic traditions within the PFM operations allow the emergence of 
non-compliance. Further, it elaborates on how those two factors influence the PFM 
actors to become involved in non-compliant acts and behaviours. This study adopts 
a qualitative reseach methodology using a single case study method, along with 
various data-gathering techniques of documentation, focus group discussion and 
semi-structure interview. 
The examination, within the context of this study, has confirmed the presence of non-
compliance in PFM operational practices across local governments in Indonesia. 
Those non-compliance practices exist within almost all components of PFM 
operations and have led to systemic problems in the three main elements of local 
government PFM operations. The first element, the internal control system, has been 
characterised as exhibiting a lack of more detailed and proper standards, procedures 
and guidelines for actions in order for PFM actors to carry out their duties in 
accordance with the stipulated requirements in the PFM rules and regulations. In 
regard to the second element, budget execution, it is clear that local governments 
have been struggling to improve their efficiency and effectiveness in revenue 
collection, disbursement processes, procurement practices, treasury systems and 
asset management. The third element, financial accounting and reporting, has been 
impacted by a lack of proper transactional records and inappropriate reporting 
iii 
 processes, which has affected the ability of local governments to prepare fair financial 
statements in accordance with the applicable accounting standards. 
This study has found variations in the PFM actors’ motives, within the workplace of a 
public bureaucracy’s organisational setting, that ranges from a simple financially-
related, self-interested motive to a more community service-oriented, public-
interested motive. Both types of motives have influenced the PFM actors to commit, 
or become involved in, acts of non-compliance that have resulted in the above-
mentioned systemic problems in PFM operations. Along with a lack of consistent and 
regular direct control over the behaviour of the PFM actors, the lack of a proper 
system of incentives has also facilitated those PFM actors who are driven by self-
interest motives to commit non-compliant acts. PFM actors who possess public-
interested motives, on the other hand, break the rules and become involved in non-
compliance because they have the perception that rules do not support the provision 
of more effective, efficient and timely public services.  
This study also identified influences of dysfunctional bureaucratic structures upon 
non-compliance among the PFM actors. Rules that govern PFM operational practices 
have been identified as being ineffective and are characterised by contradictions, 
misinterpretations and defectiveness, causing confusion among the PFM actors about 
how they are to be implemented. The hierarchy tends to shift the PFM actors’ loyalties 
to their superiors, enabling them to neglect their obligations to comply with the rules 
and regulations in order to attain organisational goals. The division of labour has 
fragmented the mindset of the PFM actors, causing the problem of a silo mentality 
that allows the PFM actors to focus only on the responsibilities of their own units, 
instigating non-compliance problems at the organisational level. An improper 
arrangement in the division of labour has also resulted in imbalanced workloads 
among the PFM actors, causing those who have a greater workload to be more prone 
to making errors. Dysfunctional bureaucratic structures were also displayed by the 
failure to establish expertise among the PFM actors, due to inappropriate human 
resources management policies. That failure has prevented the development of skills, 
capabilities and knowledge among the PFM actors that would have enabled them to 
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 Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Assessment on public financial management (PFM) in Indonesia, especially after the 
major PFM reform in 2004, have shown the PFM legal framework in Indonesia to be 
of robust and adequately designed (World Bank 2007; 2012). Nevertheless, a number 
of problems that hinder the achievement of PFM objectives have also been 
highlighted in many studies (see for example: Achmad 2012; Kristiansen et al. 2009; 
Siallagan 2012; Harun et al. 2012; Blondal et al. 2009). This creates a concern 
regarding the actual PFM practices in Indonesia and curiosity about how those 
practices support or retard the effectiveness of PFM. 
The author for this thesis, who works at BPK1, is also aware of the increasing number 
of audit findings reported by BPK in its audit reports. As a result of the PFM reform, 
BPK has an important role as the independent and external institution that has a 
mandate to assess and audit the financial management of Indonesia’s public 
institutions. It does the assessment and audit by collecting evidence regarding a set 
of criteria, usually derived from the requirements stipulated in legal documents, and 
then reports findings where the criteria have not been met. Usually, such reported 
findings are material in nature – either quantitatively ot qualitatively. The increasing 
number of BPK’s audit findings contribute to more doubt about the effectiveness of 
the PFM practices after the reform. Without undermining the achievement of the PFM 
reform so far, a more thorough study of the actual practices of specific aspects of PFM 
after the reform is now overdue. This thesis focuses on the practices of PFM 
operations at the local government2 level in Indonesia following the PFM reform of 
2004. 
In this introductory chapter, several aspects of the research which provide direction 
to the presentation of this thesis are outlined commencing with a section that 
describes the background, context and scope of the study. It is then followed by the 
research objectives and questions section before a brief summary of the research 
methodology and techniques that were developed and implemented in this research. 
1  BPK, or Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, is the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia. 
2  The term ‘local government’ in this study refers to the subnational level of government, which includes 
provinces (provinsi), cities (kota), and districts (kabupaten). 
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 The last section of this chapter describes the structure of the thesis to guide its overall 
presentation. 
1.1. Background and Context 
Following the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, Indonesia has been continuing to 
place considerable effort into the democratisation of its political, legal, social, and 
economic systems to safeguard the establishment of a welfare state, as mandated by 
the Constitution. In the democratisation process, the development and 
implementation of a strong and effective governance framework are critical. McLeod 
and MacIntyre (2007) suggest that an effective governance framework can sustain 
the elements necessary to, and favourable for, maintaining strong economic growth. 
In the long run, it is expected that an effective governance framework will sustain 
strong economic development in Indonesia and will contribute to Indonesia’s model 
of democracy. 
The World Bank (2006) has further explained that the elements of a governance 
framework include: (1) voice and accountability, (2) political stability and absence of 
violence, (3) government effectiveness, (4) regulatory quality, (5) rule of law and (6) 
control of corruption. Without undermining the other elements, government 
effectiveness which covers the quality, credibility and commitment to public service 
necessary to run the government’s operations effectively, is one of the major elements 
that shapes the accountability of government to its legislature and citizenry. Thus, 
efforts to establish a strong governance framework during the democratisation 
process must also cover the area of public sector management. 
Public sector management reform is one of the processes being pursued to 
strengthen governance frameworks in Indonesia after the resignation of President 
Suharto. According to Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004), public sector management reform 
usually comprises of four different components: (1) financial, (2) personnel, (3) 
organisation, and (4) performance measurement systems. Among those components, 
efficient financial management is considered to be the essential component that can 
influence the achievement of the whole set of public management objectives (Lane 
2004; Ingraham and Kneedler 2000). Thus, it is important to conduct a study on 
certain aspects of PFM reform in Indonesia in order to examine the extent to which 
reform has been able to achieve its intended objectives.  
The major PFM reform in Indonesia was started in 2003 through the enactment of 
Law 17/2003 regarding State Finance. This law was then followed by two further laws 
enacted in 2004, which were Law No. 1/2004 regarding State Treasury and Law No. 
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 15/2004 regarding State Audit, to complete the trilogy of financial laws. Those laws 
established a new regulatory framework for PFM practices in Indonesia replacing the 
system that had remained unchanged since Indonesia became independent in 1945. 
The introduction of the new PFM legal framework was a priority selected by the 
Indonesian government to develop adequate controls, as well as to overcome the 
operational, structural and systemic problems and weaknesses that were present in 
the old PFM arrangements and practices in Indonesia (Achmad 2012). It also 
described the effort to promote good governance by curtailing opportunities and 
incentives for corruption and other rent-seeking practices (Siallagan 2012). The new 
PFM regulatory framework, as stipulated in Law No. 17/2003, incorporates the 
principles of transparency, results-oriented accountability, professionalism and 
independent external auditing mechanisms to establish good governance in the 
management of public resources which aligns with the principles of democracy. 
Further, Siallagan (2012) also notes that the new framework reflects efforts to instil 
modern practices of financial management and to replace the traditional public 
financial administration model. Those efforts include, among other things, the 
integration of a dual-budgeting system (e.g. routine and development budgets) into a 
single unified budget, the application of a lengthier budgeting perspective through the 
introduction of a medium-term expenditure framework, the endowment of more 
flexibility for public managers by shifting from input-oriented budgeting to a more 
output- and outcomes-focused budgeting system, and the adoption of an accrual 
accounting system in the preparation of governments’ financial reports, with the 
objectives of enhancing the effectiveness, efficiency, transparency and accountability 
of the governments’ financial management and operations (GoI 2003). 
A number of studies have been conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of some 
aspects of PFM in Indonesia after the reform. The World Bank (2007) concluded that, 
at a national level, an adequate regulatory PFM framework had been established, 
even though some challenges affecting the consistency of its implementation were 
also identified. By 2012, in almost all areas of PFM, including at the local government 
level, Indonesia had completed the establishment of its legal and regulatory 
architecture and had shifted its focus toward the effective implementation of its new 
PFM practices (World Bank 2012). 
Despite its sound and robust design, a number of issues with regard to the 
implementation of the new PFM regulatory framework have also been reported. In 
terms of the budgeting process, the enduring emphasis on detailed input bases within 
official budget documentation and the concentration of budget spending, especially 
3 
 for capital expenditures, within the last months of the fiscal year impede the 
implementation of a modern legal budgeting framework (Blondal et al. 2009; World 
Bank 2012). In the public accounting arena, Harun et al. (2012) depict the struggle to 
institutionalise accrual accounting within public institutions, specifically at the 
municipality level, due to the intricacies of political and economic forces, the limitations 
of technical capacity, the reluctance to abandon old practices, and the lack of 
enthusiasm to utilise accounting financial reports that have been prepared according 
to accrual accounting principles. Performance measurement systems, which have 
been designed as one core element of public accountability mechanisms under the 
new PFM framework, have not been able to improve the effectiveness and efficiency 
of public institutions because the development of performance indicators is being 
undertaken solely to meet regulatory requirements (Akbar et al. 2012). Based on 
fieldwork interviews in 2006 to 2007, Kristiansen et al. (2009) have highlighted the 
failure to enhance public financial transparency and accountability at district and 
municipality levels in Indonesia after the implementation of its decentralisation policy. 
While the implementation of the new PFM laws in 2003 to 2004 aimed to establish 
stronger regulations for improving the transparency and accountability of local 
government, findings from the above-mentioned studies identified the existence of 
problems that contribute to the lack of transparency and accountability, potentially 
hampering the achievement of the overall objective of the PFM reform in local 
government. Further, the studies mentioned above clearly show the difficulties that 
arise when directing the performance of public institutions to comply adequately with 
the PFM regulatory framework that has been established. Proposed 
recommendations from those studies, however, do not focus on minimising these 
compliance gaps3 in the performance of public institutions. They seem to focus on the 
technical aspects of the PFM system and fail to recognise the endogenous 
characteristics of individual public employees and officials as well as the specific 
bureaucratic tradition in Indonesia’s public institutions. 
Bresser-Pereira (2004) suggests that the extent to which any public sector reform 
program is successful relies on the government’s ability to direct and control 
bureaucrats to adapt their behaviours according to the reform objectives. Public 
employees and officials are the driving force for improving accountability, 
transparency, efficiency and effectiveness of the new PFM framework in Indonesia. 
The absence of an examination of the non-compliance of public employees and 
3  The term ‘compliance gap’ is used in this thesis to refer to the deviation of the actual PFM practices 
from the expected practices stipulated in the relevant PFM rules and regulations.  
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 officials in the previous studies has resulted in partial assessment of the 
implementation of the new PFM framework in Indonesia. This study aims to fill this 
gap by examining problems of non-compliance identified in relation to the 
implementation of the new PFM framework from the perspective of public employees, 
the main actors who carry out the reform tasks. 
1.2. Scope of Study 
Apart from the PFM reform, efforts to democratise Indonesia’s governmental system 
also include the devolution of the central government’s authorities, including the 
authorities regarding financial management, to local governments, through the 
adoption of a regional autonomy policy. The policy was established through the 
enactment of Law 22/1999 regarding Local Government and Law 25/1999 regarding 
Fiscal Balance. These regulations were then updated, in 2004, through the enactment 
of Law 32/2004 and Law 33/2004, respectively4. The new PFM regulatory framework, 
as stipulated in Law 17/2003, explicitly states that it not only provides a reference for 
the PFM reform but also intends to strengthen the foundation for implementing 
decentralisation policy in Indonesia. These twofold objectives of the PFM reform at 
the local government level add to the complexity of its actual practices, which leads 
to the importance of this current study to focus on the implementation of the new PFM 
regulatory framework at the level of local government in Indonesia. 
Despite the transformation of the definition of PFM and the expansion of its coverage, 
in this study, PFM is simply defined as the management of the government budget. 
The design of the new PFM framework covered in the trilogy of financial laws, which 
is applied to all levels of government within Indonesia, encompasses the overall 
government budgeting processes that begin with policy design to develop the 
government’s programs and activities and end with external audit and evaluation. 
Given the broader coverage of the government budgeting processes, the scope of 
this study only covers the implementation stage of the annual budget, which covers 
budget execution and accounting and reporting phases, starting from the preparation 
of a budget execution document and concluding with the preparation and finalisation 
of the government’s financial reports. The term ‘PFM operations’, as introduced by 
4  In 2014, a new local government law, Law 23/2014, was enacted to replace Law 32/2004. However, 
no major changes in the financial management of local governments resulted from the stipulations of 
the new law. The previously derived PFM regulations for local governments are still being enforced 
after the enactment of the new law. Most of the sections regarding local government financial 
management in the new law incorporate the arrangements that were established within the Trilogy of 
PFM Laws. 
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 CIPFA (2010), is used throughout this thesis to refer to the above-mentioned scope 
of the study. 
1.3. Objectives and Questions 
The existence of compliance gaps in the implementation of the new PFM regulations 
after the reform in 2004 is of a great interest to the researcher. This study further 
examines those gaps from the perspective of public employees who are involved in 
the PFM operational processes on a daily basis. The gap refers to the non-compliance 
of public employees, which potentially leads to a number of systemic problems in PFM 
operational practices. Such problems may not only impede the efficiency and 
effectiveness of government operations but may also contribute to a lack of financial 
transparency and accountability within Indonesian public institutions. 
The objective of this study is to examine the non-compliant behaviour of public 
employees who are involved in PFM operational processes in local governments in 
Indonesia. It encompasses the extent to which the non-compliance of the PFM actors5 
has led to a number of systemic problems in PFM operations, the motives of PFM 
actors to become involved in non-compliant behaviour, and the influence of 
bureaucratic traditions in PFM operations upon non-compliance. This objective will 
assist current efforts to gain a more profound understanding of the nature of non-
compliant behaviour of public employees involved in PFM operations, within the 
context of Indonesian local governments. This deeper understanding is essential to 
gain more insights for formulating better recommendations on how to confidently and 
steadily move the PFM reform agenda forward and to attain the objectives of the PFM 
reform. 
To accommodate the above-mentioned objective, this study proposes the following 
research questions: 
1. What are the systemic problems resulting from non-compliance that hinder the 
effective implementation of the new PFM operational framework in Indonesia’s 
local government? 
2. What are the motives behind the behaviours of the PFM actors and how do those 
motives influence PFM actors to be involved in non-compliance? 
5  The term ‘PFM actors’ is used throughout this thesis to refer to public employees who are involved 
in various stages and components of the PFM operations. 
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 3. How do bureaucratic traditions in PFM operations influence the PFM actors to be 
involved in non-compliance? 
1.4. Methodology 
This study follows interpretive research philosophy because the PFM practices 
undertaken by public employees display social constructs based on their personal 
interpretations and understanding of the new PFM regulatory framework. These 
characteristics lead to the application of a qualitative research methodology. The 
nature of the research questions in this study requires a two-stage research process 
through the adoption of content analysis and a case study method that uses a mix of 
documentation, focus group discussion and semi-structured interviews as the data 
gathering techniques. 
The first stage addresses the first research question to identify the systemic problems 
in Indonesia’s PFM operational practices after the reform as a consequence of non-
compliant behaviour of the PFM actors. It adopts the content analysis method and 
applies it to BPK’s Audit Reports Summary that sums up BPK’s audit findings 
disclosed in all audit reports published during a certain semester6. The description of 
the audit findings reported in the audit reports reveals the nature of PFM actors’ non-
compliance, including the relevant rules and regulations that have been violated and 
the causes and impacts of those non-compliant behaviours. Comments from the 
relevant officials on the audit findings and the proposed recommendations from BPK 
to overcome the problems also are included in the audit reports. Since the coverage 
of the Audit Reports Summary includes audit findings for all local governments in 
Indonesia, that is also the scope of the analysis for the first stage of this research. 
The second and third research questions are addressed in the second stage of the 
research design. Given some resource constraints, the second stage adopts a single 
case study method. West Lombok District has been selected as the subject of the 
study. Content analysis of the audit reports was repeated in the second stage but was 
limited to the audit reports of West Lombok District. This reiteration was important to 
provide the context for this particular case because not all systemic problems 
identified in the first stage occurred in West Lombok District. Similarly, not all problems 
found in West Lombok District were identified, or significant, at all local government 
level. A focus group discussion (FGD) with BPK’s auditors who audited West Lombok 
6  Financial year in Indonesia starts from 1 January to 31 December. A Summary of Semesterly Audit 
Reports for the first semester sums up all BPK’s audit reports published between 1 January and 30 
June, while the summary for the second semester encapsulates the audit reports published between 
1 July and 31 December. 
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 District was also conducted to supplement and expand upon the results of the content 
analysis. The understanding of the context of the case that was gained from content 
analysis of audit reports and the FGD with the auditors was then utilised to develop 
in-depth semi-structured interview questions. The respondents of the interviews were 
public service employees who worked in various positions within agencies and offices 
in West Lombok District. Thematic analysis of the interview transcripts, using the 
template analysis method, was conducted to identify and examine the motives of the 
PFM actors and the influence of bureaucratic traditions upon the occurrence of non-
compliance in PFM operations. 
1.5. Thesis Structure 
To provide guidance on the overall presentation of this thesis, Figure 1-1 depicts its 
general structure. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 reviews the literature 
relevant to this present study, focusing on the two main aspects: (1) PFM and its 
operational components, and (2) bureaucracy, the dominant organisational model in 
public sector institutions. Chapter 2 provides a point of reference for the researcher 
to examine the perspectives of public employees to problems of non-compliance in 
PFM operations, through the lens of public bureaucracy theory. 
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 Figure 1-1 
Structure of the Thesis 
 
Chapter 3 deals with the research methodology. It extends the discussion of research 
methodology in this introductory chapter by providing further details on the research 
approach and methods, as well as data gathering techniques and analysis, including 
other essential elements such as research ethics and confidentiality of research data. 
Chapter 4 describes the legal framework that is applied to PFM operations within all 
local governments throughout Indonesia. It provides a reference for the expected 
practices and behaviours of local government employees undertaking all processes 
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 Chapter 5 discusses the content analysis results of BPK’s audit reports. It specifically 
addresses the first research question and examines non-compliant behaviour, 
exemplified by the actual local governments’ PFM operational practices. It also 
elaborates upon the impacts of those non-compliant behaviours to the emergence of 
systemic problems in the PFM operations of local governments in Indonesia. 
Chapter 6 commences the case study report. It aims to provide contextual information 
regarding PFM operational practices in West Lombok District. It describes the profile 
of West Lombok District, the single local government case selected for this study, 
which is then followed by discussion regarding its specific PFM operational 
arrangements and the identified systemic problems, as disclosed in BPK’s audit 
reports. The discussion in Chapter 6 provides contextual information and a reference 
for the actual PFM operational practices and non-compliance of PFM actors in West 
Lombok District, which is essential for comprehending subsequent chapters that 
discuss the influences of PFM actors’ motives (Chapter 7) and the bureaucratic 
traditions in local government PFM operations (Chapter 8) upon non-compliant 
behaviour. 
The overall conclusion of the research and the implications of the study are presented 
in Chapter 9, which also provides suggestions for the future direction of research into 
PFM in the Indonesian context, in particular, and in the context of developing countries 
in general.
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 Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
This chapter considers the literature pertinent to the topic and scope of this study. It 
is separated into two major sections. The first section reviews the literature regarding 
public financial management (PFM). General aspects, such as its definition, 
coverage, key objectives and the PFM reform processes, are described, followed by 
a discussion of its cycle within the phases of overall government budgeting. A more 
detailed review relevant to the operational aspects of PFM, including its components, 
practices, key actors and common problems of non-compliance, is then extensively 
discussed. The first section provides a reference for addressing the first research 
question of this present study. The second section focuses on public bureaucracy, 
which is the broader organisational context within which PFM operates. It discusses 
two typical characteristics of public bureaucracy and the impacts of both 
characteristics in allowing the manifestation of non-compliance among public 
employees and officials. The first characteristic is the public employees’ motives in 
carrying out their roles and the second is the bureaucratic traditions in public 
institutions, which refer to the structural features of public bureaucracy. The second 
section aims to provide relevant references for addressing the second and third 
research questions of this study. 
2.1. Public Financial Management (PFM) 
The literature that discusses PFM is substantial, ranging from theoretical academic 
textbooks and articles by scholars in political science and public administration to 
weighty handbooks on PFM reform prepared by a number of international 
organisations. A large number of evaluation reports and case studies at a country-
specific level further expand the world of PFM literature. Fedelino and Smoke (2013) 
argue that the key elements of PFM and the budgeting process are similar for all 
levels of government; thus, while the discussion of PFM literature in this section 
mostly refers to the central government level, it is also applicable to local 
governments. Additional explanation is provided, as required, where there are 
differences between the central and local government levels. It is also important to 
note that different legal and institutional contexts among countries have often caused 
PFM to be seen as a domestic issue, with only a rare general international view of 
PFM being found in the literature (Steccolini 2010). A more thorough and contextual 
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 review of PFM in Indonesia’s local governments, specifically in relation to its 
operational components, is presented and discussed in Chapter 4. 
2.1.1. Definition and Coverage 
Initially, PFM belongs within the domain of public finance, which is basically about the 
taxing and spending activities of a government (Rosen 1999). According to Miller 
(1994), PFM can be viewed using three different frameworks: economics, accounting 
and budget execution. All of those frameworks define PFM in relation to the 
management of government budgets, as it is also defined by Hughes (2003). 
Recent developments in the field of PFM have demonstrated a broader and more 
complex PFM structure (Pretorius and Pretorius 2009; Cangiano et al. 2013). It is not 
merely related to technical issues, such as the accounting and reporting mechanisms 
of government budgets (Lawson 2015), but covers the holistic revenue and 
expenditure management of government and how that impacts the overall allocation 
of public resources. The broader coverage of PFM has led to the development of a 
holistic and more objective-focused definition of PFM. The Chartered Institute of 
Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) has initiated the development of a universal 
definition of PFM by identifying the effectiveness of PFM in achieving its goals and 
delivering the best goods and services to the citizens as the core of PFM (CIPFA 
2010). CIPFA (2010, 5) further defines PFM as “the system by which financial 
resources are planned, directed and controlled to enable and influence the efficient 
and effective delivery of public service goals”.  
This recent development shows that PFM goes beyond the narrow government 
budget definition. Cangiano et al. (2013, 2) posit PFM “as an umbrella definition, 
covering a set of systems aimed at producing information, processes, and rules that 
can help support fiscal policymaking as well as provide instruments for its 
implementation”. It covers all aspects of managing public resources including 
progressive expansion into fiscal policymaking. It supports the development of 
sustainable fiscal policies from the perspectives of both the medium- and long-term. 
It forecasts the potential impacts and risks of today’s policy decisions in regard to 
public resources. Those characteristics of PFM provide support to the formulation of 
a sustainable fiscal policy for any country. 
Such expansion displays a broader public sector context in which PFM operates, 
beyond the central government level. For example, most local governments still rely 
on grants from their central government to finance their activities because they may 
have limited authority to collect taxes on the economic activities taking place or from 
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 the institutions residing within their borders. In addition, public corporations may 
engage in specific transactions to carry out government functions or operations. Thus, 
their activities may have impacts upon a country’s fiscal sustainability. To 
accommodate this, Cangiano et al. (2013) have included broader public sector 
institutions in the scope of PFM, which involves all levels of government that includes 
central, state/provincial, and local governments, as well as public corporations, such 
as state-owned enterprises, public-private partnerships, and the central bank. 
The term ‘PFM’ is occasionally used interchangeably with the term ‘public expenditure 
management’, which is defined by Allen et al. (2004, 2) as: 
“… all of the components of a country’s budget process – both upstream 
(preparation and programming) and downstream (execution, accounting, 
control, reporting, monitoring, and evaluation) – including legal and 
organisational framework arrangements”.  
It includes the formulation of potential revenues and expenditures, the development 
of medium-term expenditure frameworks, the efforts to link budget with policymaking, 
the preparation of budget, the management of cash and expenditure, the procurement 
of public goods and services, the management of assets, the implementation of an 
internal control and monitoring system, the implementation of a financial accounting 
and reporting system, the establishment of government performance management 
frameworks, and the establishment of an effective external audit function including 
the proper oversight roles of the legislature and other bodies (Allen et al. 2004). While 
the term ‘public expenditure management’ seems to focus on the expenditure side of 
the budget (Potter and Diamond 1999), it does include the formulation process of 
potential revenues, such as from taxation and revenue-sharing in the case of local 
government, to assist the formulation of expenditures budgets, especially in terms of 
prioritisation of the proposed activity to be included in the budget and identification of 
other revenue sources. In terms of PFM’s definition, despite the debate about the 
inclusion of revenue mobilisation in the definition of PFM (Simson et al. 2011), most 
scholars agree that PFM encompasses the mobilisation of public revenue, allocation 
of public funds, undertaking of public spending, procurement of public goods and 
services, management of public assets, treasury management, and government 
accounting and auditing (Premchand 1999; Kioko et al. 2011; Lawson 2015; Simson 
et al. 2011). 
2.1.2. Key Objectives and the PFM Reform 
The transformation of the definition of PFM and its coverage has made it possible for 
PFM to actively contribute to the achievement of its widely accepted key objectives 
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 of: (1) maintaining a sustainable fiscal position, (2) effective allocation of resources, 
and (3) efficient delivery of public goods and services (Schick 1999; Allen and 
Tommasi 2001; PEFA 2011). The first objective of maintaining aggregate fiscal 
discipline has a nation-wide perspective in providing the overall expenditure control 
of government spending, coordinated by the Ministry of Finance (Allen and Tommasi 
2001). At this level, budgeting is used to ensure the achievement of sustainable 
macroeconomic indicators, such as the level of fiscal deficit and public debt ratio in 
the long run. Those indicators are included in a medium-term macroeconomic 
framework, which is commonly prepared in many developed countries to guide the 
development of their annual budgets. 
The second objective of allocative efficiency focuses on the establishment of priorities 
within the budget to strategically allocate the scarce public resources to chosen 
development sectors, on the basis of both the government’s priorities and the demand 
of the public in general. It refers to resources allocation decisions and is mainly under 
the responsibility of line ministries, spending agencies and the inter-ministerial 
coordination mechanisms (Allen and Tommasi 2001). 
The third objective of operational efficiency deals with maximising value for money. It 
ensures the optimum combination of economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the 
provision of public goods and services by the government (Lawson 2015). This 
objective focuses on the lower-level government functions such as directorates, 
programs, or projects (Allen and Tommasi 2001). 
Lawson (2015) argues that the success of a PFM system depends on how its 
implementation can simultaneously achieve those objectives. However, the 
interdependence among those objectives creates a major issue for any government 
to concurrently achieve all of the objectives within an optimum balance (World Bank 
1998; Allen and Tommasi 2001). Efforts to focus on the achievement of a certain PFM 
objective may undermine the achievement of the other objectives. For example, lack 
of discipline in prioritising resources allocation among strategic programs, as required 
to achieve allocative efficiency, may cause a mismatch between policy objectives and 
resource allocation at the aggregate fiscal discipline level, hence resulting in 
inadequate funding of resources to achieve operational efficiency. 
In addition to those three key objectives, Parry (2010) and Lawson (2015) have 
highlighted the importance of enhancing transparency and ensuring accountability as 
another dimension of a sound PFM system. Transparency and accountability 
encompass a wider public sector domain and are important elements of a democratic 
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 society. They should exist in all government activities, including efforts to achieve the 
key objectives of a PFM system. In relation to PFM, transparency is achieved through 
open processes and freely available public financial information and reports; while 
accountability is achieved through adherence to legislation, regulations, rules and 
procedures, including an ethical code of conduct and the avoidance of corrupt 
practices. Information regarding the level of conformity of the PFM processes to the 
regulations should be made public to ensure accountability through the application of 
democratic checks and balances mechanism (Lawson 2015). 
PFM reform aims to ensure the establishment of those PFM key objectives. It involves 
adjustments in the financial management and administration processes through the 
identification and utilisation of new information and the establishment of constraints 
under which the individuals act and behave (Schick 2013). By the same token, Allen 
(2013) indicates that PFM reform refers to the effort to strengthen the enforcement of 
laws, procedures, and rules to effectively align the behaviour of public officials and 
organizations towards the attainment of the PFM key objectives. Numerical fiscal 
rules, for example, have been used in many countries as an instrument to shape and 
direct the behaviour of the PFM actors towards the establishment of medium and long 
term fiscal sustainability (Budina et al. 2013). Nevertheless, the reform process in 
developing countries, as suggested by Allen (2013), is ‘difficult and slow’. The typical 
approach of the PFM reform that predominantly focuses on the formal and technical 
characteristics of the PFM system has contributed to the slow progress of the reform. 
The approach has ignored the presence of informal rules and the lack of incentive 
structures in the organization that do not induce individuals to act and behave in 
accordance to the intended objectives of the reform. Further, Allen (2013) mentions 
that factors other than the technical ones have increased the complexity of the PFM 
reform. 
2.1.3. PFM Cycle and Budgeting Phases 
Despite the expansion of PFM’s definition and coverage, a government’s budget 
remains the vital instrument in a PFM system (CIPFA 2010) and it is used to ensure 
the achievement of the key PFM objectives (World Bank 1998; Allen and Tommasi 
2001; Lawson 2015). PFM encompasses a broader function than being merely a 
technical financial management process and it is generally considered to be a 
comprehensive budgeting cycle that has six phases (Lawson 2015) as depicted in 
Figure 2-1. The budgeting cycle commences with policy development where a 
number of stakeholders including the public, research bodies, political parties and the 
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 government’s executive are involved in providing advice, input and suggestion on 
what programs and activities should be prioritised to be carried out. In a decentralised 
government, local communities are also encouraged to participate in the policy 
development process to ensure the inclusion of local needs in the local government 
budget and to close the gap in the policy development. 
The second phase is budget formulation, where the policy priorities are linked to the 
next year’s available public financial resources (Simson et al. 2011), and it is 
presented in monetary terms. The Ministry of Finance usually prepares a Medium 
Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) where macroeconomic targets are set to guide 
the budget formulation process that is technically prepared by the spending agencies 
under the coordination of the Ministry of Finance. The MTEF generates a link to allow 
expenditures in the annual budget to be driven by policy priorities while still being able 
to accommodate the realities of limited resources (World Bank 1998). The application 
of an MTEF is widely accepted and serves as a central element of sound PFM in 
developing countries where, as Houerou and Taliercio (2002) argue, the 
disconnections among policy-making, planning and budgeting are still common. 
However, the impact of the MTEF on local government budgeting processes is rather 
problematic. An MTEF can be seen as a pressure from central government that 
potentially diminishes the role of local government in policy development (Holmes and 
Evans 2003). During the budget formulation process, oversight in the form of ongoing 


















 The third phase, budget approval, marks the end of the budget formulation phase. 
The budget is approved by the legislative body and is enacted in the form of budget 
law. Budget approval by a legislative body, which in a democratic country is a 
representative organ of its citizens, is a fundamental principle whereby the executive 
is given the authority to collect money from the public and to spend those monies in 
accordance with a set of appropriations that are stated within the budget (Schiavo-
Campo 2007a). 
These first three phases of the PFM cycle are considered to be the budget preparation 
stage and mainly address the PFM’s key objectives of maintaining a sustainable fiscal 
position and effective allocation of resources (Schiavo-Campo 2007b). A sound 
budgeting system must set clear sequences and timetables of budget preparation 
activities, in advance, to ensure that the budget is approved before the beginning of 
the new financial year (DFID 2001). The differences among systems of government 
and the roles of key actors in the budget preparation stage may alter the detailed 
practices and activities of the phase of policy development, budget formulation and 
budget approval within each country (Potter and Diamond 1999).  
Once the budget law has been enacted and the new fiscal year starts, spending 
agencies and the Ministry of Finance begin the fourth phase of the PFM cycle: the 
budget execution. Spending agencies have the authority to spend the money 
according to the appropriation stipulated in the budget. However, in some countries, 
the appropriated budget amounts still need to be converted into a more detailed 
budget document in the form of government decrees or regulations (Lienert and Jong 
2004). Budget execution involves not only the disbursement processes of the budget 
in the form of, for example, payment of salaries and wages, payment of operational 
costs of government offices and payment of procurement of goods and services to 
run the public service delivery functions of the government, but also the revenue 
collection processes and treasury management (i.e. cash, debt and investment). They 
are also essential factors in the budget execution phase because they may affect the 
availability of funding to make timely payments for running government programs. 
The fifth phase, accounting and reporting, occurs in parallel throughout the budget 
execution phase. Each spending agency is required to record its financial transactions 
according to certain accounting standards set by the government, with a consistent 
and comprehensive classification of accounts to facilitate the preparation of a financial 
statement that can be analysed and compared over a period of time (World Bank 
1998). Lienert and Jong (2004) consider the accounting and reporting phase to be 
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 part of the budget’s execution. A well-defined accounting system must exist to assist 
the preparation of periodic budget execution reports. These reports are not only 
essential for the government to internally monitor its budget execution but also for the 
legislative body to perform its function of controlling the implementation of the 
government’s budget. The content of the report may contain financial data, such as 
budget realisation figures for all accounts, as well as non-financial data, such as 
information in regards to the attainment of the performance targets. At the end of the 
fiscal year, the Ministry of Finance prepares a consolidated financial statement that 
demonstrates how the budget has been implemented. 
The last phase of external auditing involves external scrutiny by a Supreme Audit 
Institution (SAI)7, which is an independent government body, to ascertain the fairness 
of the government’s financial statement and to ensure that agencies have acted in 
accordance with laws and regulations. Recent developments in the field of external 
auditing have displayed a common trend among SAIs to also undertake a value-for- 
money audit that assesses the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of government 
agencies in achieving the stated goals and objectives. External auditing by an SAI is 
the main accountability mechanism for financial management in public institutions. 
The publication of its audit reports also heightens the transparency of the overall PFM 
system. 
2.1.4. PFM Operations 
The previous sections have discussed PFM from a holistic point of view. In this 
section, a further review relevant to the scope and focus of the study is presented. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, the scope of this research is the budget implementation 
stage, which covers both the budget execution and the accounting and reporting 
phases of the budgeting cycle. Some literature considers the accounting and reporting 
phase as part of the budget execution phase (see for example: Allen and Tommasi 
2001; Lienert and Jong 2004) and the terms ‘budget implementation’ and ‘budget 
execution’ are used interchangeably. This thesis uses the term ‘PFM operations’, as 
introduced by CIPFA (2010), to refer the above-mentioned scope of the study, starting 
from the preparation of the budget execution document until the preparation and 
finalisation of financial statements. The first part of this section discusses the main 
components of PFM operations, while the second part discusses problems of non-
compliance problems in PFM operations.  
7  BPK has a role as the SAI of the Republic of Indonesia. 
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 2.1.4.1. Components of PFM Operations 
According to CIPFA (2010), PFM operations are the principal financial management 
activities that are embodied in the overall PFM system to assist in the achievement of 
the PFM key objectives and they comprise eight main components, as follow: (1) 
budget execution, (2) procurement, (3) revenue collection, (4) treasury management, 
(5) financial transactions, (6) accounting, (7) financial management information 
systems, and (8) reporting. The following section discusses each component in more 
detail. 
2.1.4.1.1. Budget Execution / Disbursement 
CIPFA (2010) uses the term ‘budget execution’ to refer to the process of spending the 
financial resources already allocated in the budget to deliver the government’s 
programs and policies. Simson et al. (2011) simplify the process of budget spending 
into the four main steps of: (1) authorisation and allocation, (2) commitment to pay, 
(3) verification of deliveries, and (4) payment. The annual budget law gives formal 
authority for spending units to spend the allocated funds according to the program’s 
appropriation and budget classification. Nevertheless, in many countries, this still 
needs to be converted into a more detailed budget execution document. A budget 
execution document is prepared to give de facto authority to spending units to utilise 
resource allocation in the budget for the provision of goods and services in the current 
year (Allen and Tommasi 2001). A timely completion of the budget execution 
document (i.e. before the start of the fiscal year) is important to ensure the 
smoothness of a government’s operations at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
A spending unit, based on the budget execution document, can carry out contracts 
for the provision of goods and services that eventually generate commitments to pay 
for the government. A successful disbursement process relies on the ability of the 
agencies to record and monitor commitments that have been made (Allen and 
Tommasi 2001). This ability is important to enable the government to make accurate 
and timely payments, which ultimately builds trust in the government and provides 
appropriate assurances for other parties that provide goods and services to the 
government. 
A verification process is established before the payment to each outstanding 
commitment can be processed and executed. The spending unit carries out the 
verification process to check whether or not goods and services have been delivered 
and whether they conform to the provision specified in the agreements of the contract. 
For very technical items, such as road or building construction work, a specialised 
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 handover committee may be established to conduct the verification process. The 
general principle of segregation of duties separates the unit that receives and verifies 
the goods and services from the entity or officials that authorise the payment, even 
though they may be in the same agency (Allen and Tommasi 2001). 
After goods and services have been received and verified, payment orders are 
prepared by the spending units. The Ministry of Finance verifies the payment orders 
to ensure that the payment does not exceed the budget ceiling, that the classification 
of accounts is correct, that the authorised officials have signed the payment order 
properly, and that the supporting documents are attached (Hashim and Allan 2001; in 
Achmad 2012). Once the payment orders have been verified, payments can be 
processed by transferring money from the government’s bank accounts to the 
appropriate beneficiaries. Similar disbursement procedures of commitment, 
verification, issuance of payment orders and actual disbursement of fund are also 
applied when handling routine payments, such as for personnel expenses (i.e. 
salaries, pensions, entitlements, etc.). 
The interplay with other components of PFM operations, such as treasury 
management, is evident in the disbursement process. The verification process for 
payment orders is an attempt to match payment orders with the availability of funds 
before the payment is made, hence avoiding the risk of accumulation of payment 
arrears (Potter and Diamond 1999). As it also checks the conformity of the payment 
orders with the classification of accounts and budget items, the verification process 
can prevent the problems of potential overspending and misallocation of funds that 
can disrupt the activities of other agencies and the overall government’s programs 
(CIPFA 2010). It can also prohibit any payments to unauthorised recipients (Allen and 
Tommasi 2001). 
In addition, unexpected changes in the macroeconomic environment may occur at 
any time and should be accommodated properly to avoid any disruptions to the 
activities of the agencies (Simson et al. 2011). This leads to an important role of the 
Ministry of Finance in monitoring and managing those changes and proposing any 
necessary budget alterations. The complexity of the budget execution also increases 
because agencies must transmit the message incorporated in the budget into the 
actual delivery of government programs and activities while, at the same time, 
responding to the feedback received from the actual implementation of the budget in 
a timely manner and appropriate fashion. Any budget alterations require amendment 
of the annual budget and cannot be executed without approval from the legislative 
body. Supplemental budget requests can be considered to accommodate any 
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 substantial changes that need to be implemented immediately while the budget 
amendment is being prepared and submitted to the parliament for its approval 
(Simson et al. 2011). The capacity of agencies to manage that complexity in an 
effective way is essential to ensure budget execution can actively support the 
achievement of the three key objectives of PFM: fiscal stability, effective utilization of 
resources, and value for money in the delivery of public services. 
2.1.4.1.2. Procurement 
Procurement is the process of acquiring goods and services, including construction 
works, which are then utilised to deliver the governments’ programs as stipulated in 
the budget. Obviously, it comes before the disbursement process, however, agencies 
cannot initiate procurement without the initial inclusion within the budget document of 
the programs that are going to utilise the procured goods and services. The 
procurement of low-cost goods can be conducted according to a simple procedure; 
however, the procurement of more expensive goods and services requires a complex 
competitive bidding process (Simson et al. 2011). Procurement involves the process 
of identification of needs, determination of procurement procedure and a tendering 
process (Allen and Tommasi 2001). CIPFA (2010) also considers the procurement 
cycle to include the process of managing and monitoring the progress and delivery of 
the contract, the management of the procured assets throughout their useful lifetimes 
and the eventual disposal of the assets.  
Allen and Tommasi (2001) argue that procurement is one common source of 
corruption. They contend that sound procurement policies and practices that adopt 
open competition, transparent procedures and principles of fairness are required to 
minimise the risk of corruption, while also providing equal opportunity to all bidders 
and ensuring the acquisition of goods and services at a competitive price without 
undermining the quality of the procured items. The PFM legal framework of a country 
should include a procurement standard that can minimise any conflicts of interest of 
the public officials who are involved in the procurement process by having adequate 
segregation of duties, proper delegation of financial authority and clear assignment of 
responsibilities. In addition, a periodic rotation of officials is also essential to mitigate 
the risk of corruption as a result of potential collusion practices between the buyer (i.e. 
the government’s officials) and the supplier. Hence, while procurement can be viewed 
as an independent topic on its own, it is also an integral and essential part of PFM 
operations (CIPFA 2010) and has a significant impact on the operational efficiency of 
the whole PFM system. 
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 Simson et al. (2011) highlight the trend toward the adoption of a more decentralised 
procurement system by most countries, whereby each spending agency maintains its 
own procurement process. In such a system, however, a central public procurement 
board exists to supervise and oversee the overall procurement system. The board 
establishes procurement policies, coordinates strategic purchasing decisions across 
the spending units and both informs and publishes procurement guidelines to all 
stakeholders (i.e. potential bidders, suppliers, and internal government units as 
buyers). The board can also promote competencies, introduce good practices and 
initiate improvement plans that are required to empower spending units in a 
decentralised procurement process. CIPFA (2010) views a central procurement board 
as a good governance arrangement within a public procurement system.  
2.1.4.1.3. Revenue Collection 
This component refers to a government’s activity in collecting revenues from taxes 
and other non-tax sources. In general, the provisions regarding taxation and other 
types of revenue should be based on a clear and legitimate regulatory framework 
(CIPFA 2010). The framework should lay out clear rules and regulations regarding 
the assessment basis for calculating the amount of tax payable, the due date of 
payments and the procedure for making payments. Strict application of the rules 
should be enforced to ensure certainty in the amounts of revenues to be collected and 
the times they are going to be received. 
The entire revenue collection process, from registration and assessment to payment, 
should be efficient so that high collection rates can be attained and the cost of 
collection is minimised. In addition, prompt and timely collection of valid revenues is 
important to ensure the availability of cash for paying off any commitments that 
emerge from carrying out government programs (Tommasi 2007). Advancement in 
the banking sector’s network and infrastructure has enabled commercial banks to 
provide a more efficient revenue collection process than the conventional way of 
collecting revenue through the government’s tax office. On the one hand, payment 
through banks provides convenience to taxpayers to fulfil their taxation liabilities; 
while, on the other hand, it allows the government to focus its efforts on ensuring the 
compliance aspects of the revenue collection process. Those compliance activities 
may include identifying and tracking taxpayers, issuing accurate and timely tax 
assessments, and monitoring timely payments (Tommasi 2007). To effectively 
improve the level of tax compliance, governments should also consider instigating tax 
education and public awareness programs, extensive efforts to collect tax arrears, 
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 examination of tax payment obligations, and the imposition of sanctions and penalties 
for any violations of tax obligations (CIPFA 2010). 
2.1.4.1.4. Treasury Management 
Treasury management plays a central role in ensuring timely availability of funds to 
meet payment commitments and to prevent accumulation of arrears, while also 
minimising the necessity for borrowing and optimising the returns on idle cash 
(Simson et al. 2011). Tommasi (2007) highlights the coverage of treasury 
management to include cash management, management of government’s bank 
accounts, accounting and reporting, cash flow forecasting, management of 
government debt and management of financial assets. In developing countries, it 
should also include the administration of foreign grants and other international aid.  
Sound cash management requires good periodic cash planning and adequate control 
over cash transactions. Based on its annual budget appropriation for each activity, a 
spending agency prepares a cash plan by forecasting its monthly revenue and 
expenditure flows, and reporting the forecast to the treasury office. Some developed 
countries can prepare a more detailed daily or weekly cash plan. Even so, constant 
revision of the forecast is required to ensure up-to-date cash planning (Hashim and 
Allan 2001). Cash management is the heart of a public treasury system. It makes 
significant contributions to the support of fiscal discipline and the maintenance of 
adequate cash balances while also providing expeditious support for spending units 
in the disbursement process. Unfortunately, many developing countries still struggle 
to maintain a sound cash management system and often confuse the term ‘cash 
management’ with ‘cash rationing’, which usually leads to undesired budget cuts 
(Lienert 2009). 
Central control over cash can be achieved through the adoption of the Treasury Single 
Account (TSA) method. TSA is defined as “a unified structure of government bank 
account enabling consolidation and optimum utilization of government cash 
resources” (Pattanayak and Fainboim 2011, 2). The application of TSA requires the 
provisions of all government receipts and payments to be transacted through a single 
bank account or a set of linked bank accounts so that a consolidated view of the cash 
position can be recognised at the end of each day. In the TSA model, even though 
cash balances must be centralised, all payment funds can be allocated to the 
spending agencies’ bank accounts for payment processes adopting the imprest 
system, by which spending agencies are given the funds, in advance, to be cleared 
on a periodical basis (Simson et al. 2011). In countries that have a well-developed 
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 commercial banking system, spending agencies can maintain bank accounts for their 
receipts and payments at commercial banks (Pattanayak and Fainboim 2011). 
However, the main TSA account should be held at the central bank because it is the 
fiscal agent of the government. 
The adoption of TSA can assist government in making a strategic decision in regards 
to not only its cash management but also its debt and investment management 
(Lienert 2009). TSA enhances the ability of government to comprehensively monitor 
the consolidated cash resources, preventing them from borrowing money and paying 
costly interest charges to fund the expenditures of some agencies while other 
agencies have idle cash in their bank accounts. On the other hand, when a cash 
surplus is identified, the excess can be invested into profitable financial instruments.  
2.1.4.1.5. Financial Transactions 
Financial transactions are embeded in all activities of governments. CIPFA (2010) 
highlights that typical financial transactions of government, such as revenue, 
payments, payroll and pension administration, require adequate performance 
indicators to measure unit costs, trends, accuracy and timeliness. In addition, strict 
internal control procedures should be applied due to the complexity and the immense 
volume of the government’s financial transactions (CIPFA 2010). 
Financial transactions do not stand in isolation. They require proper recording 
procedures to be implanted within the accounting system and the inclusion of the 
financial transactions data in the government’s financial management information 
system (FMIS) database. The interconnection of financial transactions with an 
accounting system and FMIS is essential to ensure a reliable financial reporting 
process for the government. 
2.1.4.1.6. Accounting 
Accounting is a central element of PFM for ensuring the accountability of the 
government in the management of public finances. An accounting system enables 
government to record, classify and summarise its financial transactions as well as 
report on financial outcomes. An appropriate accounting system assists government 
to ensure that its financial activities comply with financial management rules and that 
public funds are being used in accordance with the intended purposes stipulated in 
the budget (Simson et al. 2011). Allen and Tommasi (2001) consider the core 
components in a government’s accounting system to be the maintenance of spending 
authorisation records on budget execution, the recording of all financial transactions, 
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 the maintenance of general ledger accounts and the presentation of the financial 
reports. 
Most developing countries are still using a cash-based accounting system (Simson et 
al. 2011; USAID 2008), which recognises financial transactions based on the timing 
as to when cash is received or disbursed. However, recent global trends have shown 
a preference toward an accrual-based accounting system, which records the 
transactions when an obligation or a right is established. Accrual accounting enables 
government to record its payables, receivables, assets and liabilities. It provides more 
accurate information regarding the government’s financial position and performance, 
allowing a better assessment of its financial outcomes against the budget. Despite its 
advantages, the adoption of accrual accounting by developing countries that do not 
have adequate financial management infrastructure and capacity has to be 
considered carefully (Simson et al. 2011). In practice, a variety of modifications from 
cash-based to accrual-based accounting have been developed to provide options for 
the gradual adoption of accrual-based accounting by developing countries. 
2.1.4.1.7. Financial Management Information System (FMIS) 
The availability of reliable and timely government financial data and information is one 
critical factor that can impact the effectiveness of budget management of a country. 
In some developing countries, budget execution and accounting processes are still 
characterised by manual processing and inadequate computerised infrastructure, 
causing a lack of reliable and timely government financial data and information 
(Diamond and Khemani 2005). This situation restricts the ability of the government to 
properly plan, implement, monitor and report its budget. It also hampers the 
transparency and accountability of the government, and undermines the governance 
arrangements of most developing countries. 
An FMIS is considered as a set of tools that link and integrate planning, budget 
preparation, budget implementation and the accounting and reporting phase of 
budgeting cycle (DFID 2001). It enables the integration of financial information into all 
PFM operational components via the utilisation of IT resources throughout the 
government’s line ministries and spending agencies (Diamond and Khemani 2005). 
The implementation of an FMIS requires at least a well-established accounting 
system, as it is the core element that can generate accurate and complete general 
ledger where all inflows and outflows of government funds are recorded (Allen and 
Tommasi 2001). Other information systems, such as payroll, budget development, 
procurement, assets and individual project ledger, do not necessarily have to be 
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 included in the FMIS (Diamond and Khemani 2005; Allen and Tommasi 2001). 
Interfaces can be developed and established to link the core accounting and reporting 
systems to other information systems in order to create a fully integrated FMIS. 
Despite the significant advantages of implementing an FMIS, Diamond and Khemani 
(2005) found that the development and adoption of an FMIS in developing countries 
is very expensive and vulnerable to failure. Most developing countries do not have 
strong political commitment, sufficient human and financial resources, widespread 
internal governmental support or an effective change management agenda to support 
the adoption of an integrated FMIS (Diamond and Khemani 2005). A gradual and 
phased approach to the implementation of an FMIS in developing countries has been 
suggested by some PFM scholars (Simson et al. 2011). 
2.1.4.1.8. Reporting 
The publication of a government’s budget and accounts is the primary instrument for 
public accountability. The PFM framework of a country should be able to provide clear 
and objective information regarding its government’s budget and accounts. In regards 
to financial reporting, this involves the extraction of data from the government’s 
accounting system and the presentation of the data in a way that can facilitate both 
internal analysis and external public scrutiny (Simson et al. 2011). The government’s 
reports should include not only financial information regarding the budget and its 
execution but also information beyond the government’s financial accounts: for 
example, assessment reports on the outcomes of budgetary policies. In most 
developing countries, the adoption of performance-based budgeting creates 
difficulties because it asks for the presentation of non-financial information that can 
link financial information to progress in the achievement of outputs and outcomes 
stipulated in the budget. 
In general, the following reports are typically required as part of sound PFM 
operational practices: daily cash flows monitoring report, monthly budget execution 
and management reports, mid-year financial and performance reports, annual 
financial reports for external audit, and accountability reports to the parliament 
(Simson et al. 2011; Allen and Tommasi 2001). In developing countries where 
international financial aid is provided, the government may be required to prepare 
separate reports to fulfil lenders’ needs. Overall, the reporting component of PFM 
operations should be designed to enable the government to present its budget and 
financial reports in a number of various formats to accommodate the different needs 
of its audiences (CIPFA 2010). 
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 Apart from the eight components of PFM operations mentioned above, CIPFA (2010) 
also includes internal control within the PFM operational design. It is a complementary 
component of PFM operations that aims to measure the progress and achievement 
of budget milestones and to keep the government on track in actualising the ultimate 
outcomes of their budget (CIPFA 2010). It refers to policies and procedures that are 
put in place by the government to ensure: the achievement of its agencies’ objectives 
and missions; the adherence to laws, regulations and other internal directives such 
as standard operating procedures (SOP); the safeguarding of public resources, 
including assets, against waste, abuse and mismanagement; the stimulation of 
effective and efficient government operations; and the presentation of reliable, fair 
and timely financial information (INTOSAI 2001). Internal control encompasses a 
number of components that include: performance management; budget monitoring; 
risk management; internal financial controls; fraud prevention, detection, and 
investigation; internal regulations, written standards and manuals of operation; and 
partnership frameworks (CIPFA 2010). New developments in the field of PFM 
encourage the establishment of an internal audit function (Simson et al. 2011), which 
is distinct to an internal control (CIPFA 2010). It independently reviews, examines and 
reports upon the implementation of programs and policies to the heads of government 
agencies. In summary, the World Bank (1998) states that a professional internal audit 
function is an important element of modern internal control in the public arena. 
2.1.4.2. Problems of Non-compliance in PFM Operations 
The major challenge that PFM systems face is the necessity to simultaneously meet 
the three key objectives of maintaining a sustainable fiscal position, allocating public 
funds effectively and promoting efficiency in the delivery of goods and services (ADB 
1999). The PFM operational processes mostly deal with the third objective of 
maximising the value for money, which ensures the optimum combination of 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the provision of public goods and services 
by the government (Lawson 2015). At this level, it is critical to maintain compliance 
with the budget allocations stipulated within the budget law and with other relevant 
laws or regulations that provide detailed procedures for arranging the actual spending 
and disbursement of funds (Lienert and Jong 2004). Simson et al. (2011) further 
express the view that emphasis on compliance with the appropriation limits and other 
rules is required in the execution of a budget to prevent corruption and overspending, 
while ADB (1999) mentions that focus on compliance would ensure the disbursement 
of funds under the budget’s ceiling and according to its intended purposes. Conformity 
with budgetary authorisation also ensures proper control over the overall budget 
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 execution processes and can ultimately enforce the achievement of the fiscal target 
(ADB 1999). Conformity with budget law and relevant PFM rules and regulations is 
also essential for ensuring the accountability of public institutions. 
The day-to-day PFM operational processes are mainly carried out by lower-level 
government functions, such as directorates, programs or projects, within the line 
ministries or local government units (Allen and Tommasi 2001; CIPFA 2010). In 
contrast, the legal PFM operational framework is commonly stipulated in the PFM 
organic laws and it is set by the central government (Schiavo-Campo 2007a) through 
approval from the Parliament. The same process also applies to the preparation of 
the annual budget. While lower-level government functions are involved in the 
budgeting process through a technocratic process of preparing their budget 
proposals, finalisation of the government’s budget is made through political process 
involving the central government bodies and the Parliament. Other derivatives 
regulations are also set centrally by the Ministry of Finance and they are applied to all 
public institutions. This situation creates potential conflict during budget 
implementation because policies and programs stipulated in budget document and 
PFM rules and regulations may not be properly interpreted by the lower-level 
operational units (Hackbart and Ramsey 1999). As a result, the actual behaviour of 
the PFM actors often deviates from the intended behaviour as specified in the budget 
documents and regulations. The potential for conflict is enormous because PFM 
operational processes involve a large number of players who have to coordinate their 
roles and responsibilities effectively. Such a complex environment may limit the ability 
of internal controls and other enforcement measures to effectively monitor the 
behaviour of the PFM actors and to ensure their adherence to the stipulated rules and 
regulations. In addition, the risk of individual characteristics of public employees to 
pursue their own personal interests (Downs 1967; Niskanen 1971; McLean 1987) may 
lead to further deviation from the desired practices of PFM operations. 
The following section reviews some empirical evidence from several developing 
countries regarding common problems that originated from non-compliance practices 
in their actual PFM operations and the impact of those problems of non-compliance 
on accountability, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness of the overall PFM 
system. 
In his analysis of the Auditor General of Lesotho’s Reports, Wallis (1989) found that 
the long delay before the publication of the audit reports was mainly due to the failure 
of the Treasury to prepare the government’s financial statements in a timely manner. 
Delay in the finalisation of unaudited financial statements left the Auditor General with 
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 nothing to enable adequate assessment of the quality of financial management of the 
government. The audit reports further elaborated upon the causes of the long delay 
in the presentation of financial statements, which included the absence of accounting 
records, the absence of several crucial documents and the time-consuming exercise 
of the compilation of financial statements. Wallis (1989) further highlighted the laxity 
in the management of financial affairs in Lesotho’s government by referring to lack of 
discipline in financial management practices that led to non-compliance with financial 
regulations, rules and instructions and catastrophically impacted the effectiveness of 
the financial controls in Lesotho. He observed the interrelated and systemic impacts 
of laxity problems within public employment upon all elements of PFM operations. 
The negligence of tendering procedures in the provision of goods and services, for 
example, caused inflated prices for the awarded contracts. The failure to promptly 
update and keep adequate records of employees’ rotation resulted in double 
payments being made to some employees. Payments could also be made for 
inaccurate claims for some expenses, such as car mileage, which could have granted 
some officers with extra income at the expense of the public funds. Lesotho’s case 
illustrates that delay in the finalisation of financial statements indicates a symptom of 
loose, or even almost non-existent, financial controls that provide opportunities for 
fraud and criminal actions (Wallis 1989), resulting in waste and inefficiency in the 
financial management of a public sector institution. 
In another developing country in Africa, Ghana, problems of non-compliance in PFM 
operations were also visible. Certan et al. (2013) mentioned that Ghana faced 
challenges in assuring the compliance of its budget execution practices with formal 
procedures of budget execution. Informal practices that deviated from the formal 
procedures were commonly carried out in many areas of budget execution. The 
implementation of a clear and comprehensive legal framework for its tax and revenue 
system, for example, failed to minimise tax arrears. Accurate and timely information 
on tax arrears was also lacking because the actual practices of tax revenue 
administration could not be used to aggregate and monitor tax arrears collection 
activities at the district level. Expenditures in Ghana also experienced a high volume 
of arrears. The expenditure arrears figures were derived not only from the provision 
of goods and services activities but also from personnel expenses, such as salaries 
and wages. Payroll management suffered from a lack of accurate personnel data due 
to cumbersome personnel administration practices. Hence, despite there being a 
direct link between its payroll system and personnel database, long delays in entering 
information about new recruits, promotions, transfers and retirements into the 
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 personnel database caused the accumulation of personnel expenditure arrears. Lack 
of liquidity due to bad cash management practices, such as reluctance to update cash 
flow plans and to monitor up-to-date information on cash balances in all government 
bank accounts, was another cause for arrears. In the procurement of goods and 
services, lack of liquidity was followed by the adoption of practical solutions to bypass 
the release of funds procedures, thereby undermining the effectiveness of the 
procurement system for ensuring value for money. In its accounting system, the 
introduction of a standardised chart of account was not followed by its consistent 
application across the core areas of PFM: budgeting, execution and reporting. To 
further complicate the problems, bank accounts were not adequately reconciled. 
Reconciliation for some accounts was performed annually, while for other accounts it 
was done quarterly. The reconciliation of the treasury main accounts, even though it 
was done on a monthly basis, still suffered from a significant delay of up to three 
months, heightening the problems in both treasury management and accounting 
components of Ghana’s PFM operations. 
In regard to the Southeast Asian region, Myanmar experienced a number of problems 
and weaknesses in its PFM operational practices (Taliercio et al. 2012). Its accounting 
and reporting system was incapable of performing timely monthly reconciliation and 
compilation of its accounts reports. In general, up to three months was needed to 
complete the reconciliation and compilation of accounts, delaying the finalisation of 
the monthly financial report which, in the end, jeopardised the preparation of the 
annual financial report. Combined with the limited degree of analysis included in the 
monthly reports, this condition weakened the capacity of government to receive any 
proper feedback during its in-year budget monitoring process. At the time, Myanmar 
also still relied heavily on manual aggregation processes in its reporting system, 
causing difficulties for preparation of the reports in different formats that could 
accommodate different readers and purposes. The disbursement process in 
Myanmar was also characterised by the lack of an accurate database on commitment 
records, which systematically weakened the control over the flow of payments. In 
some cases, payments were carried to the following fiscal year, contributing to 
another problem in budget management. Delay of the detailed budget approval had 
also forced the execution of some initiatives and programs into the final few months 
of the year. Problems in the disbursement process were also compounded by a weak 
revenue collection system that caused a high amount of on-going arrears. 
Improvement in the legal basis of taxation was not followed by better taxpayer 
registration and tax assessment, especially at local government level. The 
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 procurement area in Myanmar also displayed some shortcomings due to the absence 
of detailed procedures and systems for ensuring more open competitive tendering, 
causing variations in procurement practices from one agency to another. 
Another Southeast Asian country, the Philippines, also suffered from an inability to 
prepare and publish timely financial reports (World Bank 2015a). Some local 
government units were not able to finalise their financial reports within nine months 
after the end of the fiscal year. Some basic control procedures, including periodic 
reconciliation of bank accounts were absent and cash advances were not managed 
well. Lack of adequate financial and non-financial information records in asset and 
inventory management, due to its manual record-keeping systems, further 
deteriorated the quality of its financial statements. The majority of financial statements 
of the government agencies continued to receive ‘qualified audit opinions’ from the 
Commission of Audit, contributing to a lack of integrity and completeness for the 
overall financial data of the whole government. Further, World Bank (2015a) also 
highlighted some deficiencies in the Philippines’ internal control and reporting system. 
Those shortcomings weakened the overall quality of public service delivery due to the 
inability of government programs to achieve the expected outcomes as outlined in the 
budget. 
In Vietnam, there were weaknesses in actual revenue collection, procurement, cash 
management, and accounting and reporting activities (World Bank 2013). Tax 
administration required more effort to improve tax collection performance. Although 
there had been some improvement, the amount of outstanding tax arrears in Vietnam 
was still substantial. The application of competitive bidding procedures in Vietnam 
was also limited, due to their preference to direct the contracting method to a single 
supplier. In cash management, until 2010, Vietnam had not adopted the TSA 
approach and it had to maintain substantial cash reserves in all agencies, including 
local governments. This implies inefficiency in cash management practices because 
the government was not able to utilise idle cash for investment purposes or for 
reducing debt. Some components of government revenues and expenditures in 
Vietnam were managed outside the budget. The preparation of the final budget 
execution statement in Vietnam could take up to 14 months due to some complexities 
in consolidating financial information from all lower-level government units. Therefore, 
Vietnam could not publish any consolidated financial statements for the whole 
government, weakening its accountability and the transparency of the government’s 
financial management. 
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 The discussion in previous paragraphs has displayed the greater span of PFM 
operational problems in developing countries, which encompasses almost all 
components of PFM operations. In more advanced developing countries, such as 
Thailand, Serbia and Brazil, PFM operational problems do exist, but they are 
commonly limited to only a specific area and are not necessarily triggered by practices 
of non-compliance. In Thailand, the absence of a unified chart of accounts has created 
difficulty in linking the accrual-based financial statement with the cash-based 
budgeting (World Bank 2009b). Tax revenue collection in Serbia has been managed 
adequately with a sufficient daily monitoring tool; however, emphasis on improving 
voluntary compliance of taxpayers was still required (World Bank 2015b). In Brazil, 
fiscal controls have been strictly implemented at the expense of budget flexibility and 
improvement in the performance of public service delivery (World Bank 2009a). In 
contrast, many developed countries have been executing their PFM operations 
according to the best international practices. Norway, for example, has not shown any 
significant problems in its actual PFM operational practices (Mundal 2008). 
To assist developing countries in tackling their PFM problems, international bodies 
such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) have published a handbook that can be 
used as a guideline for establishing a sound PFM framework and practice. The 
handbook also underlines common problems that have been identified from the 
practices in its member countries. In the disbursement process, ADB (1999) identifies 
the problem of overspending in public fund disbursement when officials of a spending 
unit breach the spending limits defined in the budget. In a well-designed PFM 
operation, cash is generally controlled and each spending unit will be allocated only 
the amount of cash in accordance with their appropriated expenditures. In most cases, 
the schedule of payment is also set and money will not be available outside the 
payment schedule. Nonetheless, such control can be so complicated that it causes 
officials to bypass the procedures, for example, through off-budget spending 
mechanisms. This non-compliant action, if not properly addressed, would generate 
uncontrollable arrears that could further damage management of public finances. In 
another case, overruns could also be caused by inadequate budgeting where the 
inflation rate, multi-year investment commitments and continuing expenditures (i.e. 
salary, wages, retirement benefits, etc.) are not adequately addressed during the 
budgeting process. 
ADB (1999) also considers that impediments in the budget spending process can 
cause poor program implementation, which eventually contributes to ineffective 
strategic allocation priorities and inefficient use of resources. The Ministry of Finance 
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 could, at any time, initiate budget cuts by authorising expenditures lower than the 
amount already provided in the budget. Such cuts are rarely applied to outlays on 
salaries and other personnel-related expenses but tend to fall heavily on operational 
costs and capital expenditures. Cuts to operational costs may immediately impact the 
delivery of government services and operation, while the impact of cuts on capital 
spending may occur in the long run. Insufficiency of funds in government’s bank 
accounts and non-compliance with requirements of government tendering processes 
may also delay the authorisation of expenditures, compounding the effect upon 
overall government operations. Another common issue of non-compliance in budget 
execution relates to the actual utilisation of funds where expenditures may be applied 
to purposes different from those originally intended, even though they may reflect the 
correct budget items or categories. Improper practices in budget execution may also 
include inter alia: delay in the distribution of the detailed budget to spending units, 
inadequate forecasting of cash requirements, and inadequate on-time information on 
actual expenditure. 
2.2. The Organisational Context of PFM Operations 
The discussion in this chapter so far has been focused on PFM in general and the 
technical details of PFM operations. It has been recognised in the literature that 
financial resources are the essence of public sector organisations (Kioko et al. 2011; 
Lane 2004; Ingraham and Kneedler 2000; CIPFA 2017). Hughes (2012) also argues 
that PFM is the most important part of the internal management of government. Since 
the early 20th century, the operations of the government sector have been dominated 
by the traditional bureaucratic model of public administration. Nevertheless, the 
current trend in governmental sector reforms suggests a preference toward the New 
Public Management (NPM) approach (Hood 1991; Larbi 1999; Polidano and Hulme 
1999). Increasingly popular since its inception in the 1980s, NPM assumes that the 
traditional long-standing bureaucratic model of public administration is malfunctional 
and inefficient (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). It needs to be fixed by reinventing 
government operations through the adoption of efficient private sector solutions such 
as market-like competition and the fulfilment of public needs through a customer-
driven policy development model being integrated into public sector operations 
(Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Savoie 1995). 
It is contended that the global and widespread PFM reform also displays a preference 
for the NPM principles of adopting private sector practices (Ferlie and Steane 2002). 
The PFM reform has reconstructed the overall PFM framework and processes of 
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 government budget management, from its formulation stage to its ultimate stage of 
public service delivery (Rubin and Kelly 2007; Humprey et al. 2005). Generally, the 
NPM-based PFM reform shifts the line-item input-based budgeting towards a more 
output- and outcome-focused budgeting, and allows the implementation of a results-
based performance measurement system. It discontinues the application of a cash 
basis accounting method and progresses to an accrual basis accounting system that 
can provide more accurate financial information essential for improving the 
transparency, accountability and efficiency of public resource allocation. NPM-based 
PFM reform also introduces a market-oriented approach in the provision of public 
services to promote efficiency in government operations. The reform also heightens 
the monitoring process by establishing an internal control system and an external 
audit mechanism. Nevertheless, Rubin and Kelly (2007) suggest that other factors, 
such as local politics, history, culture, previous reforms and advice from international 
organisations, may be accommodated within this reform, resulting in diversities in the 
application of NPM principles in different countries.  
While the NPM model is conceptually promising, the implementation of NPM 
principles into government operations has not necessarily resulted in the expected 
outcomes. Empirical studies on the implementation of NPM have exhibited, to some 
extent, the failure of NPM-based public sector management to implant its 
characteristics into the traditional bureaucratic model of public administration (see, for 
example, Kim and Han 2015; Schofield 2001; Manning 2001; and Dunn and Miller 
2007). Such failure is also evident in some OECD countries which are regarded as 
the native habitat of NPM practices (Manning 2001). Specifically, in the PFM area, 
the NPM-based PFM reforms also have not significantly changed the PFM practices 
that have been established under the traditional bureaucratic public administration 
model of government. In Australia, for example, the reform to move towards 
outcomes-based budgeting and an accrual-based accounting system have not 
changed the underlying orientation of the actual budgeting and accounting practices, 
which remain focused on traditional cash-based inputs (Carlin and Guthrie 2003). 
Further, Carlin and Guthrie (2003) also mentioned that the reform was largely 
superficial and failed to provide a better quality of performance information required 
to improve management and control of budgeting processes. 
In developing countries, the experiment-based (Polidano and Hulme 1999), gradual 
(Manning 2001), and incomprehensive (Turner 2002) adoption of NPM principles, 
along with the existence of other models of public sector management reform that 
have focused on improving the capabilities of governments (Polidano and Hulme 
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 1999), have allowed the bureaucratic model of public sector administration to remain 
relevant despite the influence of the NPM model to reduce the government’s role in 
public management. Cheung (2005) further argues that in most Asian countries, 
including Indonesia, the NPM approaches and techniques actually coexist with the 
‘old’ public administration system. 
2.2.1. Structural Features of Bureaucracy 
The endurance of bureaucracy as a model for government operations (Aucoin 1997; 
Zafirovski 2001; Drechsler 2005; Meier and Hill 2007; Dunn and Miller 2007; Kettl 
2008) has made it a relevant theoretical perspective for the examination of the second 
and third research questions of this study. The term ‘bureaucracy’ comes from a 
French word, bureau, which can be traced back to the 13th century to refer to an 
exclusive room where the King’s administrators usually stored their financial records 
(Kettl 2008). In the 19th century, the term was generally used to define a political 
system in a hereditary monarchy where the King appointed career officials to occupy 
ministerial positions and run the day-to-day administration of the monarchy (Beetham 
1996). 
In the early 20th century, Max Weber, a German sociologist, introduced the use of 
bureaucracy as a term outside the traditional monarchical system of government. He 
viewed bureaucracy from a sociological perspective and explained its general 
characteristics and structural features where the application of a bureaucratic model 
was conceivable (Heady 1959; Beetham 1996; Anderson 2004). To Weber, 
bureaucracy meant a system of organisations within a large organisation that was 
characterised by complex administrative problems requiring a systematic process and 
structure to coordinate the work of many individuals within that organisation (Blau and 
Meyer 1987). In other words, bureaucracy refers to a structured division of labour to 
assist a large organisation to achieve its purposes. 
Weber’s model of bureaucracy was derived from the rise of the rational legal authority 
model (Rainey 1991; Wallis 1989), as opposed to the traditional and charismatic 
leadership models which were no longer compatible with modern society (Kettl 2008). 
The model has established legal instruments (i.e. laws and their derivatives, including 
rules, regulations, instructions, procedures, standards, etc.) as the main sources of 
authority (Wallis 1989; Hughes 2012), and which govern the whole operation of a 
bureaucratic organisation (Blau and Meyer 1987; Gawthrop 1969). Bureaucracy 
extensively uses legal rules to distribute the operational activities through the divisions 
of labour that are required to realise its purposes, in a fixed way, and to establish the 
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 official duties of its members (Weber et al. 2009). People who decide to become the 
members or employees of a bureaucratic organisation, whether they like it or not, 
have to accept their official duties as specified in the regulations (Wallis 1989). The 
rational legal authority model further characterises the structure of bureaucracy which, 
according to Beetham (1996), can be summarised into the four basic attributes of: (1) 
hierarchical structure, (2) expertise, (3) impersonality and (4) continuity. The rest of 
this section further explains each of those attributes in more detail. 
Firstly, bureaucracy accommodates the delegation of legal authority within the 
hierarchical structure of an organisation (Hughes 2012). It refers to various layers of 
official formal positions (Wallis 1989) that are characterised by the separation of 
superiors from subordinates to form clear accountability relationships (Gawthrop 
1969). The layers of hierarchy can be many, depending on the size of the 
organisation. Every official in the hierarchy is accountable to his or her superiors; in 
turn, superiors have the authority to control and monitor the performance of their 
subordinates (Beetham 1996). Superiors have the authority to give orders to their 
subordinates; while subordinates have the responsibility to obey their superior’s 
commands (Blau and Meyer 1987). The authority, however, is not inherent to any 
individual but to the position that he or she holds within the hierarchy (Hughes 2012). 
Superiors can only give commands that are relevant to their official functions (Blau 
and Meyer 1987) and that are aligned with the objectives of the organisation as 
specified in the rules. Downs (1967) adds that hierarchical structure in a bureaucratic 
organisation exists in terms of not only formal authority but also a formal 
communication network. 
The second basic feature, that of expertise, derives from the division of labour 
attributes of the bureaucratic organisation (Beetham 1996). The division of labour 
involves horizontal distribution of tasks among the officials in a manner that allows the 
development of their expertise through specialisation of their functions (Blau and 
Meyer 1987). The application of merit-based assessment in the employment selection 
processes, both in the initial hiring stage and the promotional system within the 
organisation (Downs 1967), along with the provision of continual training (Beetham 
1996; Wallis 1989), further ensures a high degree of expertise and competency of the 
officials. Gawthrop (1969) adds another aspect that may reflect the expertise of 
bureaucratic officials, namely, their access to information and knowledge concerning 
the operational rules, regulations and procedures that are stored in the organisation. 
The expertise of the officials, both in terms of their functional responsibilities and their 
knowledge about rules that govern their bureaucratic organisation, contributes to the 
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 effective performance of their duties (Blau and Meyer 1987) and assists in the 
achievement of the organisation’s goals or purposes. 
The third basic feature of bureaucracy, impersonality, deals with the characteristics of 
a bureaucratic organisation where there is a separation between working life and 
private life. Wallis (1989, 3) contends that: “Officials do not own their jobs, that is, the 
job itself belongs to the organisation, not the individual who happens to be occupying 
a particular position in the hierarchy at any point of time”. Weber et al. (2009, 197) 
specifically assert that: “public monies and equipment are divorced from the private 
property of the official”. Impersonality requires officials to prevent the involvement of 
their personal feelings, emotions, and values when discharging their official roles 
within the organisation and making official decisions (Blau and Meyer 1987). Such a 
requirement ensures equity and justice through the provision of equal treatments of 
all individuals (e.g. as clients, superiors, subordinates or fellow members) who are 
interacting within the bureaucracy (Blau and Meyer 1987). The impersonal character 
of a bureaucratic organisation is linked to its legal formalistic attributes, where written 
documentation of rules and procedures are preserved (Blau and Meyer 1987). Written 
documents, such as laws and rules, normally set out and specify the authority of the 
bureaucracy and the obligations that have to be fulfilled (Wallis 1989). They are used 
to control the actions of its members and set the structure of the administration (Wallis 
1989). Gawthrop (1969) enlarges upon the importance of written documentation in 
the internal operation and management of a bureaucratic organisation because 
documents are used as a formal communication channel enabling the transmission 
of information, decisions and directives within the organisation. Dependence on 
written documentation cannot be avoided in a bureaucratic organisation because it 
tends to keep records of every transaction emanating from its daily operations 
(Beetham 1996). Nowadays, the advancements in science and technology sector 
have increased the reliance on a computerised system to manage the written 
documentation of an organisation in the form of electronic records, files and 
databases (Wallis 1989). 
The fourth basic feature of bureaucracy is continuity. This feature assumes the long-
term establishment of bureaucracy as a result of the permanent employment status 
of its members and the opportunity for regular career advancement across 
hierarchical structures (Beetham 1996). Downs (1967) argues that members of a 
bureaucratic organisation are also financially and economically dependent on the 
existence of the organisation to support the continuity of the bureaucracy in the long 
run. The protection of employment status from arbitrary dismissal (Weber et al. 2009; 
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 Blau and Meyer 1987) further supports the continuity feature of bureaucratic 
organisations. Written documents in which actions, decisions and processes have 
been recorded, together with the impersonal characteristic of a bureaucracy, to a large 
extent have supported the continuity of the operations of a bureaucratic organisation 
(Wallis 1989). Those records gradually construct the image of the organisation, assist 
the development of effective operating procedures and engender organisational 
loyalty, which then generates personal commitments among its members to go hand-
in-hand towards achieving the purposes of organisation (Gawthrop 1969). Specifically 
within the public sector, continuity is linked to the long-run perspective of the public 
bureaucracies because they are not created on an ad-hoc basis to achieve short-term 
objectives (Wallis 1989). Wallis (1989) further contends that changes in government 
will not necessarily cause the operation of any public sector bureaucracies to cease. 
Another characteristic of a public bureaucracy that supports its continuity is the 
principle of ‘tenure for life’ that applies to the possession of an official position within 
the institution (Weber et al. 2009, 202). 
2.2.2. Bureaucracy in the Public Sector 
In a democratic system, the term ‘bureaucracy’ is used to refer to public sector 
institutions of central and local government, including public corporations (Gormley 
and Balla 2008), while the term ‘bureaucrat’ technically refers to a public sector 
employee who exercises the executive decision (Jackson 1982) or, in other words, an 
appointed official of a government institution. Nevertheless, as the distinction between 
public employees who do and do not exercise executive decisions is unclear, the term 
‘bureaucrat’ generally refers to all public sector employees (Jackson 1982; Beetham 
1996). Weber’s description regarding bureaucracy in terms of its essential structural 
characteristics being a prerequisite to accomplishing large-scale administrative tasks 
in a modern organisation has been widely accepted due to its clarity, precision and 
generalisability (Beetham 1996). This definition can be applied to all political systems 
and to all complex and large-scale organisations (Beetham 1996; Blau and Meyer 
1987) where those features are met, including the government sector. 
The territory of a bureaucracy within the public sector is also explored by political 
economy and public administration scholars (Beetham 1996). Both perspectives 
augment Weber’s structural characteristics definition of a bureaucracy by 
emphasising certain important assumptions in their analyses of public bureaucracies. 
According to the perspective of a political economist, public bureaucracy is 
characterised by a non-market method of financing where its operations are not 
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 financed by selling products or services in the market but, instead, by general 
endowment from its parent organisation in the form of a government budget (Downs 
1967; Niskanen 1971). The individual members of a bureaucratic organisation, like 
the economic actors in the market, are assumed to pursue their rational self-interested 
motives (Downs 1967) while exercising their roles within the hierarchy. They have 
motives that are linked to maximising their position or status in the bureaucracy or 
accumulating personal gain through money, income, power and prestige (Wise 2004). 
In the market setting, the impact of self-interested motives upon the operational 
inefficiency of the organisation is minimised by the existence of a profit and price 
mechanism to create an effective performance system that provides incentives for the 
economic actors to behave efficiently in the marketplace (Peters 1981). 
Public bureaucracy, on the other hand, relies heavily on the bureaucracy’s structural 
characteristics to direct the behaviour of its members. A hierarchical structure and 
division of labour, for example, can serve as a substitute for the profit mechanism to 
allow cooperation among the members of the bureaucracy and the creation of a 
supervision system to monitor and control their work and behaviour (Beetham 1996). 
A legal instrument that establishes a reward and punishment framework is also used 
in a bureaucratic organisation to ensure the alignment of individual members’ 
behaviours with the organisation’s goals and objectives. The political economy tenet, 
however, upholds the superiority of a market-based incentives system and argues 
that the absence of such incentives within a bureaucracy has provided an opportunity 
for the individual members to shirk and prioritise their own personal goals (Beetham 
1996) at the expense of the organisational goals. 
Different from the perspective of political economy,  which brings the economic point 
of view into the discussion about public bureaucracy, public administration scholars 
underline the distinct features of public accountability in a public bureaucracy as a 
result of its public nature (Peters 1981). In a democratic system, the government, 
which is the politicians elected via a democratic general election process, must be 
held accountable to the people through a representative assembly of parliament. 
However, instead of carrying out the mandate of the voters directly themselves, the 
government appoints bureaucratic officials to deliver the government policies and to 
manage the operations of the government units in the provision of public goods and 
services. The appointed officials are given the mandate to exercise the executive 
decisions and policies of the government that have been assigned to their units. They 
are supported by a hierarchical civil service system to run the day-to-day operations 
and decision-making of the government. Such a chain of accountability forces a public 
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 bureaucracy to be accountable to the public. The discipline of public administration 
views public accountability as the major distinctive element of a public bureaucracy 
(Beetham 1996). 
The following section expands the discussion regarding problems of non-compliance 
in public bureaucratic setting. While most of the literature which is reviewed in the 
following section is in the context of public bureaucracy in general, it can also be used 
to provide a reference for the examination of non-compliant behaviour in the PFM 
operational context. 
2.2.3. Non-compliant Behaviour in Bureaucratic Organisations 
Since Merton’s study, in 1940, that attempted to link the structural characteristics of 
bureaucracy and the behaviour of bureaucracy’s members, most studies on 
bureaucratic behaviour have been focused on the rule-bound bureaucratic personality 
image where every member of bureaucracy is viewed as a normative individual 
characterised by their refusal to deviate from any organisational rules (DeHart-Davis 
2007). This trend is not surprising due to the very strong impersonal principle attached 
to a bureaucratic organisation. In his study, Merton (1940) argues that bureaucracy 
has a tendency towards strict adherence to every single prescribed rule in whatever 
situation, despite the fact that such a tendency may lead to goal displacement. Crozier 
(1971) believes that rigidity in following rules has been so attached to bureaucracy 
that it has made bureaucracy inflexible and incapable of creating innovations or taking 
appropriate actions to maintain its efficiency, especially in a changing environment. 
Thompson (1961) also elaborates upon the existence of feelings of personal 
insecurity within a bureaucratic organisation, especially at the higher hierarchical 
positions, which has led to the application of a strict control mechanism to ensure that 
subordinates perform their roles and behave in accordance with the predetermined 
standards for actions. From subordinates’ perspectives, strict adherence to rules and 
public sector values, norms and ethos is a typical response to protect themselves 
against any potential complaints from their superiors when they are exercising their 
roles and functions within the public sector (Crozier 1971). 
The reliance of public bureaucracy on conformity to rules and regulations has also 
been reinforced by its basic characteristic of using a non-market method of financing, 
which then leads to the application of the concept of public accountability in the field 
of public bureaucracy (Peters 1981). Public bureaucracies rely on public money, as 
stipulated by the government’s budget, to finance their operations. Therefore, they 
are responsible for the management of the budget and must be held accountable to 
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 the public. This concept of public accountability requires public bureaucracies to be 
able to protect their actions and decisions against any potential complaints from the 
public, which can only be provided through their strong adherence to rules and 
procedures. Process-based accountability, which is commonly practiced in public 
bureaucracy administration, invites scrutiny from external/public monitoring bodies 
such as the auditor general, legislative committees and even the media and press, 
should there be a small pattern of errors emerging from their operations (Behn 1998). 
Savoie (1995) also adds that the political environment of a public bureaucracy, which 
always looks for errors and has a very low tolerance for any mistakes, has further 
driven the necessity for public employees to always adhere to the prescribed rules. 
The absence of a market mechanism has also constrained public bureaucracies to 
have a strong performance measurement system based on the output price and 
financial profit (Barton 1979), which further impose the adoption of a compliance-
based performance system to manage the organisation (Rainey 1991). In US 
counties, for example, many measures that are used to appraise employees’ 
performance are concerned with the issue of compliance (Berman et al. 1999). Such 
bureaucratic environments tend to rewards their members for compliance with rules, 
regulations and procedures, which inhibits them from doing a better job by creatively 
inventing a more efficient way of conducting their roles (Peters 1981). Peters (1981) 
argues that the requirement to fulfil accountability to the public and the lack of a 
performance measurement system due to the absence of a market mechanism have 
forced public bureaucracies to be more concerned with maintaining their conformity 
to rules and norms. As a result, public officials and employees are inclined to strictly 
follow the rules. 
However, the strong association of bureaucratic behaviour with rule adherence does 
not eliminate conflict because each individual within a bureaucratic organisation could 
have his or her own interpretation of the same rules (March and Olsen 1989). In 
addition, empirical evidence also displays an insignificant occurrence of strict rule-
bound behaviour, both in public and private bureaucracies (Foster 1990; in DeHart-
Davis 2007). DeHart-Davis (2007, 893) argues that it is reasonable to turn the 
attention of the study of bureaucracy to its “unbureaucratic personality” characterised 
by rule-bending behaviour, which is defined as “a willingness to depart from rules and 
procedure”. In the context of the workplace, employees’ rule-breaking behaviour is 
commonly defined as deviant behaviour and can be differentiated as productive 
deviance and property deviance (Hollinger 1986). The former denotes any action to 
modify the application of workplace rules that causes deviation in the actual 
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 production from its expected level as a result of unfair working conditions perceived 
by the workers, while the latter refers to rule-breaking actions that lead to 
inappropriate and unauthorised utilisation of the organisation’s assets. Puffer (1987) 
uses the term ‘non-compliant behaviour’ for any dysfunction in the conduct of non-
task behaviour8 and places emphasis on the negative impact of such behaviour upon 
the organisation. Vardi and Wiener (1996, 151) categorise non-compliance as part of 
organisational misbehaviour, which is defined as “any intentional action by members 
of (an) organisation that violates core organisational and/or societal norms”, including 
formal laws, rules, regulations, standard operational procedures, etc., that are 
applicable to the organisation. 
Non-compliant behaviour can be viewed as organisational deviance, which according 
to Vaughan (1999, 273) is defined as: 
“an event, activity, or circumstance, occurring in and/or produced by a formal 
organisation, that deviates from both formal design goals and normative 
standards or expectations, either in the fact of its occurrence or in its 
consequences, and produces a suboptimal outcome”  
This definition extends non-compliance to not only cover the actions of breaking the 
rules and regulations but also to include any actions that negatively impact the 
performance and hinder the attainment of, or cause deviation from, the organisational 
goals (Camilleri and Heijden 2017). It can refer to routine non-conformities and 
explains how things can be so erroneous within a socially organised setting (Vaughan 
1999), including in the context of public bureaucracies. 
According to a number of sociological theories and concepts, Vaughan (1999) asserts 
that the cognitive practices of individuals within an organisation is one of the factors 
contributing to the emergence of routine non-conformity. Similar to Vaughan (1999), 
DeHart-Davis (2007) also argues that rule-bending intentions and attitudes are 
influenced by the individual characters of public employees and officials. In proposing 
the solution for public bureaucracy’s problems, Barton (1979) highlights the necessity 
to carefully analyse the personal traits of the bureaucrats. The following section 
reviews the literature on public employees’ motives, which is one of the personal 
dispositions of individual members of a public bureaucracy that has the potential to 
influence non-compliant behaviour. 
8  Non-task behaviour refers to behaviour that is relevant to the work context but not directly related to 
focal tasks (Puffer 1987, 615). 
42 
                                                   
 2.2.3.1. Public Employees’ Motives at Work 
It is argued that, in general, bureaucrats own “a complex set of goals” comprising the 
elements of income, power, prestige, security, convenience, personal loyalty, pride in 
excellent work and a desire to serve the public interest (Downs 1965, 441). The list of 
possible goals of individuals within an organisation ranges from a rational motive of 
pursuing a purely self-interested goal of financial income to the most normative 
altruistic motive of fulfilling public interest (Downs 1965). 
The rational motives of public employees are derived from self-interest assumption of 
individuals within a public bureaucracy (Downs 1965; 1967; Niskanen 1971). Under 
this assumption, the behaviour of government employees can be explained through 
the lens of logic of consequentiality where their behaviour is not influenced by their 
identity and expected roles in the society but, instead, by their values and the 
consequences of alternative behaviour that match to those values (March and Olsen 
1989). In this case, public employees tend to pursue their personal gains by 
attempting to “maximize the payoff that they receive from public actions. This payoff 
may be in the form of benefits or less difficult work” (Wise 2004, 674). 
Normative motives of public employees, on the other hand, are generated from the 
establishment of the norms, rules and procedures that are applied in public 
institutions, which also align with their expected roles in society to fulfil the public’s 
best interest. The impersonal characteristics of public bureaucracy nourish the 
tendency of public employees to possess normative motives and conduct their actions 
and behaviours according to their expected roles in the organisation. The concept of 
norm-based motives is widely used in the study of bureaucracy from a public 
administration perspective, where the behaviour of individuals within a public 
bureaucracy follows the logic of appropriateness (Wise 2004) to satisfy public interest. 
In other words, the behaviour of public bureaucrats is determined by the appropriate 
roles and functions that they hold within the hierarchy, as stipulated in the rules and 
procedures (March and Olsen 1989). 
Downs (1967), however, argues that such normative objectives do not practically exist 
because it is impossible for the public employees to fully abandon their self-interest 
motives. Only a fraction of their time would be allocated to the division of labour 
mechanism of public bureaucracies that requires them to put public interest above 
their self-interested motives, while most of their time and commitment would actually 
be devoted to their own personal purposes. Based on this argument, Downs classifies 
bureaucrats into two major types: (1) purely self-interested officials and (2) mixed-
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 motives officials. The former refers to bureaucrats who possess, and are entirely 
inspired by, personal goals that promote their own profit and welfare (i.e. income, 
power, prestige, security and convenience) instead of goals that benefit their 
organisation and the public at large. The other goals (i.e. loyalty, pride in excellent 
work and desire to serve public interest) are considered as a combination of self-
interested and altruistic motives and are assigned to the latter. They seek power that 
will enable them to effectively exercise government policies that have been 
established to manifest the government’s purposes of accommodating the public 
needs. They enjoy their involvement in the government’s programs because it can 
also provide them with prestige in their society. Working in the public sector allows 
individuals to satisfy their personal needs while also serving the public’s needs (Perry 
and Wise 1990). Despite the emphasis on the self-interested motives of individual 
members of a public bureaucracy, Downs (1967) does not nullify the notion of 
normative bureaucrats that are discussed in the public administration literature. He 
defines them as ‘statesmen’ who possess a significant degree of altruism motives and 
loyalty to serve the society as a whole. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the work motivational factors of an 
individual employee in the public sector range between the two extremes of self-
interested and public-interested motives (Hirschman 1982; in Perry and Wise 1990). 
This reflects the complexity of human behaviour that should not be avoided when 
examining the motivation of individuals working in public bureaucracies (Olsen 2004; 
in Wise 2004). In the context of this study, both self-interested and public-interested 
motives of public bureaucrats could potentially influence public employees to involve 
in non-compliant behaviour while undertaking their official duties and roles within 
public organisations. 
2.2.3.1.1. Self-interested Motive and Non-compliance 
Morrison (2006), for example, argues that the motive of self-interest is one of the 
sources of employees’ deviant behaviours. The self-interested motive, along with the 
opportunity to shirk and the lack of effective controls to ensure rule compliance, 
encourages employees to break organisational rules and take advantage of their 
organisation (Eisenhardt 1989a; in Morrison 2006). The assumption of an individual’s 
self-interested motives in the discussion of public bureaucracies has provided 
superior explanations of some of the negative consequences of non-compliant 
behaviour, including: shirking, when bureaucrats ‘goof off’ on the job; subverting, 
when bureaucrats commit acts of administrative malfeasance; and stealing, when 
44 
 bureaucrats use their public office for private gain (DiIulio and DiIulio 1994). From the 
perspective of political economy, the failure to establish an effective system of 
incentives and punishments within the public bureaucratic system provides an 
opportunity for individuals to shirk and pursue their motive of self-interest in 
maximising their personal gains by committing non-compliant behaviour, thereby 
hindering the achievement of the organisational goals (Beetham 1996). In other 
words, the establishment of adequate institutional arrangements is required in a public 
bureaucracy to ensure that the deeply-rooted private motives of public bureaucrats 
will lead them to act and behave according to the expectations of the society that they 
serve and fulfil public interest (Downs 1967). 
Another explanation of how self-interested motives could lead to non-compliance 
comes from the tendency for the creation of informal structures within the bureaucracy 
that serve the self-interests of its members (Downs 1967). According to Downs 
(1967), a bureaucratic organisation can be characterised as a coalition in which the 
members have some, but not all, goals in common, leading to the divergence of the 
goals of individual members from the overall objectives of the organisation. 
Divergence of goals may lead to biased behaviour patterns when there are differences 
between the way an individual actually performs his role within the organisation and 
the way he would perform it if he had identical goals as those of the organisation. In 
such a situation, therefore, it is possible for individuals to pursue their own personal 
preferences while also carrying out their expected roles within the hierarchical 
structure of the bureaucracy. To assist them in attaining their personal objectives, 
they establish an informal structure within the organisation that augments the formal 
structure that has been established by rules and hierarchy. 
Informal structures depreciate the degree of impersonality in public bureaucracies 
through the involvement of members’ personal dispositions in conducting their roles 
within the organisations. Carlisle (1971) contends that reliance on impersonal 
structure contributes to the appearance of conflict between an individual’s goals and 
the organisation’s goals; a common problem in bureaucracy when the opportunity for 
a member’s self-actualisation is limited due to the application of a compliance-based 
reward system. 
Informal structure could also be established in the manner of an informal network, 
which may distort the decision-making process within the organisation (Vaughan 
1999). Knowledge claims, where the relevance of information is determined by its 
social appropriateness and technical correctness, may not be properly attained 
because an informal network could lead to the omission of certain relevant 
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 information, causing partial understanding and thereby contributing to non-conformity 
and unexpected negative outcomes. 
In another occasion, motive for self-interest influences individual members of a 
bureaucracy to escape from a complex and difficult work situation by remaining 
ignorant of their official duties and roles as public employees. They do not care and 
do not want to understand the goal of the organisation; hence, they are prone to 
deviant behaviour and are likely to breach formal organisational rules (Morrison 
2006). Further, Morrison (2006) contends that non-compliance may also refer to 
unintentional violations when individuals in the organisation are ignorant and unaware 
of the rules. 
2.2.3.1.2. Public-interested Motive and Non-compliance 
In regard to the public-interested motives of public bureaucracy, Wise (2004) argues 
that the failure of an impersonal structure of rules to accommodate public needs may 
potentially trigger a high degree of non-compliant behaviour. Such failure represents 
the absence of a valid means-ends relationship among the rules of a public 
bureaucracy. The lack of a valid means-ends relationship can be caused by changes 
in the environment in which public bureaucracy operates (Desai 2010). Current rules 
may fail to accommodate new public needs as a result of the changes in the 
environment. Public employees who are driven by public-interested motives, hence, 
are prone to break the rules to enable them to better serve the public and 
accommodate the public’s needs. While this argument displays the limitation of rules 
to appropriately capture and accommodate the dynamics of the environment, it also 
sheds a positive light on the non-compliant behaviour that searches for new and better 
ways of organising the operations of a public bureaucracy (Desai 2010). DeHart-Davis 
(2008) further argues that non-compliance does not always lead to negative 
consequences of inefficiency and deviation from the organisation’s goals; in the 
situation when there is a gap in the formal rules, non-compliance can be beneficial 
and positive for the organisation.  
More recent studies in sociology have also discussed non-compliant behaviour within 
public bureaucracies from a more positive point of view, that is, in providing benefits 
for the organisation (Larsson and Ramstedt 2013; Borry 2013). Morrison (2006), for 
example, introduces the term ‘pro-social rule breaking’ to refer to non-compliant 
behaviour that is intentionally committed by public employees to more efficiently 
exercise their roles, assist their subordinates or colleagues and improve public service 
deliveries. Pro-social rule breaking behaviour displays the non-selfish nature of non-
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 compliant behaviour in public institutions when the violation of rules and regulations 
may reflect public employees’ desires to better exercise their organisational roles and 
to contribute a good thing to the organisation and the larger community. Brockmann 
(2015) uses the term ‘unbureaucratic behaviour’ to refer to the non-compliance of 
individuals for the purpose of procedural improvements in public bureaucracies. Such 
behaviour is driven by pressures from the public to provide better and more efficient 
public service deliveries, requiring the public bureaucracy to work innovatively and go 
beyond its traditional belief to always comply with the rules. This positive perspective 
of non-compliance confirms the existence of public-interested motives that are able 
to drive public employees to conduct their roles in accordance with the public’s needs 
despite the fact that they do not comply with the organisational rules and regulations. 
2.2.3.2. Structural Factors of Bureaucracy 
Other than the individual dispositions of public employees, Vaughan (1999), DeHart-
Davis (2007), and Barton (1979) also mention the structural characteristics of public 
bureaucracy as another factor that may contribute to the existence of non-compliant 
behaviour among public employees who carry out public duties and roles as civil 
servants. Weber’s description of bureaucracy, in terms of its essential structural 
characteristics that are prerequisite to the accomplishment of large-scale 
administrative tasks in a modern organisation, has generally been accepted  due to 
its clarity, precision and generalisability (Beetham 1996). However, it has also been 
criticised for its inherent flaws when those structures become dysfunctional and 
impede its superiority in attaining the highest degree of efficiency, thereby impacting 
the attainment of the organisational objectives (Hughes 2003). Bureaucracy 
establishes formal structures and coordination whereby complex tasks are distributed 
into a series of manageable jobs through the establishment of organisational rules 
that promote precision, speed, clarity, expertise, consistency, quality, uniformity and 
reduction of friction throughout the administrative processes (Mongkol 2007). 
However, those bureaucratic structures can also produce negative consequences 
diverting the actual final outcomes from the expected ones (Vaughan 1999). 
Acar and Aupperle (1984) argue that, in a bureaucratic organisation, the functions to 
attain organisational goals are manifested and embodied into the major structures of 
impersonality, division of labour and hierarchy. Certain assumptions regarding 
conditions and environment are carefully examined and defined to ensure that the 
established structures can effectively support the functions of the organisation in the 
attainment of its objectives and purposes. In a small organisation, those assumptions 
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 can be easily communicated to all members, enhancing their understanding of the 
policies, strategies and procedures of the organisation. However, in a large 
bureaucratic organisation, it is unlikely that subordinates will have adequate 
comprehension of the rationale behind the establishment of these structures. Peters 
(1981, 77) argues that the structure of a bureaucracy can “block the smooth flow of 
[legal] authority downward” within the hierarchy resulting in a failure to comprehend 
the ‘meaning’ of the rules. As a result, those who are performing the tasks remain 
unconnected to the functions and the ultimate goals of the organisation (Acar and 
Aupperle 1984), leading to the failure of members of the bureaucracy to fully 
comprehend their roles or to conduct their functions as designed by the formal 
structures. 
2.2.3.2.1. Ineffectiveness of Rules 
One of the major characteristics of bureaucracy is its impersonality, which is directly 
derived from the rational-legal authority assumption. Structures in the form of vertical 
and horizontal divisions of labour, along with their expected roles, functions, and 
responsibilities, are formalised through rules, regulations, procedures, etc. (Borry 
2013). Rules separate the involvement of personal attributes of the individuals holding 
the positions within the structure from the execution of their roles and duties within 
those organisations (Scott 1987; in Borry 2013). From a sociological perspective, 
prescribed rules are assumed to be functional and effective when the pattern of 
behaviour of the bureaucracy’s members is in accordance with the rules’ descriptions 
(McLean 1987). 
However, rules may have their own drawbacks that can trigger non-compliant 
behaviour. DeHart-Davis (2008) differentiates ineffective rules from the effective 
ones. Ineffective rules refer to ‘red tape’ (DeHart-Davis 2008) and may include 
circumstances when there are too many rules (Borry 2013). In the case of red tape, 
conformity to rules generates unanticipated negative consequences that threaten the 
overall efficiency of the organisation (Merton 1940). Ineffective rules engender a 
compliance burden. Thereby inhibiting those rules as a rational-legal instrument for 
attaining their intended purposes of establishing the organisation’s goals (Bozeman 
2000; in Borry 2013). 
DeHart-Davis (2008) further elaborates upon the characteristics of effective rules by 
proposing Green Tape Theory. The theory stipulates a number of characteristics that 
can impact upon the effectiveness of rules, which include: 
(1) Rules are written 
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 The extent to which rules are written enables them to be functional and effectively 
implemented. Written rules nullify the personal attributes of the officials who hold 
positions, allowing them to optimally impose the rules to the regulated, while unwritten 
rules are viewed as unacceptable and subjective. 
(2) Rules have valid means-ends relationship 
Means and ends link organisational rules to their expected goals and purposes. A 
valid means-ends relationship displays the rationality of rules, thereby allowing them 
to gain cooperation from the stakeholders, a condition that is vital for ensuring that 
rules are applied and supported in the realisation of their objectives. 
(3) Rules have optimal control 
Optimal control of rules refers to the level of control that rules impose. Rule over-
control may result in the feeling of distrust among the regulated, thus reducing their 
desire to follow the rules, while rule under-control may appear artificial to 
stakeholders, thus weakening the rule’s ability to achieve its intended objectives. 
Optimal control ensures the effectiveness of a rule to achieve its objectives by 
communicating its genuine objectives and establishing trust among stakeholders, 
thereby enhancing stakeholders’ cooperation in rule implementation. 
(4) Rules are consistently applied 
Consistent application of rules deals with the establishment of fairness and justice. It 
eliminates favouritism and any feeling of inequality in the organisation, encouraging 
the stakeholders to accept the rules and voluntarily comply with them. 
(5) The purposes of rules are understood by stakeholders 
Understanding rules’ purposes improves the compliance level of the employees. 
Employees who have little understanding of the rules’ purposes may fail to 
comprehend their contribution to the organisation and feel alienated in the workplace. 
Efforts to ensure employees’ understanding of rules’ purposes, such as through 
training and supervision activities (Oberfield 2010), enable them to see the 
importance of their presence in the bureaucratic system, thereby increasing their 
cooperation and level of compliance in rule implementation. 
2.2.3.2.2. Dysfunctional Hierarchical Authority 
The complexity of tasks that are dispersed along the vertical division of labour in a 
large organisation can also be so intricate that it limits the ability of higher hierarchical 
officials to adequately control the actual behaviour of their subunits (Vaughan 1999). 
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 From a rational choice perspective, lack of controls from the organisation provides 
opportunities for employees to shirk and violate the rules in an attempt to pursue their 
own self-interests at the expense of the organisation (Morrison 2006). Granovetter 
(1985) further observes the potential failure of the established bureaucratic structures 
to maintain appropriate intra-organisational relational ties, which may result in the 
diminishment of trust and control, thereby providing individual members with the 
opportunity to cheat and commit wrongdoings. 
Acar and Aupperle (1984) also observe that the discretion and authority in a 
bureaucratic organisation tend to be centralised in the higher levels of office due to 
the higher level of task uncertainty in such elevated hierarchical positions. 
Centralisation of authority, according to Vaughan (1999), may be beneficial because 
it can improve coordination; however, on the negative side, it can also reduce 
flexibility, thereby increasing the potential for rule violation at lower hierarchical levels. 
In such situations, individual responsibility and initiative are discouraged (Beetham 
1996), causing individuals in the lower hierarchy to make some poor judgments, for 
example, during the information screening process (Gawthrop 1969). Peters (1981, 
77) contends that a hierarchical structure can create communication problems that 
“block the smooth flow of information upward”. Ultimately, the top hierarchy may 
experience a lack of relevant information required for effective decision-making and 
control (Gawthrop 1969). 
2.2.3.2.3. Ineffective Division of Labour 
Another bureaucratic structure, the horizontal division of labour, aims to develop 
expertise through rational specialisation of tasks. Specialised experts are engaged in 
each particular position and they are responsible for exercising their skills to support 
the effective performance of their duties (Blau and Meyer 1987). However, it may also 
result in boring and routine activities that lead to careless performance, non-
conformity and low productivity. Specialisation, while it can improve efficiency through 
expertise, also tends to create tunnel vision where the specialised experts have a 
narrow outlook of their own department and fail to view their functions within the big 
picture of the whole organisation (Martin 2015). Specialisation helps to clarify the 
responsibilities of each individual member of the organisation, but it can also induce 
a rivalry among departments and ignorance of what other departments have done. 
Loyalty of the individual members to the overall bureaucratic structure has been 
interpreted and practised in terms of unit loyalty (Gawthrop 1969), which further 
complicates the tunnel vision problem within the bureaucracy. The strengths and 
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 advantages of the horizontal division of labour are then easily transformed, at the 
same time, into the damaging problem of the silo effect (Tett 2015). 
A number of tasks within the organisation also require not only specific expertise but 
also explicit tacit knowledge, which is the core set of knowledge related to the task 
that cannot be articulated by others (Collins 1981; in Vaughan 1999). The absence of 
this core set of knowledge represents imperfect knowledge of the individual and could 
endanger his expertise. This, in turn, can lead to unanticipated suboptimal outcomes, 
including non-conformity behaviour. Vaughan (1999) also points out the structural 
secrecy phenomenon whereby segregation of knowledge about tasks and goals 
presents in the bureaucratic organisation as another source of non-conformity. It 
involves the deletion and distortion of information as it passes through the system of 
the organisation. Similar to the absence of tacit knowledge, structural secrecy can 
also lead to partial and incomplete information and knowledge, which increases the 
possibility of non-conformity, especially in relation to cross-boundary tasks. 
Unfortunately, non-conformity can emerge not only when the information shrinks but 
also when there is abundant information (Feldman 1989; in Vaughan 1999). To make 
things worse, structural secrecy negatively impacts upon the effectiveness of the 
organisation’s monitoring and control system to identify, and take actions to control, 
any activities that deviate from the normative standards of expectations. 
2.2.3.3. Environmental Factors 
In addition to the individual dispositions of public employees and the dysfunctional 
bureaucratic structures, Vaughan (1999) notes the environment of the organisation 
as the third factor that can contribute to the emergence of routine non-conformity. 
Environmental factors, according to organisation theory, include both the internal 
organisational setting, such as networks and inter-organisational relations, and the 
social contexts of politics, technology, economy, law, demography, ecology and 
culture (Vaughan 1999). One central feature of the environment that could lead to 
non-conformity and deviation from the expected outcomes is its uncertainty. Barton 
(1979) specifically points out uncertainty in terms of political pressure whereby 
politicians may request, at any time, to implement certain policies or programs that do 
not represent the desires of the public in general. Given that public bureaucracy is not 
in the proper position to reject or avoid the directives from its political master, non-
conformity in the execution of the programs can be expected and may eventually 
derail the actual outcomes of the programs. Advancements in technology, to give 
another example of uncertainty within the environment, may also create unclear 
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 conditions because appropriate rules cannot be established before the adoption of 
new technology; instead, rules emerge from the practice and experience in 
implementing the new technology (Wynne 1988; in Vaughan 1999). Changes in the 
environment often cannot be accommodated within the regulations in a timely 
manner. Hence, efforts from the organisation to respond to the threats of uncertainty, 
as a result of changes in the environment of the bureaucracy, may lead to non-
conformity to the current rules (Vaughan 1999). 
Other than uncertainty, social agreement, especially in regard to cultural aspects, 
could also produce organisational deviance. Individuals may apply their cultural 
values that are embedded in their traditions (Giddens 1991) while exercising their 
roles and functions within the organisation. The bindingness of particular traditions, 
stemming from norms and values that exist in the society, may result in resistance to 
applying new practises introduced through formal rules (Giddens 1991). Norms and 
values as a result could modify the original understanding of what was expected by 
the organisation (Sackmann 1991). Such actions are prone to any organisational 
deviance. In a patrimonial culture, for example, bureaucracy may not be able to fully 
apply its meritocracy principle. Individual members may alter the application of certain 
procedures to accommodate the social expectations in that culture. Further, the 
external environment of a bureaucratic organisation may define members’ 
interpretations of the rules and impact the way they implement and execute the rules 
(Albrow 1970).  
2.3. Chapter Summary 
This chapter have reviewed the literature in the field of PFM and the theory of public 
bureaucracy. In general, PFM operations, as the context of this study, have been 
referred to the implementation stage of the government’s budget, starting from the 
preparation of the budget execution document until the preparation and finalisation of 
financial statements. At this operational level, compliance with budget allocations, 
which have been stipulated in the budget law, and adherence to other relevant laws 
or regulations that govern the detailed arrangements for managing PFM operations 
are critical to assist the attainment of one of the PFM key objectives to maximise the 
optimum combination of economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the provision of 
public goods and services. 
Despite efforts to ensure compliance, the risk of non-compliance in PFM operations, 
especially in developing countries, cannot be fully negated. This chapter has shown 
that developing countries, such as Lesotho, Ghana, Myanmar, the Philippines and 
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 Vietnam, have experienced a significant level of non-compliance in their PFM 
operational practices. In those countries, non-compliant behaviour has caused a 
number of problems in all components of PFM operations, including delays in the 
details of budget approval, the existence of informal practices in budget execution 
processes, failure to effectively collect tax arrears, a higher volume of expenditure 
arrears, lack of liquidity due to bad cash and treasury management, the absence of 
valid and complete accounting and transaction records, inability to prepare a 
consolidated financial statement, and delays in the preparation of financial 
statements. 
This chapter has also exposed that the recent PFM reform trend toward an NPM-
based PFM model, especially in developing countries, does not eliminate the 
existence of recognisable structural features of bureaucracy in PFM operations. This 
evidence allows the examination of non-compliance problems in PFM operations in 
Indonesia through the lens of public bureaucracy theory. The theory indicates the 
influences and the roles of three major factors to non-compliant behaviour among 
public employees: the individual dispositions of public employees, the structural 
characteristics of public bureaucracies and the environmental factor. 
In summary, this chapter has provided adequate references from the literature to 
address the three research objectives of this study. Empirical evidence on the pattern 
of non-compliance problems in the PFM operations, especially among developing 
countries, assists the discussion regarding the first objective to identify the systemic 
problems in Indonesia’s local government PFM operations as a result of non-
compliant behaviour of the PFM actors. Further, reviews of the literature on non-
compliant behaviour from the perspective of public bureaucracy theory support the 
discussion to address the second and third research objectives. They provide 
explanation on how the PFM actors’ motives at work and the bureaucratic traditions 
in PFM operations have instigated the emergence of non-compliance problems in the 
Indonesia’s local government PFM operations.  
Following this literature review, Chapter 3 elaborates upon the development of the 
research design and methodology that is appropriate to address the research 




 Chapter 3 
Research Design and Methodology 
This chapter describes the design and methodology applied to conduct this present 
study. It aims to provide an explanation and justification of how the research methods 
used in this study have appropriately addressed the research objectives and 
questions. This research adopts a qualitative research methodology using a 
combination of several research techniques including content analysis, a case study, 
and thematic and template analyses. Data were mainly collected from documents, an 
FGD and semi-structured in-depth interviews. The chapter begins with a discussion 
about the nature of the research, the appropriateness of the application of a qualitative 
research methodology and how the research process can fulfil the assumptions 
required for the qualitative research. The development and the application of a two-
stage research design and how it can address the proposed research questions are 
then explained. Further, this chapter describes the actual data collection processes, 
including the method of selecting the timeframe of the study, the case to be studied, 
the participants for the FGD, the respondents for the interviews and other relevant 
aspects of the data gathering fieldwork. Later in this chapter, details of how the data 
were analysed and how the ethical issues were handled are also presented. 
3.1. Development of the Research Design 
Social research is driven by a number of motivational factors in order to gain 
knowledge and understanding about social phenomena. Those factors include the 
intention to search for a solution to overcome a social problem, the necessity to 
evaluate potential consequences of alternative actions or decisions, and the simple 
passion for gaining knowledge about ourselves, our society and the world we live in 
(Chadwick et al. 1984). Regardless of what factor motivates the research, Chadwick 
et al. (1984) note that proper development of the research design is important to 
ensure that the research makes a valuable contribution to the body of knowledge (i.e. 
science) or finds a practical solution for the social problem in question. 
3.1.1. Qualitative Nature of the Study 
The nature of this study focuses on the actual PFM operational practices following up 
the implementation of the new PFM rules and regulations. The actual PFM operational 
practices encompass personal interpretation of those who are working in the public 
sector, especially the PFM actors who are involved in various stages of the PFM 
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 operational processes. Their experiences and interactions with others, along with the 
historical, cultural and personal characteristics of the PFM actors, may result in 
different views and understandings among them about how they have to behave in 
accordance with the new PFM rules and regulations. 
In such a situation, the researcher seeks to evaluate all of the meanings, and the 
research relies on the participants’ understanding of the situation (Creswell 2007). As 
a result, an interpretive research philosophy is assumed, leading to the application of 
a qualitative research methodology in this study. The research questions that focus 
on the new PFM operational practices and the understanding of people who are 
involved in those practices (Rosaline 2008) also support the selection of a qualitative 
research methodology for this study. In addition, as Creswell (1998) mentioned, 
qualitative research does not need to be contrasted with quantitative research. It can 
stand on its own right without losing its reliability and credibility. 
3.1.2. Basic Philosophical Assumptions of the Study 
The qualitative research methodology adopted in this study has guided the 
development of the research design to fulfil a set of basic philosophical assumptions 
that, according to Creswell (2007), consists of ontological, epistemological, 
axiological, rhetorical and methodological. An ontological assumption refers to the 
nature of the reality being studied. In this study, the implementation process of the 
new PFM framework involves subjective and differing interpretations, as seen by the 
PFM actors (i.e. the respondents of this research) regarding the new PFM laws and 
their derivative rules and regulations. This assumption requires the disclosure of 
different perspectives through the use of quotes and themes in words provided by the 
respondents themselves regarding all aspects of their actions and behaviour under 
the expected PFM practices stipulated in the PFM rules and regulations. 
Epistemological assumption deals with the question about the appropriate way to 
know the reality being studied. In a qualitative research, the interpretive nature of the 
reality being studied requires the researcher to lessen the ‘distance’ between he/she 
and those who are being studied. The application of FGD and the semi-structured 
interviews for data gathering in this study expose the attempt to narrow the distance 
between the researcher and the respondents, which assisted the researcher to gain 
insider views via the responses provided by the respondents. 
Axiological assumptions refer to the roles of values in the research. This study 
recognises that the values of the respondents are inherent in their responses. They 
are not omitted but, in fact, are acknowledged and discussed openly in this study. In 
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 conjunction with the interpretations of the researcher, the values of the respondents 
are analysed and, ultimately, form the basis for the formulation of the research 
findings. 
The term ‘rhetorical assumption’ denotes the language of the research. More 
specifically, in this study, the literal and personal narrative responses from the 
respondents were used extensively. Direct quotes from the respondents’ are used in 
this research thesis to identify and clarify any patterns, categories or themes that 
emerged from interactions with the respondents during the study. 
The last philosophical assumption, i.e. methodological, is derived from the previous 
four assumptions (Creswell 1998). It is concerned with the research processes that, 
in a qualitative study, are characterised by an inductive logic, are contextually-bound 
and use emergent design. This study applies both content and thematic analyses of 
the data by which patterns, categories and themes are developed, both deductively 
and inductively, into more abstract units of information. Details about the context of 
the study are presented as part of the case study method being applied in this study. 
Thus, sections that describe the context of PFM in Indonesia’s local government, 
including the history of the PFM in Indonesia, the PFM regulatory framework, the 
profiles of the local government selected for the study and other relevant matters, will 
be presented in this thesis prior to discussion of the research findings.  
3.1.3. Two-stage Research Design 
A research design is developed in order to answer the research questions and 
achieve the research objectives. The nature of the research questions in this study 
has led to the development of a two-stage research design, as displayed in Figure 
3.1. The first stage addresses the first research question. At this stage, a content 
analysis technique is employed by analysing the contents of the audit findings, as 
expounded in the external audit reports of local governments. The Indonesian public 
sector external audit institution, BPK, generally applies the requirements stipulated in 
the law as its audit criteria. Therefore, any negative findings in the audit reports 
indicate compliance gaps between the actual behaviour and practices of the PFM 
actors and the expected behaviours as stated in the law. This study considers any 
compliance gap as a non-compliance problem. The disclosure of those non-
compliance problems in BPK’s audit reports potentially signifies the existence of 
systemic problems in the implementation of the new PFM framework. 
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 Figure 3-1 
Two-Stage Research Design 
 
Considering the resource constraints and the high number of local governments in 
Indonesia 9, the second stage adopted a single case study method in one local 
government. It addressed the second and third research questions relying on the 
results from interviews with a number of a local government officials and employees 
9  As of 2014, the total number of local governments in Indonesia was 542, which consisted of 34 
provinces, 415 districts and 93 cities (Direktorat Jenderal Otonomi Daerah 2014) 
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 who were involved in the PFM operational processes. A case study requires an 
understanding of the case being studied (Stake 1994; Creswell 2007). For that 
purpose, a documentation review regarding the local government selected for the 
study was also conducted to gain knowledge about the profile and other contextual 
information of the case in the study. It also included the reiteration of content analysis 
of audit reports that had been conducted in the first stage, but was limited to the audit 
reports of the local government being studied, in order to gain information about 
relevant non-compliant behaviour prevailing in that specific local government. 
3.2. First Stage – Content Analysis of Audit Report 
Content analysis is a method which has a long history in the qualitative research 
realm. According to Dovring (1954), the history of content analysis dates back to 1743, 
when a collection of religious Christian hymns entitled “Songs of Zion” was published 
in Sweden. Later, in the 1940s, content analysis became very popular as a research 
technique to examine the content of mass communication, mostly in its quantitative 
nature that focused on the calculation of frequencies of the contents (Berelson 1971). 
Further, criticisms of the quantitative characteristics of content analysis were raised, 
resulting in the development of qualitative approaches to content analysis (Mayring 
2000).  
Content analysis is a data reduction process (Weber 1990; Patton 2014) by which 
qualitative data is systematically identified, categorised and described (Hsieh and 
Shannon 2005; Patton 2014; Mayring 2000) to obtain something meaningful in regard 
to its content. The quantitative and qualitative traditions embedded in content analysis 
alternate the application of content analysis in the research. The quantitative tradition 
of content analysis evaluates the text material deductively and quantifies elements of 
meaning, whereas the qualitative tradition works inductively to summarise and 
classify the elements of meaning in the text material (Donsbach 2008) relevant to the 
study. Despite those differences, in conclusion, content analysis allows a qualitative 
analysis of the text material while, at the same time, calculating the frequency of 
certain concepts that emerge from the analysis (Berg and Lune 2014; Vaismoradi et 
al. 2013). Quantification of concepts allows content analysis to identify the magnitude 
of each concept appearing in the study and helps the researcher in looking for 
patterns that support the research findings (Berg and Lune 2014).  
The first stage of this study deals with the identification of systemic problems in the 
implementation of the new PFM operational legal framework in Indonesia’s local 
governments. It provides the context of the study where gaps exist between the 
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 expected practices, as stipulated in the new PFM operations rules and regulations, 
and the actual practices performed by the PFM actors. Under the new PFM 
framework, these gaps are documented in the audit reports, a legitimate form of 
documentation regarding the quality of PFM in Indonesia that is published by BPK. 
While a number of studies have utilised the general information of BPK’s audit reports, 
such as its financial audit opinion on government institutions’ financial statements, 
there are still very limited number of studies that have examined the more detailed 
audit information of BPK, such as its audit finding database and the qualitative data 
of the audit findings disclosed in the audit reports. The availability, format, structure, 
and arrangement of BPK’s audit findings database management, especially its audit 
findings statistics, have supported the application of the content analysis technique 
used in the first stage of this study. Further, the qualitative data and information 
available in the audit reports have enabled deeper understanding regarding the nature 
of non-compliant behaviour of the PFM actors. 
3.2.1. BPK’s Audit Reports at a Glance 
BPK has a mandate to audit the management and accountability of the state’s finance. 
The new PFM laws strengthen the role and function of BPK as the only external 
auditor of public financial management and accountability for both central government 
institutions and local government jurisdictions. In carrying out its mandate, BPK 
conducts three types audit: financial audit, performance audit and special purpose 
audit. For each of those assignments, BPK publishes an audit report that generally 
consists of five components: 1) audit finding, 2) audit criteria, 3) cause, 4) impact and 
5) recommendation (BPK 2014c). In addition to those components, for financial 
audits, BPK also presents its audit opinion regarding the fairness of the government’s 
financial statements; and for performance and special purposes audits, BPK presents 
its audit conclusions (GoI 2004b). 
According to the state audit law, the auditees have the opportunity to provide their 
comments on the reported findings, conclusions, and recommendations. BPK is 
required to incorporate the comments into the audit reports. In the case of local 
governments, at the end of the audit reporting process, BPK submits the audit reports 
to the local governments official (governors, mayors, and/or regents) and the local 
parliaments (GoI 2004b). As part of its transparency, audit reports that have been 
submitted to the government and local parliaments are publicly available10. 
10  Though the law explicitly states that BPK’s audit reports are public documents, BPK decides not to 
upload the finalised individual audit reports on its website, except for the IHPS and Financial Audit 
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 Article 18 of Law No. 15/2004 regarding State Audit specifically mentions the 
requirements for BPK to submit an Ikhtisar Hasil Pemeriksaan Semesteran (IHPS) or 
a Summary of Semesterly Audit Reports to the parliament (i.e. the House of 
Representatives and the House of Regional Representatives) within three months 
after the end of each semester. BPK is also required to hand in the IHPS to the 
President, all governors, all mayors, and all regents to ensure that all levels of 
government have nation-wide information about the audit findings of the audit reports. 
It took two years before BPK was finally able to submit its first IHPS to the Parliament 
in September 2007, which covered BPK’s audit reports published in the first semester 
of 2007. 
As part of its mandate, BPK viewed the necessity to establish an audit findings 
database (BPK 2010c). Such a database would allow BPK to develop and present 
some statistics about its audit findings. For that purpose, in 2010, BPK issued BPK 
Decree No. 5/K/I-XIII.2/8/2010 regarding its Technical Guideline for Audit Finding 
Classification. The guidelines are used to categorise audit findings based on the 
problems found and described in the audit reports. As part of their audit assignment, 
auditors would analyse the audit findings. Each audit finding can be categorised into 
one or more audit cases. Auditors would further evaluate each audit case and 
categorise it as one appropriate audit case item, according to the guideline. The audit 
case item is the third or the lowest level of the audit finding classification hierarchy. It 
consists of 80 items which can be further classified into audit finding sub-groups (the 
second hierarchy) and groups (the first hierarchy). The result of the audit findings 
evaluation, categorisation and classification processes is then inputt into BPK’s 
integrated audit management information system 11 . The availability of an audit 
findings database enables BPK to conduct further analyses that are beneficial in 
assisting the stakeholders with their decision-making (BPK 2010c). 
The audit finding classification guideline categorises the audit findings items into three 
broader groups, which consist of 1) non-compliance with legal rules, 2) internal control 
weaknesses, and 3) 3Es findings12. The first group, non-compliance findings, is then 
Report on Consolidated Central Government Financial Statement. BPK had published BPK 
Regulation No. 3/2011 regarding Public Information Management in BPK which sets the protocols 
and procedures that need to be followed for gaining access to individual audit reports and other 
information regarding BPK. 
11  Integrated Audit Management Information System refers to Sistem Manajemen Pemeriksaan. It is a 
web-based application that is used by BPK to manage audit data and information throughout all audit 
stages, consisting of an audit planning module, an audit fieldwork module, an audit follow-up module 
and an audit evaluation and monitoring module (BPK 2011f). 
12  3Es stands for economy, efficiency, and effectiveness. “3Es findings” refers to audit findings that 
have caused waste, inefficiency and ineffectiveness in government operations. 
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 categorised into 5 sub-groups based upon the impacts, which are: a) causing the 
occurrence of state losses, b) potentially causing the occurrence of state losses, c) 
causing a shortage in government revenue collection, d) causing administration 
deficiencies, and e) indicating criminal and/or corruption offences. The last item of the 
non-compliance group of audit findings, an indication of criminal and/or corruption 
offences, is considered to be confidential information. Hence, the statistics of this audit 
findings group are not disclosed in the IHPS13. The second group, internal control 
weaknesses, is divided into three sub-groups, namely: a) accounting and reporting 
control weaknesses, b) budget execution control weaknesses, and c) internal control 
structure weaknesses. The last group of 3Es findings are simply divided into three 
sub-groups, as follow: a) waste, b) inefficiency, and c) ineffectiveness. Appendix 2 
displays the 80 audit finding items and their classification into audit findings sub-
groups and groups, as specified in the guidelines. 
To provide more holistic information about the accountability and management of 
public finance throughout Indonesia, both at central and local government levels, BPK 
includes the statistics from the audit finding classifications in its IHPS. In Semester 
I/2008, BPK piloted the inclusion of audit findings statistics in the IHPS, even though 
it was only limited to financial audit reports. In 2009, BPK was finally able to present 
audit findings statistics that covered all types of audit reports for all government 
institutions, including local governments, in its IHPS. Since then, the frequencies of 
the audit findings classification items have been included in the IHPS.   
3.2.2. Selection of the Audit Reports 
As mentioned earlier, a complete and reliable audit findings database was not made 
available by BPK until 2009. As a result, the analysis presented in this study covers 
the audit findings reported in the local governments’ audit reports that were published 
from 2009 until 2014. Every year, BPK conducts financial audits on local governments’ 
financial statements. Financial audit on local governments is conducted and published 
by BPK’s Regional Offices, located in all provinces throughout Indonesia. All local 
governments’ financial audit reports are included in the analysis, except the audit 
reports on local governments for which their finalisation and publication had been 
delayed for more than one year. Under the current PFM framework, local 
governments are required to submit their unaudited financial statements to BPK three 
13  BPK is required to report any criminal and/or corruption offences found during its audits to law 
enforcement agencies (i.e. National Police Agency, Attorney General and Corruption Eradication 
Commission). 
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 months after the end of the financial year at the latest or, in other words, by 31 March 
in the following year. BPK then has to publish its financial audit report by the end of 
the first semester of the subsequent year, or by 30 June. In the early implementation 
of this requirement, most local governments were not able to submit their financial 
statements within this timeline, causing BPK to also delay its financial audit 
assignment. For local governments that submitted their financial statement within the 
timeline, BPK did complete its financial audit in the first semester of the subsequent 
year. The statistics on the audit findings of that financial audit are then reported in the 
IHPS Semester I. Financial audit assignments on those local governments that were 
not able to submit their financial statements on time were conducted in the second 
semester, causing the statistics of those audit findings to be reported in IHPS 
Semester II. Nevertheless, there have been occasions when the delay of unaudited 
financial statement submissions to BPK has been more than one year. In such cases, 
BPK did not publish the audit finding statistics of those audit reports in its IHPS. As a 
result, 19 financial audit reports on various local governments for financial year 2009 
until 2014 could not be included in the analysis due to the extensive delays of the 
respective local governments in submitting their unaudited financial statements to 
BPK.  
The audit processes for performance audit and special purposes audit on local 
governments are not similar to that of financial audit. These audits are not necessarily 
conducted by BPK’s Regional Offices. Some of these audits, commonly known as 
thematic audit, are planned and conducted by BPK’s Headquarters in Jakarta, 
especially for strategic, complex and nation-wide audit themes (BPK 2008). In a 
number of instances, BPK has published one performance or special purposes audit 
report as part of its thematic audits on several local governments. On other occasions, 
BPK has supplemented the audit report with an individual audit report on each local 
government included in the audit. The main consideration on whether BPK publishes 
one audit report or more is based on the resources being used for the audit. When 
the audit is funded fully from the budget of BPK’s headquarters, the audit is conducted 
by auditors from the headquarters and the audit report is also published by the 
headquarters. However, when the audits involve resources (e.g. budget and auditors) 
from BPK’s Regional Offices, individual audit reports are also published by the 
regional offices. In addition to that, BPK’s Regional Offices publish a number of 
performance audits and special purposes audits on their local government portfolio. 
In this study, only performance and special purposes audit reports on local 
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 governments published by BPK’s Regional Offices during the period of study are 
included in the analysis. 
Using a selection method described in the previous paragraph, this study has 
examined 5,141 audit reports on local government published between 2009 and 2014. 
It represents about 94.11% of the total 5,463 audit reports published within the same 
period. Figure 3.2 below breaks down the number of audit reports included in this 
study based on the audit types. 
Figure 3-2 
Number of Audit Reports Included in the Content Analysis 
 
3.2.3. Criteria for Systemic Problem Identification 
From section 3.2.1, we can conclude that the preparation of the IHPS is one type of 
quantitative content analysis because it analyses the text material (e.g. the audit 
reports) deductively, using audit finding classification as the criteria for categorising 
the qualitative data of the audit findings disclosed in the audit reports. It enables BPK 
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 to present the aggregate information about the frequencies of each audit finding 
classification item in the IHPS based on the type of audit and the type of government 
institution (i.e. ministries, local governments, and government-owned enterprises). A 
complete set of data regarding the audit findings classification of each individual audit 
report is available in BPK’s audit findings database. 
Based on the selected audit reports, as discussed in Section 3.2.2, the researcher 
developed a separate audit findings database for local governments’ audit reports that 
was used to identify any systemic problems resulting from PFM operational practices 
at local governments. Three criteria were then used to analyse the local governments’ 
audit findings database and to identify the systemic problems. Those criteria are the 
frequency of the audit finding, the locus of the audit finding, and the impact of the audit 
finding to the overall PFM objectives. 
3.2.3.1. The Frequency of the Audit Finding Items 
The frequency of each audit finding item can be easily calculated and summarised 
based on the audit finding database used in this study. Krippendorff (1980) suggests 
that the summarising function of a content analysis can be made in terms of absolute 
frequencies or relative frequencies. Absolute frequencies recapitulate the number of 
each incident, in this case each audit findings item that was found in the audit finding 
database, while relative frequencies present the percentage of each incident 
compared to the total incidents reported in the database. The calculation of 
frequencies is the most basic and common form of data analysis (Krippendorff 1980), 
and it often provides significant findings regarding the data. The higher the frequency 
of certain audit findings, potentially, the more likely it is that they could contribute to 
the existence of systemic problems in the PFM operational practices. The greater 
number of certain audit findings reported during the period of the study reveals the 
inability of the current PFM practices in local government to prevent the problems 
from occurring. In addition, higher frequencies of certain audit findings increase the 
probability that the findings do commonly occur in most local governments showing 
the inherent flaws of the PFM operational framework and design. 
In implementing this first criterion, the aggregate audit findings database used in this 
study was sorted based on the absolute frequency of each type of audit finding item. 
Then, a careful examination of the items was undertaken to identify any similar items 
that could be combined into a single item. This examination was conducted because 
the nature of the audit findings classification guideline allows problems that have 
similar characteristics to be categorised under a different item. For example, 
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 overpayment of business travel expenses and overpayment of emolument are 
classified separately in the guideline, although they have the same characteristics of 
problems (i.e. non-compliance findings which cause expenses payments that exceed 
the applicable standard). To further simplify the analysis, 1% relative frequency was 
used as a cut-off point to eliminate any insignificant audit finding items in the 
subsequent examination. In other words, any audit finding items that were less than 
1% of the total audit finding items reported during the period of the study were 
considered not to be significant or to have any potential to cause PFM systemic 
problems. 
3.2.3.2. Locus of the Audit Findings Within the PFM System 
PFM is considered as a system that consists of a number of sub-systems. The PFM 
model developed by CIPFA (2010, pg. 16), for example, consists of eight process 
elements whereby each element represents a PFM sub-system that can be broken 
down into several PFM components. In the Indonesian context, the PFM model refers 
to the framework stipulated in the trilogy of financial laws that govern the whole PFM 
system, both at central as well as local government levels. As the focus of this study 
is the operational element of the PFM (i.e. budget execution and accounting and 
reporting), the identification of PFM systemic problems includes the identification of 
the PFM operational components in which the problems occur. Those seven sub-
systems are: 1) revenue collection, 2) disbursement process (including procurement), 
3) financing activity, 4) cash and treasury management, 5) asset management, 6) 
accounting and reporting, and 7) internal control14. 
The nature of the external audit function performed by BPK ensures that the 
occurrences of its audit findings are within the operational elements of the PFM 
framework.  As a result, it can be assumed that audit findings reported in BPK’s audit 
reports would fall under the seven PFM operational sub-systems, as mentioned in the 
previous paragraph. While a detailed examination of each audit finding case was not 
possible, due to the high frequency of the incidents15, an examination of the definition 
and scope of each audit finding item described in the guideline was conducted to 
ensure that the occurrences of audit findings were within the PFM operational sub-
systems.  
14  The seven components of PFM operations are based on the PFM legal framework after the reform. 
A more detailed discussion of PFM operational components in Indonesia’s local governments is 
presented in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3.3). 
15  The total audit findings reported during the period of study (i.e. 2009 to 2014) are 104,903 cases.  
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 3.2.3.3. Impact Upon the Overall PFM Objectives 
A system model focuses on the mechanisms to optimise the overall results of the 
system, not the performance of each individual component (CIPFA 2010). To be 
categorised as a systemic problem, audit findings items that met the first two criteria 
above were analysed further to identify their links to the overall PFM objectives. Such 
analysis involved an examination to identify and determine the negative 
consequences of the audit finding items in regard to the achievement of the PFM 
objectives, which are, according to the trilogy of the financial laws, to ensure that 
public money and resources are managed in an orderly manner, are compliant with 
the regulations and are economical, efficient, effective, transparent and accountable 
(GoI 2003; 2004a; b). The presentation of audit findings in BPK’s audit report follows 
a certain format and includes a description of the audit findings, the criteria of the 
audit, the causes of the findings, the impacts of the findings, comments from auditees 
and the auditors’ recommendations. The analysis to evaluate the impacts of the audit 
finding items that have met the first two criteria of systemic problems was conducted 
purposely by selecting the appropriate sections of BPK’s IHPS and audit reports that 
explained the auditors’ evaluations of the impacts of the audit findings.  
3.2.4. Limitations 
The design of the content analysis specifically accommodated the internal BPK’s audit 
processes and practices. That may have limited the comparability of this study to other 
countries. In addition, this study does not differentiate the audit findings statistics 
based on the type of audit despite the fact that one type of audit may significantly 
contribute to a certain classification of audit findings. For example, performance audit 
findings were mostly categorised as 3E audit findings, while financial audit findings 
contribute more to internal control weaknesses. 
3.3. Second Stage – Single Case Study 
Yin (2014, 16) defines a case study as “an empirical enquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-world context when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident”. PFM 
reform in Indonesia is a contemporary phenomenon that has been studied from a 
number of different perspectives (for example in: Achmad 2012; Siallagan 2012; Mir 
and Sutiyono 2013; Prabowo et al. 2013). Findings from those studies are mixed and 
it is still difficult to draw a general conclusion on whether the new practices introduced 
through the reform have already been embraced, adopted and implemented. The 
context of Indonesia as a developing and newly democratic country could be one 
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 factor that contributes to the complexity of the phenomenon and causes such 
difficulty. Nevertheless, from the scientific point of view, this situation makes it 
attractive for more research to be undertaken to examine the phenomenon in more 
detail. The new PFM practices, as the phenomenon under study, are bound within 
Indonesia’s public sector system that functions as the context of the phenomenon. 
They are also integral to Indonesia’s political and governmental system, which can be 
seen as the macro context of the phenomenon. While the dynamics in the political 
and public sector arenas would have an impact upon the operation of the PFM 
framework on the one hand, the actual performance and operation of the PFM could 
possibly impact the accountability of the governments and trigger the deterioration of 
the public’s trust in the public sector on the other hand. In some cases, a lack of 
accountability in PFM could generate an unstable political situation. Thus, it is 
apparent that the boundaries between PFM practices and both the public sector and 
the government’s political system are vague. This discussion about the characteristics 
of PFM in the broader public service and governmental political system suggests the 
applicability of a case study method for this study because it fits into the scope of a 
case study as defined by Yin (2014). Therefore, given the qualitative nature of this 
study, a qualitative case study was employed in this research. 
The selection of a research method should be guided by the research questions and 
objectives (Yin 2014; Flyvberg 2011). The selected qualitative case study method 
conforms to the objective of this study to present an in-depth and extensive 
description of the topic of the study from the perspective of the public sector 
employees. The conformity of this study with the case study research method is also 
supported by the ability of a case study to answer the what, why and how questions 
(Saunders et al. 2012), which are the types of research question to be answered by 
this research. 
The second stage of this study attempted to examine the link between the non-
compliance of public employees and the PFM operational practices in Indonesia’s 
local government. It is expected that further similar studies in a number of local 
governments in Indonesia can be conducted in the same way. The diversity of cultural, 
demographic, social and economic characteristics among local governments in 
Indonesia offers a potential for deviation in the linkages between the public 
employees’ behaviour and the PFM practices across local governments in Indonesia. 
This study can serve as a model, considering that the most appropriate case has been 
selected, which can be replicated in future research covering other local governments 
in Indonesia, in particular, and in other developing countries, in general. The future 
68 
 potential for further research, along with the limited resources available to conduct the 
study, provides a rationale for selecting a single case study method for this study.  
3.3.1. Selection of the Case 
Stake (1995) suggests that, when selecting the case for a case study, the main factor 
that needs to be taken into account is to maximise what we can learn. However, 
context differences among case studies limit the generalisability of case study findings 
to the population (Creswell 2007). Seawright and Gerring (2008) further suggest that 
a case study would only be useful if the case selected could represent the population. 
Representativeness is essential to ensure that the case study can provide insight into 
a broader phenomenon within the population (Gerring 2007). Creswell (2007) further 
argues that the selection of representative cases could best generalise the case study 
findings. Failure to select a representative case could jeopardise the contribution of 
the study to the body of knowledge or limit its application to the real world.  
There is advice from the perspective of quantitative research to randomly select such 
cases to avoid any selection bias. In other instances, practical considerations such as 
resources, access to the institutions, knowledge of the researchers and prominent 
methods within the field of study may also influence the case selection process. 
Nevertheless, those options cannot ensure the representativeness of the selected 
cases. Therefore, the adoption of a purposive case selection technique is often 
unavoidable. A purposive case selection technique was used in selecting the case for 
this study because it allowed the researcher to select the most appropriate case while 
also maintaining the representativeness of the case and meeting other important 
theoretical considerations (Seawright and Gerring 2008). Further, Patton (1990) also 
argues that a purposeful sampling method is commonly used in qualitative inquiry 
because it focuses on in-depth analysis of the selected cases.   
A critical step toward selection of the most appropriate case is to gather as much 
information as possible about the population, which then can be used as a reference 
for selecting the most representative case to be studied (Flyvberg 2011). Even though 
it is difficult to achieve representativeness, Seawright and Gerring (2008) further 
argue that typicality addresses the main objective of case selection when choosing a 
case that could represent the population. Typicality could be judged according to the 
mean, median or mode on a number of variables that are relevant to the population 
of the cases. When potential cases are large and the selection criteria variables are 
multidimensional, some prominent factors could be used for the identification of the 
most typical cases. The typical case selection technique may also involve a 
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 theoretically based argument of some phenomenon in the population. In this second 
stage of the study, a typical case selection technique proposed by Gerring (2007) has 
been adopted to choose one local government to be studied. Through this typical 
case, the study has the potential to draw a general conclusion about the mechanism 
of the linkage between the behaviour of the public employees and the PFM 
operational practices, which then can be used to explain this issue in relation to other 
local government jurisdictions. 
The case selection technique mentioned above was applied to 33 provinces, 93 cities, 
and 398 districts16. Finding a typical case among those potential local governments 
was quite a demanding task given the diversity of cultures, customs, demography, 
economic development, geographical layout and other characteristics that feature 
within Indonesian local governments. Nevertheless, a selection process using several 
local governments’ financial and non-financial measures that were available as of 
2012 was finally arranged. The first selection factor was the level of local 
government 17 . As the design of regional autonomy in Indonesia devolves more 
authorities to cities/districts than to provincial government (Suryadarma 2012; Djohan 
2014), the omission of provincial government as potential cases for this study was 
justifiable, leaving the selection process to include only 93 cities and 398 districts. For 
the purpose of the selection process, many variables were considered, including year 
of establishment, location, BPK’s audit opinion of financial statements, number of 
audit cases reported in audit reports, the performance accountability index published 
by the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform, and budget figures of the 
local governments that included actual total revenues, percentage of local revenues 
compared to total revenues, total budget and percentage of budget realisation. In 
addition, the Local Economic Governance (LEG) index 18  developed by Komite 
Pemantauan Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah (KPPOD) or the Regional Autonomy 
Watch Committee was considered in the selection process. The ‘average’ value of 
each selection variable was calculated to be used as a benchmark for selecting the 
case. However, the first two variables were independently evaluated because only 
local governments established before 1999 and not located in Western Indonesia 
16  These figures represent the number of financial statement audit reports on local governments for the 
financial year of 2012 published by BPK (BPK 2015d). 
17  Local government in Indonesia is divided into two levels or tingkat. Level 1 or Daerah Tingkat I refers 
to provincial government, while Level II or Daerah Tingkat II refers to cities and districts. 
18  The LEG index is a composite index that measures nine components of local governance that are 
believed to be under the direct control of the city/district governments and have significant impact 
upon the business climate in their regions (KPPOD 2011). 
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 were included in the selection process. The omission of local governments 
established after 1999 was an effort to capture the respondents’ experiences and 
acquaintance with the previous PFM practices before the reform. Meanwhile, the 
focus on cities and districts located in Central and Eastern Indonesia was due to their 
geographical distance being farther from the capital city of Indonesia, Jakarta. 
The application of these selection criteria resulted in three typical local governments 
being selected as appropriate for the study: West Kotawaringin District, Kendari City 
and West Lombok District. As methodological justification was no longer relevant in 
the last stage of this case selection technique, practical reasons in relation to their 
proximity and the resources available for this study were considered as the main 
factor in selecting West Lombok District as the single local government case to be 
studied. The characteristics of West Lombok District compared to the ‘average’ 
characteristics of local governments in Indonesia are depicted in Table 3.1 below, 
while Appendix 3 shows the geographical location of West Lombok District.  
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 Table 3-1 
Characteristics of Selected Local Government for the Study 
No Variable Average Characteristics West Lombok Remark 
1 Level of 
government 
Districts (76.44%) District Purposely selected 
2 Establishment Before 1999 
(60.78%) 
1958 Purposely selected 
3 Proximity Western (58.07%) Central Purposely selected 
4 Audit opinion Qualified (60.99%) Qualified Financial audit report 
for FY 2012 




20 cases Financial audit report 
for FY 2012 
6 Performance 
index 
C (55.41%) C Performance 
accountability report 
assessment for 2012 
7 Total revenues 
(Rp. million) 
Rp912,325.17 Rp852,081.77 Average for cities and 
districts 
8 Local revenues 
(%) 
7.37% 11.08% Average for cities and 
districts 
9 Total budget (Rp. 
million) 
Rp1,003,223.79 Rp892,179.86 Average for cities and 
districts 
10 Budget realisation 
(%) 
90.08% 97.07% Average for cities and 
districts 
11 LEG index 59.2-64.1 62.1 Mean values for cities 
and districts 
3.3.2. Data Gathering Techniques 
One of the key characteristics of case study methodology is the use of multiple data 
gathering techniques and sources (Saunders et al. 2012; Eisenhardt 1989b). The 
need for multiple data is consistent with the requirement of a case study to also gain 
an adequate and relevant understanding of the context of the study (Stake 1995). In 
the second stage, a number of data gathering techniques and sources were used, 
which include public documents, internal reports, BPK’s audit reports, FGD and semi-
structured interviews. While documents and the FGD were used to gain 
understanding about the context of the study (i.e. the profile and the nature of 
systemic problems in West Lombok District), semi-structured interviews were used to 
gain the data necessary for addressing the second and third research questions of 
this study. 
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 3.3.2.1. Documentation Analysis 
This study mostly used documentation to gather information about West Lombok 
District. General information, such as its history and the characteristics of the district, 
were acquired from publicly available sources such as the public library, the official 
website of West Lombok District and reports from the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics. 
More particular information about the district’s financial management procedures and 
practices was requested and collected during the fieldwork. This documentation was 
analysed and synthesised to compose a relevant description of West Lombok 
District’s profile, in general, and more specifically of its financial management within 
the context that is relevant to the topic of this study. 
3.3.2.2. Content Analysis 
The steps and processes of content analysis were similar to those of the first stage, 
except that only West Lombok District’s audit reports published between 2009 and 
2014 were covered. In addition, since content analysis in the second stage aimed to 
gain understanding of the nature of the audit findings and PFM problems in West 
Lombok District, it did not apply the three selection criteria for the identification of 
systemic problems that were used in the first stage (i.e. frequency, locus, and impact). 
Instead, all audit finding cases reported in the audit reports were included in the 
analysis and were considered to be relevant for gaining an adequate understanding 
of the actual PFM problems in West Lombok District. The inclusion of all audit finding 
items was necessary because the nature of PFM problems in West Lombok District 
may expose different characteristics than the overall systemic problems of local 
governments identified and examined in the first stage of this study. In addition, an 
understanding of the actual PFM problems in West Lombok District was also 
important to guide the development of the semi-structured interview questions and 
the selection of interview respondents that could adequately address the second 
research question of this study. 
3.3.2.3. Focus Group Discussion  
To gather more insight into the PFM systemic problems in West Lombok District, 
especially in relation to the audit processes and the nature of the audit findings, an 
FGD with BPK auditors who conducted the audit on West Lombok District also was 
arranged. The selection of FGD participants was based on their involvement in the 
audit assignments on West Lombok District. All types of audit were considered equally 
relevant, which resulted in a mixed group of participants that included auditors who 
had conducted financial audits, performance audits and special purpose audits. 
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 According to Berg and Lune (2014), information gathered from an FGD can be used 
for triangulation. In this case, analysis of the FGD results was used to confirm the 
findings from the content analysis of audit reports that had been conducted earlier. 
3.3.2.4. Semi-structured Interviews 
Marshall and Rossman (2006) assert that most qualitative researchers depend quite 
extensively on in-depth interviews as a data-gathering technique for their studies. This 
assertion is also supported by Yin (2014) who claims that interviews are commonly 
used in qualitative case study research. Further, in relation to encapsulating aspects 
that are difficult to be directly observed, such as the psychological aspects of human 
behaviour, it is well acknowledged that, in qualitative research, interviews are quite 
notable and superior to other data collection techniques (Patton 1990; King 1994). It 
is also summarised in the literature that most case studies deal with human affairs 
and actions; hence, interviews have become essential sources of evidence for any 
case studies (Yin 2014). As this case study has the specific aim of examining the 
behaviour of public employees involved in the PFM processes, the selection of 
interviews as the main data-gathering technique used in this study is justifiable both 
from the methodological perspective as well as for practical reasons.  
Chadwick et al. (1984) state that interview styles occur along a continuum. The 
continuum spreads from a highly structured to a highly unstructured interview. While 
a highly structured interview does not allow any deviation from the initial design of the 
interview, a highly unstructured interview consists of undirected exploratory 
questions. The research objectives are the main consideration used by researchers 
to design their relevant types of interview, which can range between these two 
extremes. Saunders et al. (2012) further mention that the degree of formality and the 
structure of interviews are commonly used to categorise them as either structured 
interviews, semi-structured interviews or unstructured interviews. 
A highly structured interview typically consists of a list of very specific questions with 
exact wording that are asked to all of the interviewees uniformly, according to the 
sequence and order that have been predetermined (Chadwick et al. 1984). It aims to 
collect particular data in order to explain the behaviour of respondents within certain 
settings or situations (Fontana and Frey 2005). These particular data can be collected 
by asking the participants to choose one of the already pre-defined answers 
(Saunders et al. 2012). A highly structured interview generally uses closed-ended 
questions and accommodates a more specific hypothesis that is being tested in the 
study (Maccoby and Maccoby 1954). Saunders et al. (2012) further posit that the 
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 structured interview is commonly used to collect quantifiable data and generally refers 
to quantitative research interviews. 
According to King (2004), cited in Saunders et al. (2012), the other two types of 
interview, semi-structured and unstructured, are often defined as qualitative research 
interviews. Semi-structured interviews involve outlining a set of themes and some key 
questions to be covered during the interviews. However, themes and questions may 
not be listed in their actual wording and exact sequence. The list is used as a checklist 
to ensure that all relevant topics have been included and covered during the interview.  
The application of this checklist may vary, meaning that the researcher may omit 
some questions if the specific context of the interviewees is not relevant to the 
research topic (Saunders et al. 2012). In regard to an unstructured interview, it can 
be classified as an informal conversational interview relying entirely on the 
spontaneous generation of questions by the interviewer (Patton 1987). Similarly, 
Fontana and Frey (2005) underlines the importance for gaining extensive information 
from unstructured interview by not enforcing any a priori answers, allowing the 
collection of any relevant data to appropriately understand the intricacy of human 
behaviour. Saunders et al. (2012) refer unstructured interview to in-depth interview 
where the interviewer does not prepare any pre-determined list of questions and 
themes to be asked during the interview. In most cases, the interviewer does not know 
what is going to happen and what further questions will be asked. Further, Saunders 
et al. (2012) assert that this type of interview is non-directive. It is the interviewees’ 
perceptions that guide and direct the conduct of the interviews. They are free to talk 
about any events, behaviour, actions and/or beliefs that are related to the research 
topic. Nevertheless, the researcher needs to have a clear idea about the pieces of 
information that are to be explored, as guided by the research objectives. In both 
qualitative types of research interview, open-ended questions are common, allowing 
the researcher to exercise his/her active listening skills to further probe the 
interviewees’ responses and obtain a complete and detailed picture of his or her 
experiences, opinions and perceptions that are essential to the research topic. 
The nature of this particular study allows the application of a semi-structured interview 
style. A highly structured interview does not fit the needs of this study because of its 
quantitative nature. Unstructured interviews also are not suitable for practical 
purposes and reasons related to assumptions. From a practical perspective, 
unstructured interviews require more time because they normally occur as part of 
ongoing participant observational fieldwork (Berg and Lune 2014). From the 
assumptions perspective, unstructured interviews assume that the interviewers do not 
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 know in advance what questions will be necessary to ask and that the heterogeneity 
of the interviewees will potentially cause them to misinterpret some of the meanings 
of words or terms used in the questions (Berg and Lune 2014). 
The early works completed in the first stage of this study to identify the existence of 
PFM systemic problems, both at the national level and in West Lombok District, 
provided some context that was necessary for the development of potential questions 
to be asked during the interview. In addition, an examination of the literature, in terms 
of the theories and their empirical evidence pertaining to the topic of the study, also 
provided some insight into the potential responses from the interviews that was 
important to assist in the development of interview questions. In regard to the 
interviewees’ profiles, the nature of this study required respondents to be involved in, 
and have adequate experience with, the financial management processes of their 
local government. Hence, the potential misunderstanding of the themes or questions 
being asked in the interview would be minimal. Consequently, the assumptions for 
unstructured interview were not met. 
The inappropriateness of both the structured and unstructured interview models for 
this study led to the development and application of a semi-structured interview 
model. Semi-structured interviews provide flexibility to ask questions spontaneously 
as required and to establish a relaxed conversational style of interview while 
maintaining the focus to gain adequate responses from interviewess on a pre-
determined set of questions, themes and topics. The conversational style of a semi-
structured interview allows the emergence of unbiased responses as the interviewees 
answer the questions. In addition, the responses generated from the conversational 
style of a semi-structured interview are generally more systematic, comprehensive 
and focused, resulting in an undemanding data analysis process compared to that for 
an informal conversational interview. 
One critical stage for conducting research interviews is the selection of respondents 
in a way that is relevant to the study and, at the same time, is justified by the theory. 
This study followed a purposive sampling technique, which Saunders et al. (2012) 
refer to as “judgmental sampling” because the researcher uses personal judgement 
to select the respondents, primarily based on their knowledge, information, opinions 
and experience being relevant to the research questions in order to fulfil the research 
objectives. This technique was selected due to the nature of the research questions 
that were specifically focused on the motivation and behaviour of public employees 
who are involved in various stages of financial management processes. The 
knowledge of the respondents about BPK’s audit reports in regard to the fulfilment of 
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 their roles in the financial management process was also necessary to gain critical 
and important responses relevant to the research objectives. A variation on the 
purposive sampling technique that allows for the diversity or heterogeneity of the 
respondents was also applied to provide comparability of the data collected 
(Saunders et al. 2012; Maxwell 2005), for example, between the hierarchy levels 
within the organisational positions of the respondents. 
The researcher’s understanding gained from the context of the case study guided the 
application of the purposive sampling technique used in this study. Results of content 
analysis on BPK’s audit reports on West Lombok District and the FGD with BPK’s 
auditors, undertaken previously, provided information about the departments or units 
within West Lombok District that were experiencing PFM problems. Further, a brief 
study of the overall organisational structure of West Lombok District was also 
conducted to provide initial insight into the roles and functions of all local government 
departments and units and how they intersected with the PFM processes. It was then 
followed by a careful analysis of the job descriptions of all local government positions 
in West Lombok District to identify potential respondents who had major involvement 
in the issues related to financial management. 
3.3.3. Data Collection 
The data collection process for the case study was divided into two phases. The first 
phase was conducted from February 2015 to March 2015 and focused on collecting 
the data from BPK’s regional office of West Nusa Tenggara Province, in Mataram. 
The data gathered in the first phase were mainly relevant for understanding the nature 
of the PFM problems in West Lombok District. It consisted of BPK’s audit reports on 
West Lombok District and the FGD with BPK’s auditors who had audited West 
Lombok District. The second phase was conducted from May 2015 until mid-July 2015 
and mainly focused on conducting interviews with West Lombok District employees 
in Gerung, West Lombok. Additional documentation about the PFM system, 
procedures, design and framework was also gathered during the second phase of the 
data collection process. 
3.3.3.1. Content Analysis 
A total of 18 West Lombok District audit reports were analysed, which consisted of 6 
financial audit reports, 3 performance audit reports and 9 special purposes audit 
reports. Appendix 6 lists the West Lombok District audit reports that were included in 
the content analysis. 
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 3.3.3.2. Focus Group Discussion 
The FGD took place in the BPK Regional Office of Nusa Tenggara Barat Province, in 
Mataram, on 23 February 2015. At the time of data collection, there were 55 auditors 
who had conducted various audit engagements in West Lombok District. However, 
most of them had already been rotated to other BPK offices, leaving only 16 potential 
auditors who were available to participate in the FGD. An FGD participant information 
statement and consent letter (Appendix 8) was sent to those 16 potential auditors, yet 
only 9 auditors agreed to participate in the FGD. The FGD was conducted in 
Indonesian language and was documented using a digital voice recorder. An FGD 
transcript was prepared shortly after the discussion. The profiles of the FGD 
participants are presented in Appendix 7. 
3.3.3.3. Semi-structured Interviews 
Yin (2014) emphasises that, in conducting the interview, a researcher has two jobs to 
be accomplished concurrently. Firstly, he has to follow his own line of inquiry that is 
aligned with the research objectives. Secondly, he needs to ask the actual questions 
in an unbiased manner. To ensure the accomplishment of these tasks, interview 
protocols that provide a general guideline on how to conduct the interview were 
developed along with the list of interview questions (see Appendix 10). The sequence, 
wording and selection of the questions in the actual interviews might be different for 
each interview, depending on the dynamic of the interview processes. Probing was 
also exercised with due care to gain more detailed and unbiased responses from the 
respondents. 
The results of content analysis of BPK’s audit reports on West Lombok District guided 
the application of the purposive sampling technique that was applied in this case 
study. Based on the content analysis, there were at least 22 units within West Lombok 
District that were identified to have problems in various aspects of their financial 
management during the period of study between 2009 and 2014. Due to resources 
constraints, only eight major units (i.e. in terms of their functions, the sizes of the the 
units and the occurrences of the PFM problems) were selected for the interviews. 
They were the: 1) Revenue and Financial Management Service or DPPKD, 2) District 
Secretariat, 3) Office of Local Assets, 4) Investment and Licensing Agency, 5) 
Education and Cultural Service, 6) Parks and City Interiors Service, 7) Health 
Services, and 8) Public Works Service. A total of 65 potential respondents were 
approached and invited to join the interviews for this study. An interview information 
statement and interviewee’s consent letter (see Appendix 9) were sent to all of them, 
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 but only 49 respondents positively responded and were actually interviewed. The 
variation in respondents’ profiles based on gender, age, job hierarchy, working units 
and education background is presented in Figure 3-3 below. 
Figure 3-3 





 3.3.4. Data Analysis 
The analysis of BPK’s audit reports using the content analysis technique to address 
the first research question of this study has been discussed in Section 3.2.3. Section 
3.3.3.1 further discussed the variations in the content analysis of BPK’s audit reports 
on West Lombok District as part of understanding the nature of the PFM problems in 
West Lombok District that were relevant to the context of the case study. In addition, 
as Berg and Lune (2014) suggest, the information gathered from the FGD could be 
used for triangulation. In this case study, the FGD transcript was used to confirm the 
existence of PFM problems in West Lombok District, as identified from the content 
analysis of BPK’s audit reports. This section specifically discusses the analysis of the 
interviews data of the case study to address the second research question. 
The semi-structured interviews were conducted in Indonesian language and took 
place in the respondents’ offices. While the interviews with higher echelon 
respondents went quite well because they had separate offices, the interviews with 
staff level respondents were quite distracted because their work stations were located 
in a room with around 10-15 employees. Given the tight schedule of the interviews, 
the interview transcripts were prepared after the completion of all interviews. 
A general thematic analysis technique for qualitative data (Braun and Clarke 2006; 
Aronson 1994; Saunders et al. 2012; Dey 1993) in combination with the template 
analysis model developed by King (2012) was used to analyse the interview 
transcripts. The application of this combinated technique was suitable for this study 
because both techniques can provide flexibility in terms of their methodological and 
theoretical positions (King 2012). Generic thematic analysis is very useful to attain a 
rich and detailed analysis of complex and enormous qualitative data (Braun and 
Clarke 2006). Template analysis can further expand this usefulness by allowing both 
inductive and deductive approaches during a more structured qualitative data analysis 
process (King 2012; Waring and Wainwright 2008). The ability to apply parallel coding 
in the template analysis, whereby a certain segment of text can be classified into two 
or more themes, provided opportunities to further maintain the richness of the data 
interpretation that was relevant to the research questions (King 2012; Saunders et al. 
2012). A computer software package, NVivo (version 10) also was used to support 
the analysis, especially in the management of such large quantities of data. It is 
argued that the use of a software package such as NVivo enables a more 
comprehensive analysis during the interpretation of qualitative data (Waring and 
Wainwright 2008). 
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 The application of the above-mentioned data analysis process can be further broken 
down into four main stages, as follows: 
1. Familiarisation with the data 
This stage of data analysis mainly covers the transcribing process of the interview 
recording files, which was mostly done by the researcher. To expedite the 
transcription process, 17 out of 49 interviews were transcribed by a professional 
transcription service. As interviews were conducted in the Indonesian language, the 
transcripts were also in Indonesian. The transcription process followed a clean 
verbatim approach. Hence, the interview transcript does not necessarily capture the 
exact spoken words; instead, it captures the fundamental meaning of the 
interviewees’ responses. The clean verbatim technique helped the researcher, 
especially in the presentation of the analysis results, because the coded text could 
easily be quoted as a direct entry into the report. Before the coding process took 
place, the researcher reviewed and checked all of the interview transcripts, at least 
twice, to ensure their accuracy. While this process was very time-consuming, it 
allowed the researcher to gain a far more thorough understanding of the data, which 
assisted in the interpretation of the data in the later stage of the analysis. 
2. Generation initial codes 
At this stage, the researcher identified any segments of the interview transcripts that 
were to be coded. The coding process attached the “meaningful bits or chunks” 
(Saunders et al. 2012) of the original transcripts to a certain category, label or theme. 
The data analysis adopted both the inductive (data-driven) and deductive (theory-
driven) approaches, given that they are highly relevant to the research questions. 
Hence, the labels were generated from any of the three sources proposed by Strauss 
and Corbin (1998) which are: a) the terms that emerge during the data analysis 
process, b) the actual terms used by the respondents or ‘in vivo’ codes, and 3) the 
terms used in the existing theory and the literature. 
As the transcripts were in Indonesian, the coding process was also conducted in the 
Indonesian language. There was no technical problem in conducting the coding 
process in a language other than English because the NVivo software has the ability 
to manage and analyse data in different languages. The coded text was then 
translated into English, while the label was allocated directly in English. This practical 
approach was selected to enable a more efficient data analysis process while 
maintaining the details of the relevant segments of the interview transcripts for further 
analysis and external review. 
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 3. Development of the template 
While the first two stages were derived from a general thematic analysis technique, 
the development of the template followed King’s (2012) template analysis model. The 
original template analysis model starts with the development of an initial template 
based on a subset of the data (i.e. transcripts) before modifying the template by 
systematically continuing the coding process with the remainder of the transcripts, 
based on the initial template. Insertion, deletion and merging of the labels are common 
during the modification process before producing the final template for the 
interpretation and presentation of the analysis. 
Differing from the original template analysis model mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, this study developed the initial template based on the whole set of data. 
Therefore, instead of going back and forth between the second and third stages of 
the data analysis process, the researcher developed the initial template after 
completing the coding process with all interviews transcripts. This practice allowed a 
more open coding process because the researcher was only guided by the research 
questions and was not restricted to any a priori labels or categories. 
The key characteristic of template analysis is its hierarchical coding presentation 
(King 2012). In the template development stage, the researcher analysed the coded 
text at various levels of detail, as required. Groups of similar codes or labels were 
then aggregated together to produce more general higher order themes. The 
expansion of the top-level themes into a number of sub-themes displayed the richness 
and depth of the analysis in providing insights relevant to addressing the research 
objectives appropriately. 
The advantage of using software for the data analysis is its ability to produce 
automatic counting figures for the coded text on each label, which was quite helpful 
during the modification process of the initial template. Frequencies of label coding 
were further examined to modify the initial template. The higher frequency of particular 
coded text in a label might reflect the importance of that label in the views of the 
respondents toward addressing the research question. Any label that seemed 
insignificant, for example, with only one instance of coded text, was evaluated further 
to simplify the hierarchical presentation of the template. These labels were either 
simply deleted from the template or inserted into other similar labels. In another 
instance, labels which looked similar were merged. These three procedures (i.e. 
deletion, insertion and merging) were used iteratively throughout the modification of 
the initial template to generate a final template that was representative for the 
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 presentation of the data analysis in this thesis. During the template modification 
process, careful attention was paid to ensure that any insignificant label that had 
theoretical and/or literature support was not deleted without proper examination. 
4. Interpretation and presentation of the template 
This stage was a crucial one because it characterises the way the data analysis result 
was written in this thesis. One major issue that needed to be addressed in this stage 
was to avoid a simple listing of themes with a summary of main findings under each 
theme (King 2012). Hence, a number of strategies suggested by King (2012) were 
applied, including the examination of the frequencies of coded text, identification of 
key themes that needed to be examined in depth, open interpretation to ensure all 
direct relevant themes were discussed, and the incorporation of integrative themes 
and/or other lateral links. A thematic presentation based on the themes included in 
the final template was used to guide the presentation of the thesis. To support the 
relevance of the themes to the research question, direct quotes from the interviewees 
were included in order to illustrate the theme, to support understanding of the specific 
interpretations and to give readers a sense of the original responses of the 
respondents. 
3.3.5. A Limitation 
The limitation that applied to the data gathering design was mainly practical in nature 
and could not be avoided. In the FGD, due to staff rotation in BPK’s office, the 
participants were only auditors who had recently conducted the audits on West 
Lombok District. As a result, most of the discussions covered the audit findings in a 
more recent time scale. Nevertheless, some respondents were able to trace audit 
findings that had been continuously reported in previous audit reports due to 
inadequate follow-up actions from the local government causing the continuity of the 
problem. The same practical issue was also found during the interview process since 
the selection of the respondents was based on their current job position. As a result, 
some of the respondents might not have been directly involved in the financial 
management problems reported the BPK audit reports of previous years. 
Nevertheless, the purposive sampling method that was used for interviewee selection 
ensured the knowledge and experience of the respondents in regard to the financial 
problems reported in their units. Most of the respondents had experience working with 
BPK’s auditors during various stages of the audit processes. 
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 3.4. Ethical Issues 
This research involved human participants through the FGD and interview activities 
during the data collection stage. It adhered to the National Statement on Ethical 
Conduct in Human Research by following the ethical protocol requirements at Curtin 
University. Approval of the research methodology and instruments had been obtained 
from the Curtin University Human Research Ethics Committee before conducting the 
data gathering processes. However, formal letters to the institutions (i.e. BPK and 
West Lombok District government) asking permission for conducting the research and 
collecting the information within their institutions were sent before the ethic approval 
was issued. 
Participants of the FGD and interviews were invited to take part in this study on a 
voluntary basis. Information and consent letters requesting participation were 
distributed to the potential participants, and only participants who signed the consent 
letter were invited to the FGD and interview sessions. A brief explanation regarding 
the objectives of the study, the benefits of the research to the participant and the 
potential impact upon the participant were conveyed before the FGD and interviews 
took place. The researcher discussed any concerns and questions from the 
participants before proceeding to the actual FGD and interviews. For documentation 
purposes, the researcher asked permission from the participants to record the FGD 
and the interview sessions. To maintain confidentiality, all personal information 
gathered during data collection is not displayed in any report, including this final 
thesis. 
Secondary data, such as audit reports and local government documents, were 
requested through formal procedures, as required by the institutions. 
3.5. Chapter Summary 
This chapter has explained the justification for adopting a qualitative research 
methodology in this study. The nature of the research questions has guided the 
development of a two-stage research design that is specifically relevant for this study. 
The first stage provided explanations in regard to the appropriateness of applying a 
content analysis of BPK’s audit reports, published between 2009 and 2014, to address 
the first research question of this study. The method applied in this stage allowed this 
study to encapsulate the PFM operational problems that had occurred in all local 
governments in Indonesia that had been reported in BPK’s audit reports. The second 
stage considered the appropriateness of a single case study method, through 
interviews with a number of PFM actors who were involved in the PFM operational 
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 practices, in order to address the second and third research questions. West Lombok 
District was selected as the single case in this study through a number of relevant 
selection criteria to ensure its typicality, thereby allowing the findings of this study to 
be utilised for assessing the occurrence of non-compliance in PFM operations in other 
local governments. 
Following this research design and methodology chapter, Chapter 4 provides a 
description of the legal framework of PFM operations in Indonesia’s local 
governments, which is essential for gaining an understanding of the expected 




 Chapter 4 
Legal Framework of PFM Operations in Local Governments 
This chapter reviews the current framework of PFM operations in Indonesia’s local 
governments. It commences with a brief history of the local government system in 
Indonesia since its independence, in 1945, unfolding trivial attempts to decentralise 
the central government’s authority to local governments and highlighting the stagnant 
development of PFM operations before the major PFM reform in 2004. It is followed 
by an elaboration on the legal framework of current PFM operations for local 
government, which establishes the benchmark for the expected PFM operational 
practices across all local governments in Indonesia. This chapter commences the 
application of the first research stage. It aims to provide a foundation to adequately 
analyse the contents of BPK’s audit reports by providing a reference to understand 
the expected behaviour and actions from those who are involved in the PFM 
operational processes. 
4.1. History of Local Government 
From legal, fiscal and political viewpoints, Indonesia has a three-tier system of 
government (see Figure 4-1). The first tier, at the national level, is the central 
government. The subnational level refers to local government, consisting of the 
second tier of provincial government and the third tier of district and city governments. 
The regional autonomy and fiscal decentralisation policy of 1999, which was then 
reorganised in 2004, formally devolved many authorities (including financial 
authorities) to the local government level, primarily to the district/city level (Djohan 
2014). Districts and cities must deliver most basic public services including health, 
education, environmental services, infrastructure and other services not legally 
provided by central and provincial governments (Fedelino and Smoke 2013). A 
province, on the other hand, is responsible for coordination of services among multiple 
districts and cities within its territory and it functions as the representation of the 
central government in the region (Djohan 2014). 
In a country like Indonesia, where diversity in geographic, economic, social and 
cultural factors, natural resources and human resources is obvious, decentralisation 
is an attractive option for the government to be able to effectively respond to a large 
variety of the communities’ requirements for government services. Attempts to 
formulate and operationalise its decentralisation policy, including fiscal 
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 decentralisation in Indonesia, have been made continuously since its independence, 
through the enactment of a series of regional government-related laws. However, the 
unstable political situation after independence, the perceived threat of 
decentralisation to national unity, and the trend toward centralisation of political power 
during the first fifty years after the independence, have made those efforts fail. 
Figure 4-1 
Tiers of Government in Indonesia 
 
The first law enacted after the Constitution 1945, Law 1/1945, caused the 
establishment of a Regional National Committee as a temporary local government 
institution and called for the enactment of a local government law within a unitary 
framework. General provisions regarding self-government in autonomous regions 
were then introduced through the enactment of Law 22/1948. In regard to local 
government fiscal capacity, the Law included provisions for local governments’ 
revenues through their authority to collect local taxes and levies, to establish local-
owned companies, to receive shares of national tax revenue, and to collect other 
income in the forms of loans, subsidies, sales of local government assets, etc. In the 
meantime, the Dutch who were reluctant to recognise the independence of Indonesia 
in 1945, attempted to maintain their influence on Indonesia. In 1949, they were 
involved in the creation of the United Republic of Indonesia, a federal state within a 
commonwealth of the Netherlands, and it injected a significant degree of regional 
autonomy into the Federal Constitution in order to gain support from the regions. The 
federal state, however, did not last for long. Indonesia’s national government was 
restored to a unitary state and recentralised its political power in 1950. The threat to 
national unity that was a result of Dutch support of the adoption of a federal state had 
limited the implementation of Law 22/1948. A fiscal balance regulation, which was 
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 essential to support the fiscal capabilities of local governments, was not established 
until the enactment of Law 32/1956. Tinker (1963) argued that Law 48/1948, 
supposedly designed to establish a system of local autonomy, was treated as “a dead 
letter”. The deviation of the actual political and administrative practices from the formal 
legal requirements was apparent, without any serious efforts to ensure the application 
of regional autonomy.  
In 1957, the rising pressures from regions against the central government had forced 
Sukarno’s government to revitalise the adoption of regional autonomy. The new 
regional government law, Law 1/1957, was enacted to allow for much greater local 
autonomy. However, in 1959, this effort was aborted when Sukarno issued a 
presidential decree that marked the adoption of a political system of “guided 
democracy” where political power was concentrated and centralised in the hands of 
the president. Law 18/1965 was then enacted, stipulating some aspects of regional 
autonomy under the “guided democracy” model. Nonetheless, Law 18/1965 was 
never put into practice because Suharto and his new order regime took power in 1967.  
The issue of regional autonomy was silenced following the reinforcement of 
centralised political power under the new order regime. In 1974, Suharto’s 
administration frivolously brought back the decentralisation policy through the 
enactment of Law 5/1974 regarding the General Provisions of Regional Government. 
The Law adopted a conditional autonomy principle by which only limited functions 
were assigned to local government. A set of criteria that characterised the capacity of 
a local government to manage its own affairs was strictly applied. Local autonomy 
status could only be granted if the local government could meet those criteria.  Under 
this Law, regional autonomy was perceived as an obligation instead of a right. 
Nevertheless, in practice, Law 5/1974 was never fully implemented (World Bank 
2003). Further, Eckardt and Shah (2006) opine that the enactment of Law 5/1974 did 
not shift the inclination of the new order regime toward a centralised financial power. 
The implementing regulations for Law 5/1974 were not available until 1992, while a 
regional autonomy pilot project in 1996 was unsuccessful because of inadequate 
support from the central government, especially in terms of personnel and facilities. 
Finally, in 1998, a major Asian financial crisis caused the fall of Suharto’s regime and 
the experimental project of regional autonomy under the 1974 regional government 
law ceased. 
The crisis in 1998 had provided momentum to reform Indonesia’s political and 
government system. A substantial application of a democratic framework, including 
the devolution of authority from central government to local government, was also 
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 established (McLeod and MacIntyre 2007; Tjiptoherijanto and Rowan 2010). The 
enactment of Law 22/1999 decentralised power to local governments in all aspects of 
government except in the areas of foreign policy, national defence, police, law 
enforcement, monetary and macroeconomic policies, and religious affairs. The 
devolution of those functions was also followed by the devolution and transfer of the 
required funds, infrastructure and human resources from central government to local 
governments (GoI 1999a). The old fiscal balance law, Law 32/1956, was abolished 
through the enactment of Law 25/1999, which offered a more democratic, just and 
transparent fiscal balance framework that would take into account the different needs, 
priorities, potentials and conditions of each regional government. The new fiscal 
balance law regulated a financial system that clearly segregated the authorities, roles, 
functions and responsibilities among different jurisdictions in order to support the 
implementation of the decentralisation program (GoI 1999b).  
Much of the literature refers to the decentralisation program in Indonesia in 1999 as 
“Big Bang” decentralisation because the program was prepared, enacted and 
implemented within an extraordinarily short period of time and covered the whole of 
Indonesia’s local governments. At that time, this consisted of 26 provinces, 59 cities, 
and 234 districts19. Though it was not the first decentralisation program attempted by 
Indonesia, many viewed Big Bang decentralisation as one essential transition element 
for Indonesia to embark upon a more democratic form of government (Alm et al. 2004; 
Hofman and Kaiser 2004). It was stated that regional autonomy gave wider authorities 
to local governments in accordance with democratic principles and accommodated 
the necessity for civil engagement, the principles of equity and justice, and recognition 
of the diversity of regional characteristics (GoI 1999a). Decentralisation allowed the 
emergence of democratic practices at local government level and helped to improve 
local governments’ performances in terms of government operations, service delivery, 
economic development, standards of living and the fight against corrupt practices (GoI 
1999b). Even so, studies of the decentralisation program in Indonesia have shown 
mixed results in the achievement of those objectives (Suharyo 2009; Hofman et al. 
2009; Djohan 2014; Smoke 2015). 
Brodjonegoro (2009) claimed that the implementation of the 1999 decentralisation 
policy had gained a “mild success”. However, as an ambitious program, the 
implementation of Big Bang decentralisation could not escape from a number of 
19  By 2014, Indonesia had 34 provinces, 93 cities and 415 distircts (Direktorat Jenderal Otonomi Daerah 
2014), experiencing an exactly 70% increase compared to the number of local governments at the 
initiation of the decentralization program. 
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 problems that had not been anticipated before. The problems started with the initiation 
of the policy because the recommendation for decentralisation was not supported by 
adequate information, especially in relation to the fiscal conditions of the local 
governments (Alm et al. 2004). Further, Hofman and Kaiser (2004) also highlight that 
the continuous demands from regions to strengthen their positions created more 
pressures for President Habibie 20  to accommodate a premature and ambitious 
proposal for decentralisation. During the implementation of Law 22/1999, a number 
of problems also arose due to lack of understanding, supports and monitoring 
mechanisms (Djohan 2014). Broad authorities were defined by the local governments 
as the freedom to develop and implement any local policies without considering the 
impacts upon other jurisdictions and national interests. The institution that handled 
the implementation of regional autonomy (i.e. Ministry of Regional Autonomy) was 
abolished and was replaced by only an echelon I unit21 (i.e. Directorate General of 
Regional Autonomy) within the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA). Given the broad 
coverage of the regional autonomy program, such institutional arrangements were not 
able to provide adequate support and monitoring functions during the implementation 
of the policy. Moreover, the issuance of derivative regulations of Law 22/1999 that did 
not align with the spirit of decentralisation indicated the resistance and ambiguity of 
central government in regard to the implementation of decentralisation policy. In 
addition, the dynamics of the national political situation following the emergence of 
the reformation era, which caused the amendment of the Constitution of 1945 and the 
enactment of a number of new regulations, for example, the trilogy of financial laws, 
forced a number of changes in the design of the decentralisation policy. As a result, 
Law 32/2004 and Law 33/2004 were promulgated to replace Law 22/1999 and Law 
25/1999, respectively. 
4.2. The Transformation of the PFM Legal Framework 
The Indonesian Constitution of 1945 stipulated the inheritance of colonial laws in all 
matters of public administration during the transition period following the 
independence of Indonesia. As a result, for PFM at the national level, three major 
regulations were in operation at that time: the Indische Comptabiliteits Wet (ICW), 
originally established in 1925, and the Regelen voor het Administratief Beheer (RAB) 
20  President Habibie took over from Suharto, who resigned in 1998. Habibie initiated the regional 
autonomy policy to accommodate pressure from the regions that had been exploited by the centralist 
policy during the New Order government regime. 
21  The Indonesian Public Service is organised in echelons, with echelon I indicating the highest and 
echelon V the lowest management levels.  
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 and Instructie en verdere bepalingen voor de Algemeene rekenkamer (IAR), both 
established in 1933. They were adopted by the newly established nation, whereas the 
general provisions for financial management at local government level followed the 
Beheersvoorschrifften Stbl. 1936 No 432 (GoI 1973). In addition, the provinces had 
specific provisions for their financial management, as stipulated in Provincie 
Ordonantie, Stbl. 1924 No. 78; while districts and municipalities adopted 
Regentschaps Ordonantie, Stbl. 1924 No. 79 and Stadsgemeente Ordonantie, Stbl. 
1924 No. 365 (GoI 1972). The application of the colonial system, which was 
characterised by a lack of transparency and accountability, displayed a lack of 
effective legal framework for PFM in Indonesia prior to the Asian crisis in 1998 
(Blondal et al. 2009). ICW, for example, as the organic law concerning PFM in 
Indonesia, had major flaws in its narrow scope of a small closed economy with no 
adequate public accountability (ADB 2004). Nevertheless, for roughly 50 years after 
independence, no solemn attempts were actually made to modernise the Indonesia’s 
PFM legal framework, regardless of a number of political changes that occurred 
throughout the period (Karianga 2013). 
In regard to local government, the old colonial arrangement was still in place until the 
1970s, when derivative regulations of Law 18/1965, Government Regulation (GR) 
36/1972 and GR 48/1973 were implemented, although they were not used in practice 
because Suharto enacted a new regional autonomy law in 1974, Law 5/1974. In 1975, 
derivative regulations of Law 5/1974, namely GR  5/1975 regarding the Management, 
Accountability and Monitoring of Local Government Finance and GR 6/1975 regarding 
Procedures for the Preparation of Local Budget, Financial Administration Execution 
and Preparation of Budget Execution Report, were established to provide guidance 
on local government financial management. During this period, Bastari (2004) 
concludes, a centralised approach through top-down planning and budgeting 
processes was maintained. In addition, a dual-budgeting model, differentiated by 
routine and development budgets, was employed but the preparation of budget still 
adopted the incremental budgeting approach. A balanced and dynamic budget was 
also used, leading to the absence of budget surplus or deficit since the equilibrium of 
revenue and expenditure in the budget had to be maintained. Financing activities were 
not explicitly disclosed in the budget. As a result, loans were recorded as local 
government revenues. In financial administration, the Local Government Financial 
Administration Manual, commonly known as MAKUDA, was established in 1981 and 
it adopted the single entry bookkeeping method and cash basis accounting method. 
The financial accountability arrangement was only reflected in the budget execution 
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 report. The limitation of MAKUDA had constrained local governments to provide 
information about their assets, liabilities and cash flows (Bastari 2004). The lack of 
proper financial reporting requirements was also hampered by the absence of an 
external auditing mechanism. Heads of local government had the authority to assign 
financial monitoring and auditing roles to their officials (GoI 1975), threatening the 
independence principle of the auditing processes. Inadequate public accountability 
arrangements also existed since local governments were not required to table budget 
realisation reports to local parliaments. The strongly centralised financial 
management model adopted during this period requested local governments to only 
report their budget realisation reports to central government. 
In 1999, the implementation of Big Bang decentralisation devolved a major part of 
authority for government spending to local governments, especially for the mandatory 
sectors such as education, health and infrastructure. In the revenue stream, while 
taxation was still centralised, local governments enjoyed a broader authority to 
manage their locally-generated income. The decentralisation of this fiscal authority 
certainly requires a proper governance mechanism in the financial management area 
because the euphoria of decentralisation tends to direct new local heads to start 
acting like little kings (raja kecil) with no accountability to either central government or 
local constituencies (Hofman and Kaiser 2004). Hofman and Kaiser (2004) further 
state that there is no clear evidence that decentralisation can automatically improve 
local governance. Therefore, it is critical to inject a proper financial management 
arrangement into the PFM framework of local governments. 
To accommodate that need, GR 105/2000 regarding Local Government Financial 
Management and Accountability was implemented. It replaced the adoption of the 
top-down, dual-budgeting and incremental budgeting approach with a participative, 
unified, and performance budgeting approach. The structure of the budget was 
reconstructed so that financing activities from the loan and sale of local government 
assets, for example, could be included in the budget structure should a local 
government experience a budget deficit. In regard to financial management 
procedures, a decentralisation policy provides regions with the autonomy to enact 
local regulations regarding the general provisions of local financial management, 
along with the local government’s financial management procedures in the form of the 
head of the region’s decrees, to accommodate the specific needs of the regions. 
Other improvements in financial administration practices were made through the 
implementation of the double entry bookkeeping method, along with the adoption of 
the modified cash basis, for local governments’ accounting systems. These changes 
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 were introduced to improve the accuracy of the recording processes for financial 
transactions and to support local governments in the preparation of more 
comprehensive financial accountability reports, which included the budget realisation 
report, balance sheet and cash flow statement (MoHA 2000). Public accountability in 
regard to local government financial management also was strengthened. A new 
accountability system at local level required quarterly budget realisation reports and 
annual financial statements to be submitted to the local parliament. Nevertheless, an 
adequate independent external auditing mechanism was still lacking. Supervisory and 
monitoring roles were mainly observed by the MoHA, although the internal audit 
function was also introduced. 
In 2003, a major PFM reform in Indonesia’s history was commenced through the 
enactment of Law 17/2003 regarding State Finance. The Law extends the definition 
of state finance to include local finance, and explicitly states that it does not only 
provide a reference for the PFM reform at central government level but also intends 
to strengthen the foundation for implementing the decentralisation policy in Indonesia. 
Law 1/2004 regarding State Treasury and Law 15/2004 regarding State Audit were 
then enacted to form a trilogy of financial laws that serves as the regulatory framework 
governing the basic rules for managing public finances at both central and local 
government levels. Achmad (2012) explains that the introduction of a trilogy of 
financial laws was a priority selected by the Indonesian government to develop 
adequate controls and to overcome the operational, structural, and systemic 
weaknesses that were present in the old PFM arrangements and practices in 
Indonesia. 
4.3. Current PFM Operations (After 2004) 
By 2004, a comprehensive set of legislation that laid down the current framework for 
PFM practices of local governments in Indonesia had already been established. It 
covers all financial management processes from the planning stage until the 
performance evaluation of the local government (Mahmudi 2010). The trilogy of 
financial laws establishes a modern PFM arrangement in Indonesia, adopting the 
principle of good governance. They are the organic PFM laws (Schiavo-Campo 
2007a) that define PFM coverage, objectives and principles. They provide a 
description of the powers and authorities of the key actors, the main processes, the 
accountability mechanism, the financial oversight process, etc. Local government 
laws, on the other hand, devolve central government financial authority to local 
governments in order to improve the quality of public service delivery and to establish 
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 a robust framework for ensuring the fiscal capabilities of local governments to support 
the implementation of the decentralisation program. Table 4.1 lists the current 
legislation that shapes the PFM framework at local government level in Indonesia. 
Table 4-1 
Local Government PFM Regulatory Framework 
Law/Regulation Description 
State Finances Law 
17/2003 
The State Finances Law 17/2003 introduces a new paradigm in 
state finance through the adoption of a performance-based 
financial system and public accountability and transparency 
principles. It expands the definition of state finance to include 
local finance, details the constitutional provisions for the budget 
process, and mandates specific milestones and dates for the 
preparation and adoption of the budget, specifies general 
principles and authorities for the management and accountability 
of state finances. It also establishes the financial relationship 
between the central government, local governments and other 
institutions. 
State Treasury Law 
1/2004 
The State Treasury Law 1/2004 lays out the management of 
state treasury in both central and local governments. It outlines 
the responsibilities of the Treasury and articulates the creation 
of treasurers in government ministries and agencies, together 
with general principles of the management and accountability of 
public funds. 
State Audit Law 15/2004 The State Audit Law 15/2004 outlines the operational framework 
of BPK as the Supreme Audit Institution of the Republic of 
Indonesia and mandates it as a professional and independent 
institution required to submit its audit reports to Parliament. 
Local Governance Law 
32/2004 
The Local Governance Law 32/2004 outlines the responsibilities 
of local governments for a range of public services, including 
education, health, public infrastructure, agriculture, industry and 
trade, investment, the environment, land, labour and transport. 
Fiscal Balance Law 
33/2004 
The Fiscal Balance Law 33/2004 outlines the responsibility of 
local governments for managing their own public finances, their 
revenue-raising and the system of transfers from the central 
government. 
Adapted from: Blondal et al. (2009); (USAID 2007) 
The description, in this section, regarding the current PFM operational framework at 
local government level is based on the above-mentioned local government PFM 
regulatory framework, along with its derivative regulations in the form of government 
regulations, presidential regulations and ministerial decrees. The details of the system 
and procedures regarding local government financial management are established by 
each local government to accommodate any essential local content and diversity 
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 among different local governments, as long as the do not violate the general principles 
described in the PFM regulatory framework mentioned above (GoI 2005). The 
comprehensive and detailed arrangements of the PFM legal framework for local 
governments, based on the hierarchy of regulations in Indonesia, are presented in 
Appendix 1. 
4.3.1. General Principles and Objectives 
In accordance with good governance principles, PFM operations within local 
governments hold the general characteristics of being united, universal, annual and 
specialised (GoI 2004a). The basis of unity requires the presentation of all local 
government revenues and expenditures in the budget document. Universality entails 
full disclosure of every financial transaction within the budget document. The annual 
basis of budgets limits their validity to a particular year. The basis of specialty requires 
a detailed allocation for every budget appropriation. The framework also contains 
provisions that encourage professionalism and ensure the transparency and 
accountability of budget implementation. In addition, the framework also 
accommodates any financial management innovations and local contents that are 
unique to any specific local government, as long as they do not contradict the general 
principles and norms introduced by the relevant laws and regulations imposed by the 
central government. 
The local government PFM framework holds multiple objectives. The framework aims 
to establish an orderly management of local finance through compliance with relevant 
rules and regulations while also maintaining its economy, efficiency and effectiveness. 
In addition, the framework ensures the transparency and accountability of local 
government financial management by providing access to financial information for the 
public, the expectation of ethical behaviour, a balanced distribution of authority and 
resources, and personal or working unit responsibilities in regard to resources 
management and program implementation for achieving the intended objectives that 
will support the attainment of the broader goals of local government (GoI 2005). 
The State Treasury Law includes provisions for the initial execution of the approved 
budget up to the preparation of financial statements, with further detailed 
arrangements set by GR 58/2005 in regard to the Local Financial Management and 
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 Minister of Home Affairs regulation, or Permendagri 13/2006, regarding Local 
Financial Management Guidance22. 
4.3.2. Key Actors 
Figure 4-2 depicts the key actors in the PFM of local government, based on their 
hierarchical relationships. Incorporating the spirit of decentralisation that was 
stipulated in the regional autonomy laws, the PFM regulatory framework devolves the 
highest financial management authorities of the President to the Heads of Region23. 
These authorities are further devolved to each Head of Local Government’s Financial 
Management Unit (FMU) and to the Head of Local Governments’ Units. In essence, 
the Head of Local Government’s FMU serves as a Chief Financial Officer (CFO), while 
the Heads of Local Government’s Units each have the role of Chief Operational 
Officer (COO) for his/her unit. 
Figure 4-2 
Key Actors in PFM Operations 
 
22  Two amendments of Permendagri 13/2006 have been made through Permendagri 59/2007 and 
Permendagri 21/2011. 
23  A province is headed by a Governor (gubernur), while a district and a city are led by a Regent (bupati) 
and a Mayor (walikota), respectively. 
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 The separation of CFO and COO functions is a new principle adopted in the current 
PFM framework to provide clarity in the division of authority and responsibility, to 
establish a proper mechanism for checks and balances, and to increase 
professionalism in the administration of local government management (GoI 2003). In 
addition to that, the Local Secretary has a coordination role within the financial 
management of local government. The arrangement of financial authorities at local 
government level is established based on the segregation of authority among those 
who are responsible to authorise, verify, receive and disburse the money (MoHA 
2006).  
The subsequent subsections provide a brief description of each role and the 
authorities of each key actor. 
4.3.2.1. Head of Region 
As the financial authority holder in local government, the Head of Region issues 
policies regarding budget execution and asset management, appoints officials who 
are responsible for a number of budget execution functions, such as collecting 
revenue, administering accounts receivables/payables, administering assets, 
authorising budget spendings, verifying invoices, ordering and making payments. The 
policies and appointments of officials are prepared in writing in the form of a decree. 
4.3.2.2. Local Secretary 
The Local Secretary is the public financial management coordinator within a local 
government. He/she provides assistance to the Head of Region in the preparation 
and implementation of budget management policies, including the development and 
implementation of guidelines in budget execution and asset management, drafts 
regional regulations concerning the annual budget, the budget amendments, and the 
accountability of budget implementation, and coordinates the implementation of 
budgeting and financial management policies, especially in areas where the FMU and 
Local Government Units are working together, such as the preparation of annual 
budget and financial statement. During annual budget formulation and preparation 
processes, including budget amendments, the Local Secretary leads the Local 
Government Budgeting Team, which consists of the Local Planning Board, the Head 
of FMU and other relevant local government officials. In the preparation of the budget 
execution document, after the approval of the document proposals from each local 
government’s units by the Head of FMU, the Local Secretary endorses the document 
to ensure commitment from both the FMU and the local governments’ units for 
executing the budget as stipulated in the budget execution document. The Local 
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 Secretary also coordinates the tasks of the Local Planning Board, the FMU and the 
Inspectorate. 
4.3.2.3. Head of Financial Management Unit 
As a CFO, the Head of FMU manages and administers the overall budget execution 
and also serves as the Local General Treasurer. He is responsible for the 
development and implementation of financial management policies, the preparation 
of the annual budget and its amendment, the collection of local revenues stipulated 
in local regulations, and the preparation of the local government financial report. 
Those responsibilities are assigned to a number of departments within the FMU. As 
the General Treasurer, he develops and ensures the application of budget 
implementation policies and guidelines, authorises the budget execution document 
for each spending unit, monitors the overall budget execution processes, collects local 
taxes, arranges loans and investments on behalf of local governments, establishes 
technical guidance on cash receipting and disbursement procedures, develops and 
implements policies and guidelines on asset management, and maintains a proper 
accounting and reporting system to support the presentation of financial information 
and the preparation of financial reports. 
4.3.2.4. Proxy of General Treasurer 
The Head of FMU, as the General Treasurer, with written consent from the Head of 
Region, appoints a Proxy of General Treasurer to perform his duties in general 
treasury areas including preparing cash budgets, issuing warrants of fund provision 
and warrants for disbursement of funds, making payments based on payment orders 
from budget users, monitoring the collection of revenue and budget disbursements 
performed by other appointed institutions, ensuring the availability of funds for budget 
implementation, managing local government investments, administering the original 
proofs of ownership for local government assets, carrying out local government 
lending, and collecting receivable arrears.  
4.3.2.5. Head of Local Government’s Unit 
As a COO, the Head of a Local Government’s Unit is the budget user and is 
responsible for exercising and implementing the agency’s budget. He/she prepares 
the budget and its execution document, verifies invoices and payment requests, 
authorises and issues payment orders, collects non-tax revenues, administers 
account receivables/payables, utilises assets, monitors budget realisation progress 
and prepares the financial statements of the agency. As part of this role, in order to 
99 
 implement the agency’s programs and activities, a Head of Local Government’s Unit 
may also serve as the Commitment-Making Official (CMO) who can carry out 
contractual agreements with other parties for the provision of goods and services 
within the budget ceilings. 
4.3.2.6. Proxy of Budget User 
To assist with day-to-day activities, the Head of Local Government’s Unit may assign 
authority as a budget user, with the written approval of the Head of the Region, to any 
subordinates as a Proxy of Budget User. Criteria, such as the size of the unit’s budget, 
its workload, capabilities, competencies, span of control, etc., must be considered to 
justify the appointment of any official as a Proxy Budget User. The Proxy of Budget 
User has the authority to conduct actions that result in budget disbursement, to verify 
invoices, to authorise and issue payment orders, to carry out contractual agreements, 
to oversee the execution of the unit’s budget, and to perform other duties assigned by 
the particular Head of a Local Government’s Unit. 
4.3.2.7. Receiving and Disbursing Treasurers 
The treasury roles in a local government’s unit are conducted by treasurers. The Head 
of the Region appoints both a receiving and a disbursing treasurer to carry out tasks 
in relation to budget execution of each local government’s unit. A receiving treasurer 
executes the revenue budget and is responsible to receive, store, deposit, administer 
and account for the local revenue money that has been collected. A disbursing 
treasurer executes the spending budget and is responsible to receive, store, pay, 
administer and account for the disbursement of the budget. Treasurers hold functional 
positions and are responsible to the Head of FMU as the General Treasurer. 
4.3.2.8. Technical Administration Officer 
A technical administration officer is an official within a local government’s unit who is 
appointed by, and responsible to, the Head of that Local Government’s Unit. He/she 
has responsibilities to control and manage the implementation of programs and 
activities, including reporting on the progress of program implementation and 
preparing documentation required for the administration of the program and for the 
fulfilment of the payment terms as stipulated in the statutory provisions. 
4.3.2.9. Financial Administration Officer 
To exercise the authority for utilising the agency’s budget, as stipulated in the budget 
execution document, the Head of Local Government’s Unit appoints a financial 
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 administration officer for examining and verifying the accuracy and completeness of 
payment requests, preparing payment orders and preparing the local government 
unit’s financial statement. 
4.3.3. PFM Operations: Components and Processes 
The main PFM operational components in local government are depicted in Figure 
4.4. The PFM operations start after the approval of the local government budget, 
which provides authorisation for local government to carry out programs and activities 
stipulated in the budget according to their appropriation. That includes all revenue and 
disbursement transactions in the form of monies, goods and/or services. Budget 
approval is enacted through the legal documentation of Local Regulations and Head 
of Region’s Regulations. Drafts of both legal documents must be submitted and 
evaluated by the higher level of government (i.e. the Governor for a district’s/city’s 
budget and the Minister of Home Affairs for a provincial budget) before they can be 
enacted. The enactment of those legal documents should be made not later than 31 
December, before the start of the next fiscal year24. 
Figure 4-3 
PFM Operational Subsystems 
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 After the legal approval of the budget, before the budget can be fully executed, a 
budget execution document should be prepared. The document elaborates more 
detailed information regarding each local government unit’s budget, which includes 
the outcomes, objectives, functions, programs, activities and allocated budget for 
each program/activity/unit, including a cash utilisation plan that describes the 
estimated schedule of cash withdrawal and/or cash reception. The execution 
document must be authorised by the Head of FMU and endorsed by the Local 
Secretary before any revenue collection and spending activities can be executed. 
In regard to any deviation from the budget assumptions, an amendment to the budget 
can be made at least three months before the end of the current fiscal year. The 
above-mentioned process for gaining approval on budget changes should include any 
required changes in the budget execution document. 
4.3.3.1. Revenue Collection 
Revenue collection deals with the collection of local government income, which 
consists of own-source income, transferred funds from central government and other 
lawful income. Local taxes, charges and fees represent the main components of own-
source income. All own-source income must be stipulated in the proper regulations 
before they can be included in the budget and collected during the budget execution 
phase. Transferred funds come from three main sources: national tax revenue-
sharing, natural resources revenue-sharing and both general allocation and special 
allocation funds. Other lawful income may come from central government (i.e. grants, 
emergency funds, adjustment and special autonomy funds), provincial tax revenue-
sharing and financial assistance funds from other local governments. 
In regard to the revenue collection process, the regulatory framework specifically 
stipulates the requirement for every local government unit that has the authority to 
collect revenue to intensify their collection efforts and deposit the collected monies 
into the local treasury account on the next business day. The regulatory framework 
also prohibits local government units from directly spending the collected revenue to 
pay their expenses. Monetary benefits and other forms of benefits that are a result of 
local government financial transactions, including the procurement of goods and 
services such as interests, fines, commissions, discounts, etc., should also be 
collected and reported as other local revenues. 
The local government’s FMU is responsible for the overall revenue management of a 
local government. Nevertheless, while the actual collection processes for local taxes, 
transferred funds and other lawful income are carried out by the FMU, non-tax local 
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 income can be carried out by local government units that have been given the 
authority to collect it. All local revenue must be transacted through the local treasury 
account. Any banks, post offices or other financial institutions utilised for revenue 
collection processes, generally for non-tax local income collection, must be nominated 
and approved by the Head of Region. The actual collecting of money is carried out by 
a receiving treasurer officer. The Head of Region appoints receiving treasurers, both 
within the FMU and the local government units that have the power to collect non-tax 
own-source income. Receiving treasurers and other collection agencies are not 
allowed to hold the collected revenue money for more than 24 hours and must deposit 
the money to the local treasury account by the next day. Revenues from the transfer 
of funds and other lawful income are directly transferred to the local treasury account, 
reducing the potential for uncollected revenue problems. 
4.3.3.2. Disbursement Processes 
In the disbursement process, any spending cannot be made before the enactment of 
the annual budget law. The amount stated in the budget is the maximum ceiling for 
each type of expense and can only be disbursed for the intended purpose. On the 
basis of the budget execution document, a local government’s unit can implement its 
programs and procure goods and services that trigger the disbursement of funds from 
the budget. The Head of Region appoints disbursing treasurers to each local 
government’s unit to handle the operational activities in relation to the budget 
disbursement process. 
Disbursing treasurers verify the validity, accuracy and completeness of invoices and 
other relevant documentation before initiating the payment process by issuing a 
payment request. The Budget User or Proxy of Budget User must confirm the 
availability of funds and verify the payment request, along with its supporting 
documentation, before authorising and issuing a payment order. A payment order 
cannot be issued before the delivery of goods and services is completed and it is 
prohibited to issue a payment order after the end of the current fiscal year. The Budget 
User then submits the payment order to the General Treasurer through the Proxy of 
General Treasurer. After verifying the completeness and the accuracy of the payment 
order and confirming the availability of the funds, the Proxy of General Treasurer 
issues a warrant for disbursement of funds to accomplish the payment process 
through the local treasury account. 
In the procurement process, the main actors involved are the Budget User or Proxy 
of Budget User, a central procurement unit, a CMO and a committee for handover of 
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 goods and services (GoI 2010). Depending upon the policy of a local government, a 
central procurement unit may carry out the tendering process for procurement of 
goods and services of all local government units. A CMO is appointed by the Budget 
User or Proxy of Budget User as the officer who is responsible for the overall 
procurement process in each local government’s unit. At the beginning of the 
procurement process, the CMO is responsible for preparing the technical 
specifications of the goods/services required, an owner’s estimate and a draft contract 
or agreement. Once the provider is selected by the central processing unit, the CMO 
is responsible for signing a contract/agreement, monitoring the execution of the 
contract, reporting the progress of the work and handing over the goods/services to 
the Budget User, upon the completion of the contract, by preparing a handover report. 
A committee for handover of goods and services is appointed by the Budget Users 
and is authorised to examine the adherence of procured goods and services to the 
specifications stipulated in the contract, to accept the procured goods and services 
upon carrying out a thorough inspection/examination and to prepare and sign the 
handover reports. Upon the handover, the procured goods and construction projects 
become the local government’s assets and must be administered according to the 
asset management provisions specified in the PFM regulatory framework. 
4.3.3.3. Financing Activities 
Financing activity is related to the receipt of funds that must be repaid later and to the 
disbursement of funds to be received back later, either in the current fiscal year or in 
subsequent fiscal years. It includes the utilisation of unspent funds (budget surplus) 
from previous fiscal year, the establishment and disbursement of reserve funds, the 
selling of local government-owned enterprises, lending and borrowing activities and 
long-term investments (GoI 2005). Generally, approval from local parliament must be 
acquired and the stipulation of a certain financing activity within the local regulations 
must be established before financing activities can be included in the budget. 
Additional restrictions may also apply for financing activities. For example, the 
issuance of a bond must meet the following requirements: 1) there must be 
compliance with capital market regulations, 2) the balance of a local government loan 
must not exceed 75% of its actual local income in the previous year, and 3) the 
aggregate loan of central and all local governments must not exceed 60% of the 
national GDP (GoI 2005). Thus, endorsement from the Ministry of Finance may also 
need to be acquired before a local government can make any loans and/or issue any 
bonds. All financial transactions in relation to financing activities must be processed 
directly through the local treasury account. 
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 4.3.3.4. Treasury and Cash Management 
In line with the requirements to establish sound financial management of local 
government, its treasury and cash management function is considered to be one vital 
component in the PFM operational subsystem. Its role is essential to efficiently utilise 
the limited financial resources of local government and to address the uncertainty of 
fund availability because the timing of local revenue collection and availability, most 
of the time, cannot be predicted accurately. The current regulatory framework that 
separates the authority to issue a payment order from the authority to execute the 
payment creates a challenge for local government’s treasury and cash management 
practices. Hence, it is mandatory for every unit within a local government to prepare 
and report its revenue and expenditure projection to the FMU on a regular basis. This 
practice assists the FMU to develop and implement a sound cash planning system to 
anticipate the possibility of cash shortages that may impede the execution of local 
government programs and activities, including its public service delivery. 
The current PFM regulatory framework also emphasises the adoption of the Treasury 
Single Account (TSA) approach for local government cash and treasury management. 
Hence, all financial transactions in relation to revenue collection, disbursement 
processes and financing activities must be processed through the local treasury 
account managed by the Local Treasurer. The implementation of TSA allows the 
Local Treasurer to identify any idle cash that can be invested in short-term investment 
instruments, which can generate additional revenue for local government. It also 
assists the Local Treasurer to develop a sound cash planning system. 
A flexible arrangement for cash management, especially to accommodate daily 
operational expenses at each local government agency, is also established. This 
involves the allocation of revolving cash advances to disbursing treasurers. 
Disbursing treasurers verify the validity, accuracy and completeness of the payment 
orders before making payments from the revolving cash balance. Any unused 
revolving cash balance at the end of the fiscal year must be returned to the local 
treasury account, along with a fund utilisation report and valid documentary evidence. 
Disbursing treasurers are also required to withhold applicable taxes from every 
payment they make and to deposit the amount of tax withheld to the state treasury 
account according to the applicable regulations. 
4.3.3.5. Asset Management 
The head of a local government’s unit is also an asset user and is required to 
appropriately manage and monitor local government assets under his/her authority 
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 according to the asset policy set up by the Head of Region (GoI 2006). It includes a 
series of actions that cover needs analysis and planning, budgeting, procurement, 
utilisation, maintenance, administration, appraisal, write off, ownership transfer and 
security of assets. Assets that are used to run local government operations are not 
allowed to be transferred without consent from the local parliament. In terms of 
security, asset users must maintain the quality, quantity and accessibility of their 
assets. They should also certify their assets with proof of ownership in the name of 
the local government. Bookkeeping, physical inventory and reporting arrangements 
for local government assets should be administered in an orderly manner. 
4.3.3.6. Accounting and Reporting 
Accounting and reporting is one component of a PFM operational system that was 
heavily impacted by the PFM reform. The new arrangement of this component aims 
to enhance accountability and transparency of the financial management of local 
governments. Before the reform, local governments were only required to prepare a 
budget realisation report and to submit the report to the central government, without 
any adequate external auditing process. The new PFM regulatory framework requires 
local governments to prepare financial statements that consist of a budget realisation 
report, balance sheet, statement of cash flow and notes to financial statement. The 
financial statement must be completed within three months after the end of the 
financial year and submitted to BPK for audit (GoI 2004a). BPK’s audit serves as an 
external audit mechanism to assess the local government’s financial management. 
Local government is required to report its audited financial statements to the local 
parliament, instead of central government. The financial accountability cycle of a local 
government’s budget is finalised when the local parliament accepts the local 
government’s audited financial statement and stipulates this in a local regulation. 
Other than the annual financial audit, the new PFM regulatory framework also 
stipulates the in-year reporting mechanism whereby local governments are required 
to prepare the first-semester budget realisation report and submit the report to the 
local parliament by the end of July of the current budget year. While this requirement 
is part of the monitoring process by local parliament, it also serves as a means for 
local governments to propose any amendments to the budget as a result of (1) change 
in their circumstances that are not aligned with the budget assumptions, (2) the 
necessity for transfers between line items, spending units or activities, and (3) the 
necessity to utilise the previous year’s budget surplus. The PFM regulations also give 
flexibility to local governments, should any emergency or extraordinary situation 
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 emerge, to disburse the funds from the budget even though those amounts are not 
allotted in the budget. Such emergency spending, however, should be reported in the 
budget realisation and included in the budget revision proposal in order to gain 
approval from the local parliament and be stipulated in the local regulations.  
While there was no proper accounting standard in place before the reform, the new 
PFM regulatory framework requires the conformity of the financial statement 
preparations with the Government Accounting Standard (GAS). The first GAS was 
implemented through the enactment of GR 24/2005. It marked the adoption of more 
modern accounting practices for local governments in Indonesia by replacing single 
entry bookkeeping with a double entry system. GAS 2005 accommodated a modified 
cash basis to bridge the adoption of a full accrual basis in the financial year 2008, as 
required by the PFM regulatory framework. Nevertheless, the GAS that adopted the 
full accrual basis was not available until 2010 when GR 71/2010 was enacted to 
replace GR 24/2005. GAS 2010, however, still allowed the adoption of the cash 
toward accrual basis during the transition to the accrual basis. This provision has 
caused further delay in the application of the accrual basis in local governments. 
MoHA (2013) stipulated that the accrual basis was not mandatory in the preparation 
of local governments’ financial statements before financial year 2015. 
Local government sets its own accounting policy and establishes a local government 
accounting system, which refers to the GAS. All local government units are required 
to prepare a financial statement for their financial transactions, which are then 
consolidated by the FMU. To enable the preparation of an accurate financial 
statement, both local government units and the FMU must maintain proper records of 
all transactions. Consistency of transaction recording, including the conformity of the 
transaction recording to the applicable accounting standard, should also be 
maintained. 
4.3.3.7. Internal Control System 
To enhance the performance, transparency and accountability of local government 
PFM, the Head of Local Government arranges and establishes an internal control 
system according to the relevant regulation25. A local government’s financial internal 
control system encompasses a process that provides adequate assurance for the 
achievement of the local government’s objectives, as reflected in the reliability of its 
25  GR 60/2008 regarding the Government Internal Control System sets the guideline for the 
development and establishment of internal control systems in Indonesia, both for central and local 
governments. 
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 financial reporting, the efficiency and effectiveness of its program implementation, and 
its adherence to the laws and regulations. 
According to GR 60/2008, an internal control system in a government institution, 
including local government, consists of five elements: 1) control environment, 2) risk 
assessment, 3) control activities, 4) information and communication, and 5) internal 
control monitoring. The control environment requires the Heads of Regions to create 
and maintain working environments that can induce positive behaviours among the 
employees through strengthening their integrity and work ethics, maintaining an 
effective leadership style, actualising a strong commitment to competence, 
establishing well-suited organisational structures, having appropriate procedures for 
delegation of authority, implementing a sound policy on human resource 
management, performing an effective internal audit function and maintaining decent 
relationships with other relevant government institutions. The risk assessment 
element requests that the Heads of Regions develop strategic objectives according 
to the responsibilities of the institutions, as stipulated in the relevant regulations. It 
deals with the formulation of a statement of vision and mission that can be specifically 
measured, and is achievable, realistic and time-bound. Effective dissemination of the 
strategic objectives to all employees, and a more detailed operational strategy at 
activity levels, should be established to ensure the effectiveness of the risk 
assessment element. 
Heads of Regions are also required to carry out control activities according to the size, 
the complexity and the nature of their roles, functions and responsibilities. More 
emphasis should be given to the main activities of the local government’s institutions, 
based on the result of the risk assessment processes. This element also specifies the 
necessity for local government to establish written policies and procedures and to 
ensure the implementation of those written procedures in their actual practices. 
Control activities must be periodically evaluated to ensure their appropriateness and 
effectiveness. In regard to the information component of the internal control system, 
Head of Regions are obliged to identify, record and communicate any relevant 
information in an appropriate form and in a timely manner. The last element of 
monitoring requires the Head of Regions to establish continuous monitoring activities, 
including routine managerial activities, supervision, reconciliation and other measures 
related to the execution of roles and functions. A separate evaluation could also be 
undertaken by an internal audit function, or other external bodies, to review and 
examine the effectiveness of the internal control system. A proper follow-up 
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 mechanism on the audit findings’ recommendations and any review/evaluation of the 
audit findings are also part of the monitoring element of an internal control system. 
Other than those major elements of PFM operations, the PFM operations of local 
governments in Indonesia also covers the arrangements for settlement of state losses 
and financial management of public service agencies (GoI 2004a). State losses can 
occur as a result of the unlawful acts or omissions of a person. The PFM legal 
framework sets provisions regarding the settlement process for the state losses, and 
stipulates that treasurers, non-treasurer civil servants or other officials who inflict state 
losses by breaching the law or neglecting their duties are responsible for 
compensating the government for the amount of the losses (GoI 2004a). The Head of 
the Region must report any state losses that have occurred in his/her local 
government to BPK. The imposition of compensation for state losses upon a non-
treasurer civil servant and/or local government officials is decided by the Head of the 
Region, while BPK is responsible for imposing compensation for state losses upon 
the treasurers. The amount of state loss that is refunded is reported in the local 
government financial report as other own-sourced revenue (GoI 2004a). 
To manage its affairs, local government may establish public service agencies, 
commonly known as Badan Layanan Umum (BLU). These agencies are in charge of 
providing services to the public, especially in relation to the local government’s affairs, 
to improve public welfare and education. The PFM legal framework provides 
autonomy for a BLU to manage its activities, with the aim of improving the quality of 
public service delivery. A BLU also has a more flexible arrangement in terms of its 
financial management. For example, a BLU is allowed to directly use its revenue to 
fund its expenses. Nevertheless, a BLU remains a local government unit whereby its 
financial resources must be included in the local government’s budget and its financial 
statement must be consolidated in the local government’s financial statement. 
In this study, however, these two elements, the settlement of state losses and the 
financial management of BLUs, are exempted from the analysis. 
4.4. Chapter Summary 
This chapter has elaborated upon the legal framework of local government PFM 
operations in Indonesia as the reference for local governments to exercise their roles 
in budget execution and preparation of financial statements. It has also exposed the 
three main elements of local government PFM operations in Indonesia: (1) budget 
execution, (2) a financial accounting and reporting system, and (3) an internal control 
system. These main elements have encompassed the typical PFM operations 
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 stipulated in the major PFM literature and technical references as have been 
discussed in the literature review chapter. This chapter has provided a foundation and 
references for gaining adequate understanding in regard to the expected behaviours 
from the PFM actors under the current legal framework of PFM operations. Any 
deviations in the actual PFM practices display the problems of non-compliance, which 
has the potential to create systemic problems in the local governments’ PFM 
operational processes. 
The following chapter, Chapter 5, continues the application of the first research stage 
of this study by presenting the results of the content analysis on BPK’s audit reports 
in order to directly address the first research objective in this study. 
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 Chapter 5 
Systemic Problems in Local Governments’ PFM Operations 
This chapter discusses the results of the content analysis of BPK’s audit reports and 
presents a number of identified systemic problems in order to address the first 
research question of this study. In this thesis, systemic problems are defined as 
deficiencies that are a result of the non-compliant behaviour of public employees in 
one or more of the PFM operational sub-systems, which lead to the inability of the 
PFM operational practices to achieve the objectives stipulated in the trilogy of financial 
laws: to improve the accountability, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness of 
government activities without undermining the principles of orderly conduct, 
compliance with regulations and appropriateness. The proposed definition of systemic 
problems led to the development of three criteria for their identification, as described 
in the research methodology chapter (see Section 3.2.3), consisting of the magnitude 
or frequency of the audit findings items, the locus of the problems and the impacts 
upon PFM objectives. 
This chapter begins with a general overview on the quality of PFM operations within 
local governments after the reform, focusing on the timeliness and the quality of the 
financial statements. A brief description of the statistics related to the audit reports 
and the audit findings reported during the period of study is then discussed, followed 
by the presentation of the main segment of this chapter, the systemic problems in 
local government PFM operations in Indonesia. 
5.1. Overview of the Quality of Local PFM Operations 
One of the immediate problems with the application of the new PFM system was the 
unpreparedness of the local governments to produce financial statements (FS) in a 
timely manner. Before the PFM reform, no government institution in Indonesia had 
experience in preparing a financial statement based on a certain acceptable 
accounting standard. Regulatory frameworks before the reform had only requested 
local governments to prepare a budget realisation report according to MAKUDA, the 
financial administration guidelines for local government. Then, the reform in 2004 
required all government institutions to prepare financial statements that consisted of 
a budget realisation report, balance sheet, cash flow statement and notes to financial 
statement (GoI 2003). These financial statements must be submitted to BPK within 
three months after the end of each fiscal year (GoI 2004a). As a result, it is easy to 
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 predict that some local governments might have difficulty in complying with this 
requirement, even though the regulatory framework allowed a two-year interlude 
before the actual implementation of this provision in the financial year of 2006. 
Table 5-1 
Delay in the Finalisation of Local Governments’ Financial Statements 
 
Table 5-1 breaks down the statistics on local governments which could not finalise 
their financial statements within the timeframe required for each financial year from 
2006 until 2014. In financial year 2006, there were 101 local governments, or about 
21.81% of the total local governments required to submit, that could not finalise their 
financial statements within the timeframe. This number soared in financial year 2007 
when 194 local governments, or 41.36%, were not able to prepare a timely financial 
statement. This trend continued until financial year 2011, when the number of local 
governments that were able to finalise their financial statements in a timely manner 
began to increase. By financial year 2014, only 35 local governments could not finalise 
their financial statements within the timeframe, or only 6.49% of the total number of 
local governments. 
Delay in the preparation and finalisation of financial statements impacts upon the audit 
process and, ultimately, hampers the quality of the PFM accountability mechanism 
under the current PFM regulatory framework. Each Head of Region is required to 
prepare a local regulation draft regarding the accountability of budget execution. 
Along with the audited financial statements, the local regulation draft is submitted to 
Local Parliament within six months after the end of each financial year (GoI 2003). 
Financial 
Year (FY)
Number of LGs Not 
Timely in Submitting 
FS to BPK
Number of LGs 




2006 101 463 21.81%
2007 194 469 41.36%
2008 192 485 39.59%
2009 156 504 30.95%
2010 164 522 31.42%
2011 98 524 18.70%
2012 109 524 20.80%
2013 68 524 12.98%
2014 35 539 6.49%
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 The financial management cycle is finalised when a local regulation regarding the 
accountability of financial management is enacted. Therefore, any delay in the 
finalisation of financial statements has a flow-on effect to the financial accountability 
mechanism of the PFM regulatory framework. 
Another obvious problem in regard to the implementation of the new provisions for 
preparing financial statements, especially during the early years, is in regard to the 
quality of the financial statements. One major component for assessing the quality of 
financial management in a local government is the fair presentation of financial 
information in its financial statements according to the relevant accounting standard. 
Under the current local government PFM framework, upon the submission of a 
financial statement, BPK conducts a financial audit to assess its fairness. BPK has 
two months to finalise its audits before issuing its opinions regarding the fairness of 
the information presented in the financial statements, according to the applicable 
GAS, and tabling the audit reports to the Local Parliaments (GoI 2004b). 
There are four types of audit opinion issued by BPK (BPK 2015a). An unqualified 
opinion is issued when the financial statement presents a true and fair view of the 
auditees’ financial position and it does not contain any material misstatements that 
could significantly impact upon the decision-making process. Under certain 
conditions, BPK may modify its unqualified opinion with an explanatory paragraph, 
although it does not affect the unqualified opinion of the financial statement. The 
second type of opinion is a qualified opinion. It means that the financial statement 
generally gives a true and fair view of the auditee’s financial statements, however, 
there are a number of aspects and/or accounts that fail to meet the required standard. 
In the situation where the auditor is unable to reach a conclusion or opinion on the 
financial statement, BPK issues a disclaimer of opinion. A disclaimer of opinion can 
be issued due to a variety of reasons, such as restrictions in the scope of the audit. 
The fourth audit opinion is an adverse opinion. This type of opinion is given when the 
financial statement is not prepared in accordance with the required standards and the 
auditee is unwilling to make any necessary adjustments or corrections that have been 
proposed by the auditors.  
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 Table 5-2 
Audit Opinions on Local Governments’ Financial Statements 
 
Table 5-2 highlights BPK’s audit opinions on all local governments’ financial 
statements from financial year 2006 to 2014. It is quite understandable that for 
financial year 2006 there were only three local governments that received an 
unqualified audit opinion, the highest ranking of BPK’s audit opinions, because most 
local governments might not have possessed adequate capability in preparing 
financial statements. For financial year 2006, most of the local governments (327, or 
70.63%) received a qualified opinion, while the remainder received a disclaimer of 
opinion (105, or 22.68%) or an adverse opinion (28, or 6.05%). As the capabilities of 
local governments have increased, the number of local governments receiving 
unqualified audit opinions also has increased. For financial year 2014, almost half of 
all local governments were able to receive unqualified audit opinions. While this 
achievement is positive, a lot of effort is still required to enhance the accountability of 
local governments as reflected in their financial statements. 
5.2. Statistics on Local Government Audit Findings 
Throughout the period of analysis, between 2009 and 2014, a total of 5,463 audit 
reports on local governments were published, both by BPK’s Headquarters and BPK’s 
Regional Offices. Content analysis conducted in this study covered 5,141 audit 
reports published by BPK’s Regional Offices throughout Indonesia, or about 94.11% 
of the total number of audit reports. The coverage of the analysis included 3,064 
financial statement audit reports (59.60%), 1,647 special purposes audit reports 
F/S Audit 
Opinion FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014
3 4 13 15 34 67 120 156 252
0.65% 0.85% 2.68% 2.98% 6.51% 12.79% 22.90% 29.77% 46.75%
327 283 323 330 341 349 319 311 247
70.63% 60.34% 66.60% 65.48% 65.33% 66.60% 60.88% 59.35% 45.83%
105 123 118 111 121 100 79 46 35
22.68% 26.23% 24.33% 22.02% 23.18% 19.08% 15.08% 8.78% 6.49%
28 59 31 48 26 8 6 11 5
6.05% 12.58% 6.39% 9.52% 4.98% 1.53% 1.15% 2.10% 0.93%
463 469 485 504 522 524 524 524 539







 (32.04%) and 430 performance audit reports (8.36%). Content analysis on those 
5,141 audit reports exhibited 104,903 audit finding cases for local governments that 
had been reported throughout the period 2009 to 2014. Figure 5.1 summarises the 
104,903 audit finding cases based on the four audit findings groups of: 1) exhibiting 
internal control deficiencies, 2) having financial impact, 3) pertaining to administrative 
matters, and 4) existence of 3Es problems (i.e. economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness). 
Figure 5-1 
Statistics on Audit Findings within Local Governments 
 
Overall, most of the problems disclosed in the audit reports were about internal control 
deficiencies, followed closely by findings that highlighted financial impacts (i.e. 
shortfall of revenue and state losses), with administrative matters and, especially, 3Es 
deficiencies being reported less often. This trend may be driven by the emphasis of 
the external auditing process on assessment of the government institutions’ internal 
control systems and their actual implementation as stipulated in the Government 
Auditing Standard (BPK 2007). An auditor is required to have enough understanding 
of the institution’s internal controls to be able to properly plan and conduct the audit. 
In a financial statement audit, for example, a separate report regarding internal control 
weaknesses should be prepared to disclose any reportable conditions. Even in 
performance and special purpose audits, the audit reports must disclose any 
significant internal control weaknesses identified within the scope of the audit. Any 
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 insignificant internal control weaknesses can be excluded from the performance and 
special purpose audit reports but they still have to be reported to the management of 
the audited entities. 
Audit findings in the financial statement audits showed a similar pattern to the overall 
audit findings. This pattern is understandable because the majority of the audit reports 
included in the analysis were the financial statement audit reports. Nevertheless, 
different patterns were found among the other audit types. Performance audits 
reported more cases of 3Es problems, followed by the internal control weaknesses. 
Only a small proportion of performance audit findings exposed problems in 
administrative matters and weaknesses that caused financial impact. On the other 
hand, special purpose audits highlighted a major problem in the financial impacts of 
the audit finding cases. The different objectives and focus of each audit type may 
have caused the dissimilarity of the audit finding patterns among different types of 
audit. 
5.3. Identified Systemic Problems 
The application of the three criteria for identification of systemic problems is 
summarised in Table 5-3. The application of the first criterion resulted in 20 audit 
finding items being identified as potential systemic problems. Criteria 2 and 3 were 
then used to elaborate upon and link each potential problem to determine the relevant 
PFM operational subsystems in which the problems occured and to evaluate the 
impacts of the problems upon the overall PFM objectives. 
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 Table 5-3 
Identified Systemic Problems of Local Governments 
 
The following paragraphs in this section further evaluate these identified systemic 
problems in more detail, including the relevant PFM operational components in which 
the problems occur and how they may hinder the effectiveness of the PFM operational 
processes. The discussion also provides some examples extracted from the IHPS to 













Total audit finding cases reported 104,903     100.00%
Total audit finding items identified 
as systemic problems         93,035 88.69%
1 Uncollected revenue and delays in revenue collection processes 11,384       10.85%
Revenue 
Collection √
2 Overpayment of expenses 10,337       9.85% Disbursement Process √
3 Inadequate and weak implementation of standard operations and procedures 7,407         7.06% Internal Control √ √
4 Inadequate and inaccurate transaction records 6,927         6.60%
Accounting and 
Reporting √ √
5 Incomplete documentation of expenses payments 6,760         6.44%
Disbursement 
Process √
6 Lack of asset safeguarding 6,138         5.85% Asset Management √
7 Irregularities in the implementation of technical and/or internal regulations 6,086         5.80% Internal Control √
8 Volume shortages 5,907         5.63% Disbursement Process √
9 Lack of planning for activity 5,221         4.98% Internal Control √ √
10 Inappropriate financial reporting processes 4,290         4.09%
Accounting and 
Reporting √
11 Low performance and quality of service delivery 4,053         3.86% Internal Control √
12 Improper policy implementation 3,633         3.46% Internal Control √ √
13 Disbursement on fictitious activities/transactions 2,710         2.58%
Disbursement 
Process √ √
14 Higher acquisition cost of inputs 2,118         2.02% Disbursement Process √
15 Inadequate financial management, accounting and reporting system 2,101         2.00%
Accounting and 
Reporting √
16 Improper cash handling 1,868         1.78% Treasury/Cash Management √
17 Improper procurement processes 1,679         1.60% Disbursement Process √
18 Non-compliance with regulations in other specific areas 1,667         1.59% Internal Control √
19 Misallocation of budget 1,617         1.54% Internal Control √ √
20 Direct use of revenue 1,132         1.08% Revenue Collection √ √
No.
Criterion 1
Impact upon PFM Objectives
Locus of the 
Problem
Criterion 3
Frequencies of audit 
finding casesAudit Findings Item
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 5.3.1. Uncollected Revenue and Delays in Revenue Collection 
The most frequent problem identified in this study was the inability of local 
governments to optimally collect the rightful local government revenues within the 
specified timeframe stipulated in the PFM regulations. Throughout 2009 to 2014, 
there were 11,384 cases of uncollected revenue or delays in revenue collection, or 
about 10.85% of the total audit findings reported in BPK’s audit reports on local 
government. Those occurences of uncollected revenue and delays in revenue 
collection highlight the systemic problem in the revenue collection component of PFM 
operations and they mostly involve the failure of local government to collect local 
taxes, levies and late charges on third party construction work. While the financial 
management regulations do stipulate the requirement for local government agencies 
that have the authority to collect local revenue to perform their powers optimally, in 
practice the optimal efforts are still lacking. 
“The exploitation of marble stone by 19 mining licensed companies in 
Pangkajene Island District was not subject to mineral resources tax, resulting in 
a shortage of local government revenue in the fiscal year 2010 that amounted 
to Rp30.55 billion.” (IHPS I/2011) 
A number of local governments also still maintain a cash collection method, especially 
for their local taxes and levies. They assign a receiving treasurer to collect local 
revenue in cash, especially where the individual amounts collected are relatively small 
and the collection area is quite dispersed and isolated. The receiving treasurer is 
required to deposit the collected monies to the local treasury account within 24 hours 
after being collected. In actual practice, however, delays in depositing the money often 
occur due to the carelessness of receiving treasurers and other practical issues, 
resulting in the potential misuse of the monies by the receiving treasurers. 
“In 2011, there were delays in depositing health care levies from the Karimun 
District local hospital into the local government bank account. The delays 
ranged between 1 to 60 working days and resulted in local government 
revenues amounting to Rp3.87 billion that could not be immediately utilised.” 
(IHPS II/2014) 
In general, most local governments in Indonesia still heavily rely on the transfer of 
funds from central government (Djalil 2014). Hence, the inability to optimally collect 
the rightful local revenues and to deposit the revenue monies in a timely manner 
further impedes the ability of local governments to finance their programs and 
activities, as stipulated in the budget, in the most effective way. 
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 5.3.2. Overpayment of Expenses 
Overpayment of expenses constituted the second most frequent audit findings 
reported at local government level, mostly in the forms of payments for cost items that 
were not stipulated in the contract, payments of emolument and travel allowances 
exceeding the applicable standard, payments of expense items that were not in 
accordance with and/or exceeded the provisions, and payments for unfinished third 
party’s work. There were 10,337 overpayment cases, or about 9.85% of the total audit 
findings, reported in BPK’s audit reports on local government between 2009 and 2014.  
“Overpayment for purchase of materials and work equipment, labour wages, 
non-physical work, equipment rental and diesel fuel in two new road 
construction projects amounted to Rp3.90 billion in West Tanjung Jabung 
District.” (IHPS II/2014) 
This problem exposes systemic problems in the disbursement processes where a lack 
of verification procedures exists. Even though the PFM regulatory framework does 
include the requirement for disbursing treasurers, budget users and general treasurer 
or a proxy of the general treasurer, to verify the validity and accuracy of the payment 
requests and invoices, the actual practices of the verification procedures could not 
prevent the overpayment problems. The problem demonstrates that the actions of the 
officers who were responsible for verifying the validity and accuracy of the invoices 
before making the payments were still lacking, resulting in inefficiencies in the overall 
PFM operational processes. 
5.3.3. Inadequacy of Standard Operations and Procedures 
The internal control element that deals with the actual day-to-day operational 
practices of PFM is its control activities, which include the establishment of written 
policies and procedures to guide the actual practices of the operations. Detailed 
directions in the form of SOPs are generally established to ensure the adherence of 
the PFM operational practices to the higher regulatory requirements. SOPs also are 
important to ensure the operational accountability and effectiveness of the actual 
practices through the establishment of clear separation of duties and functions, 
adequate authorisation for transaction and/or decisions, the establishment of a sound 
control mechanism over access to information and utilisation of resources, timely and 
accurate transaction recordings, and proper documentation of internal control 
systems, transactions and other significant events. 
“In Rote Ndao District, East Nusa Tenggara, the local government did not have 
adequate standard operations and procedures (SOPs) for the management of 
revenue collection processes potentially causing irregularities in the process of 
receiving cash by the treasurer.” (IHPS I/ 2011) 
119 
 Such SOPs are inadequate either because they are informal or ineffectively 
implemented. There were 7,407 instances, or 7.06% of the total audit findings 
reported during 2009 to 2014, in which this problem was disclosed. This fact, as a 
result, may jeopardise the effectiveness and accountability of the PFM operations of 
local governments. 
5.3.4. Inadequate and Inaccurate Transaction Records 
Another systemic problem identified in this study is the inadequacy and inaccuracy of 
financial transaction records. This problem occurs in the accounting and reporting 
component of PFM operations and mainly deals with non-conformity and 
inconsistency in accounting treatments and recording of financial transactions, which 
may cause understated or overstated figures in local government financial 
statements. Throughout the period of the study, there were 6,927 cases of inadequate 
and inaccurate transaction records reported in the audit reports, or about 6.60% of 
the total audit finding cases.  
In Bima District, West Nusa Tenggara Province, the presentation of inventory 
figures in the balance sheet was not based on a physical inventory check, 
meaning that the value of medicines inventory amount of Rp2.93 billion in the 
balance sheet might not display the actual figure.” (IHPS II/2012) 
Inaccurate figures and inadequate disclosures, as a result of improper transaction 
recording and accounting processes, weaken the ability of local governments to fairly 
present their financial statements according to the accounting standard. As a result, 
this weakness may impact upon the accountability and transparency of the financial 
statements. 
5.3.5. Incomplete Documentation of Expenses Payments 
Incomplete documentation of expenses payments is another systemic problem 
identified in the disbursement process. It was reported 6,760 times in the audit reports, 
which was about 6.44% of the total audit findings items reported during the period of 
this study. This problem mainly occurs in relation to the disbursement of grants and 
other social aid funds to a number of external institutions, such as non-government 
organisations (NGOs), political parties and other community-based organisations. 
Under the current PFM regulations, the recipients of grants and other social aid funds 
are required to provide an accountability report on how the funds were managed and 
spent. Nevertheless, most local governments struggle to ensure that the recipients 
submit proper accountability reports in a timely manner and in an appropriate format. 
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 “In Banten Province, based on examination of grant and social aid fund 
allocation, 92 organisations that received the money in fiscal years 2010 and 
2011 had not submitted their accountability reports [on fund utilisation] resulting 
in the situation where the proper utilisation of budget spending on grant and 
social aid funding totalling Rp68.30 billion cannot be ascertained and causing a 
risk that the grants and social aid funds were not used in accordance with their 
intended purposes.” (IHPS I/2012) 
This problem, in addition to the potential diminishment of the accountability of fund 
utilisation, also raises suspicion about the validity and effectiveness of the grant and 
social assistance funds allocations. 
5.3.6. Lack of Asset Safeguarding 
In asset management, lack of asset safeguarding was also frequently reported in 
BPK’s audit reports on local government, mostly in the form of inadequate supporting 
documentation for land ownership and breach of public asset management 
regulations. The total of 6,138 such cases that were reported during the period of 
study reflects about 5.85% of the total audit finding cases reported in the audit reports. 
This problem also involves incidents where public assets have gone missing and/or 
are being used or physically occupied by unauthorised parties. 
“City of Bukit Tinggi did not have certificates of ownership for 520,424 square 
metres of its land assets, valued at Rp58.66 billion, causing uncertain legal 
status and weakening the legal position of the city in the event of a dispute.” 
(IHPS II/2009) 
This situation displays the accountability issues in local government asset 
management. In addition, this problem may limit a local government’s ability to 
optimally utilise its assets. Hence, it potentially impacts upon the effectiveness of local 
governments in running their operations and delivering services to the public. 
5.3.7. Irregularities in the Implementation of Regulations 
Distortions in the implementation of regulations involve non-compliance with technical 
and other local government regulations in relation to financial management and 
administration. This problem belongs to the internal control component of the PFM 
operations, mostly in relation to both revenue collection and disbursement processes, 
and it may lead to other items of audit findings that include administrative 
weaknesses, inefficient and ineffective activities, shortages in revenue and state 
losses. Overall, this problem displays the lack of accountability of local governments 
in the management of their public financial resources. Throughout the period of study, 
this problem was reported in 6,086 instances, or about 5.80% of the total audit 
findings. 
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 One example of distortion in the revenue collection mechanism deals with revenue 
monies that were not transacted properly through the local treasury account as 
stipulated in the PFM regulatory framework. 
“In Bombana District, revenue sharing funds from land and building taxes were 
not transacted through the local treasury account in the Regional Development 
Bank of Southeast Sulawesi, causing unreported local revenue of Rp9.98 billion 
and undeposited revenue monies of Rp8.77 billion.” (IHPS II/2010) 
In the disbursement process, a number of issues in relation to improper authorisation, 
and inappropriate requests and orders, for expense payments also highlight the 
problem. 
“In Special Capital Province of Jakarta, inadequate fuel management in the 
Department of Fire and Disaster Management resulted in irregular 
disbursement processes for fuel expense payments worth Rp4.09 billion. Fuel 
consumption in each working unit was not approved by the authorised official. 
[In addition], there were no control cards to monitor the fuel consumptions of 
each fire engine.” (IHPS II/2009) 
5.3.8. Volume Shortages 
Volume shortage is a specific case of overpayment of expenses. It mainly occurs in 
the delivery of procured goods and services, especially in construction projects. 
Volume shortages are reported when constructions or procured goods and services 
are received in less than the volumes stipulated in the contract agreements, both in 
terms of quantity and quality. This case occurs when the payment of the full amount 
of the contract has been made while the procured goods or services have not been 
fully delivered according to the contract. In general, inaccurate verification during the 
handover of procured goods or services has triggered the problem. 
“Volume shortage on procured works and goods amounted to Rp2.22 billion 
occurring in Bojonegoro District and City of Tidore Island. They involved the 
physical completion of the work that did not match with the contract but the 
payments had been made in full. There was a loss in regard to the discrepancy 
between the amount paid and the value of works and goods received, among 
others, for the procurement of office furniture and generator engine 
maintenance work.” (IHPS II/2013) 
This problem highlights another systemic problem in the disbursement process when 
the project supervisors do not perform their roles optimally in the provision of goods 
and services. Between 2009 and 2014, there were 5,907 volume shortage cases 
reported in the audit reports on local governments, causing inefficiencies in the overall 
PFM operations. For a construction project, this type of problem raises another 
concern because the shortage in volume may jeopardise the overall quality of the 
construction work.  
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 5.3.9. Other Systemic Problems 
While previous paragraphs have listed and elaborated upon the major systemic 
problems26 identified in this study, the rest of this section discusses the remaining, 
less-frequently identified, systemic problems based on the components of PFM 
operations. 
5.3.9.1. Revenue Collection and Management 
Another systemic problem in revenue management is the practice of using the 
collected revenue monies to directly pay the local government units’ expenses. This 
problem occurred 1,132 times during the period of study, representing about 1.08% 
of the total audit findings. This practice violates the requirement to deposit all local 
revenue monies into the local treasury account and the requirement of paying the 
expenses through the budget mechanism. This non-compliant practice mainly occurs 
for non-tax local revenues where the authority to collect the revenue is devolved to a 
number of local government spending units that provide the services. 
“In Dairi District, North Sumatra, revenues from public health insurance claims, 
social welfare insurance claims, birth delivery guarantee claims and regional 
health insurance claims, amounting to Rp6.35 billion, were directly spent for the 
operational costs of local hospitals and local health centres.” (IHPS I/2012) 
Transparency and accountability are the two PFM objectives that are negatively 
affected by this practice. The impact upon these objectives is twofold; the first is 
concerned with the omission of revenues and expenses figures from the financial 
statements, and the other is related to improper disbursement processes since the 
payments of expenses do not follow the budget mechanism. 
5.3.9.2. Disbursement Processes 
Among the disbursement processes, there were an instances where the local 
government budget was illegally used. They involved the disbursement of budget for 
the personal use of employees and for fictitious activities such as fictitious official 
travel. There were 2,710 cases of payments for fictitious activities, or about 2.58% of 
the total audit findings, reported in local government audit reports between 2009 and 
2014. This problem displays the lack of verification procedures for the payments and 
the corrupt mentality of the public employees and officials involved. It is one source 
26  A major systemic problem is defined as an identified problem that represents more than 5% of the 
total audit findings cases reporting during the period of the study. 
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 of inefficiency in PFM operations at local government level, which also affects the 
accountability of local government in the management of public finances. 
“There were 51 fictitious business travel expenditures worth Rp44.35 billion. It 
involved trips were not actually conducted and improper documentation, such 
as the absence of travel activity reports and fraudulent airline tickets. These 
cases occurred in 45 local governments, including West Papua Province 
(Rp11.41 billion), East Kutai District (Rp4.35 billion), Deli Serdang District (4.18 
billion) and South Nias District (Rp3.28 billion).” (IHPS II/2013) 
Another contributor to waste and inefficiency in the disbursement process is improper 
processing in the procurements of goods and services. It involves the omission of 
some prerequisite procedures during the procurement process, for example, the 
procurement team does not prepare an owner’s estimate. It also includes instances 
when the procurements have been split into a number of smaller contracts to avoid 
the requirement for carrying out a bidding process and when there are pro forma 
procurements by which the winner of the bidding process has been arranged in 
advance. Improper procurement processes were reported 1,679 times, or about 
1.60% of the total audit findings reported in BPK’s audit reports on local government 
published between 2009 and 2014. 
“The central procurement unit in Sigi District didn’t exercise its authority to 
evaluate its owner’s estimate and the technical specifications [of the procured 
goods] causing the failure to have an accurate value of owner’s estimate.” (IHPS 
II/2014) 
The last identified problem in the disbursement process, especially in relation to the 
procurement of goods and services, deals with the acquisition cost of inputs being 
higher than the applicable standard market price. It also includes the acquisition of 
substandard quality of inputs. This problem obviously contributes to inefficiency in the 
PFM operations of Indonesia’s local governments. Inaccuracy in the preparation of an 
owner’s estimate, where the owner’s estimate is set higher than the market price, is 
the most common cause of this problem. Between 2009 and 2014, there were 2,118 
cases of higher acquisition cost of inputs, as reported in BPK’s audit reports, 
representing about 2.02% of the total audit findings. 
In Kutai Kartanegara District, East Kalimantan Province, there were purchases 
of laptops, which were not from the authorised dealer, causing waste worth 
Rp11.93 billion.” (IHPS II/2012) 
5.3.9.3. Cash and Treasury Management 
One problem that was identified in the cash management component related to the 
failure of disbursing treasurers to return the cash balance in their possession at the 
end of the fiscal period to the local treasury account, as required by the regulations. 
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 The problem, even though not very significant in terms of the monies involved, may 
reduce the accuracy of the cash balance figures in the financial statements and could 
potentially trigger the misuse of the money by the disbursing treasurers. 
“In Aru Island District, a cash balance of Rp26.10 million in the District 
Secretariat’s treasury for the fiscal year 2010 was not used in accordance with 
the provisions and had not been returned to the local government bank account, 
resulting in an indication of state loss.” (IHPS I/2012) 
During the period of the study, there were 1,868 incidents regarding this problem 
representing about 1.78% of the total audit findings reported in the audit reports during 
the period of study.  
5.3.9.4. Accounting and Reporting Processes 
The accounting and reporting component is concerned with the preparation of local 
government financial statements on budget implementation. Any systemic problems 
identified in this component lead to the inability of local governments to prepare fair 
financial statements according to the accounting standards. Hence, it impacts the 
quality of financial management accountability of local governments. 
Other than inaccurate accounting treatment and recording processes, inappropriate 
reporting processes in financial statement preparation also point to this systemic 
problem in PFM operations. It concerns the establishment of accounting units and 
reporting procedures that are not in accordance with relevant regulations. It also 
involves the input of invalid transactional evidence into the accounting system. During 
the period of study, 4,290 inappropriate financial reporting processes were reported, 
accounting for about 4.09% of the total audit findings. 
“In East Sumba District, East Nusa Tenggara Province, the financial 
transactions of four working units were not recorded in the general ledger of 
cash and no reconciliation had been made between the bank statement and 
general ledger of cash.” (IHPS II/2009) 
Another problem in the accounting and reporting component is related to an unreliable 
accounting and reporting information system. This indicates the inability of the 
particular accounting and reporting information system to provide accurate, reliable 
and timely accounting and reporting information. It may lead to a potentially unfair 
presentation of the financial figures in the financial statement. This problem was 
reported 2,101 times, or about 2% of the total audit findings reported throughout 2009 
to 2014. 
“In Keerom District, Papua, accounting and reporting information systems were 
inadequate. The fixed asset figure in the financial statement, amounting to Rp34 
billion, could not be traced adequately because the spending units did not 
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 prepare asset inventory cards and the Head of Asset Department did not 
compile the periodical assets inventory report. This resulted in the value of 
assets [in the financial statement] possibly not being presented fairly.” (IHPS I / 
2010) 
5.3.9.5. Internal Control System 
In relation to budget execution, the internal control system also covers efforts to 
ensure both effectiveness and efficiency in the implementation of a local 
government’s programs and activities. Other than problems in relation to the 
inadequacy of written procedures, or SOP, lack of planning is also seen as a systemic 
problem in the internal control system component. It was reported 5,907 times in 
BPK’s audit reports covered in this study, or about 4.98% of the total audit findings. It 
involves, for example, misclassification of expense items in the budget and budget 
execution document, causing a potential problem in the implementation of programs 
and activities, as well as in the accounting and reporting processes. Misclassification 
of expense items may require a revision of the budget before they can be disbursed, 
causing delay in the execution of the local government’s programs. It may also lead 
to inaccurate presentation of financial information in the local government’s financial 
statement. 
“In Mojokerto District, East Java, inaccuracy in capital expenditure budgeting 
processes amounted to Rp70.48 billion in its annual budget for the financial year 
2011, resulting in misclassification of goods and services expenditure, grant 
expenditure and capital expenditure.” (IHPS I / 2012) 
In other instances, lack of planning can be directly linked to the inefficiency and 
ineffectiveness of a local government’s programs and activities. 
“In Bali Province, procurements of ICT-based instructional media for education 
in the Office of Education, Youth and Sports during 2010 to 2012 were not 
prepared and executed based on proper planning, causing a financial waste of 
Rp69.02 billion.” (IHPS II/2012) 
A sound internal control system also requires the Head of Local Government Agency 
to carry out a mechanism to manage the overall performance of the agency. This 
includes the establishment, measurement, monitoring and evaluation of the agency’s 
performance indicators. BPK’s audit reports found that, while the establishment and 
measurement of performance indicators were developing, the actual performance of 
the local government agencies was not particularly successful. A number of agencies, 
for example in health services, struggled to achieve their minimum service standard. 
These problems were reported 4,053 times, or about 3.86% of the total audit findings 
on local governments reported by BPK during 2009 to 2014, leading to ineffectiveness 
in local government financial management, especially in public service delivery. 
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 “The service performance of Andi Makkasau hospital [in Pare-Pare City] did not 
meet the minimum service standards. Performance indicators [targets] for 
inpatient, outpatient, emergency, pharmacy and hospital maintenance services 
did not fully meet the minimum service targets.” (IHPS II/2012) 
Another systemic problem in the internal control system component is the inability of 
local government to properly implement and execute government policies. In such 
cases, local government may have failed to optimally collect potential revenue or may 
have to bear unnecessary expenses. Hence, this problem has the potential to threaten 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the overall PFM operations of the local government. 
During the period of study, 3,633 improper policy implementation cases were 
reported, accounting for 3.46% of the total audit findings disclosed in the local 
government audit reports. 
“Optimisation of the collection of hotel, restaurant and advertising taxes has not 
been properly implemented in order to support the increase in local tax 
revenues. Some issues related to this problem include that the policy and work 
plan for the tax optimisation program has not been prepared, dissemination of 
tax rules has not been fully conducted, and coordination among local tax 
authorities, the local licensing units and other relevant agencies in regard to the 
taxpayers’ database has not been carried out optimally.” (IHPS II/2013) 
In regard to improper policy implementation, other than causing inefficiency from the 
perspective of local government, it may also cause inefficiency from the perspective 
of the community. 
“Dr. M. Yunus hospital [in Bengkulu Province] did not have adequate 
commitment to carry out the government’s policy [to] intensify the utilisation of 
generic drugs for health services to the community. A high percentage of non-
generic drugs were prescribed for outpatient, inpatient and emergency 
treatment from 2010 to the first semester of 2011. Non-generic drugs were also 
given to patients who were covered by social health insurance fund.” (IHPS 
II/2011) 
Budget misallocation was also quite common in spending activities, highlighting 
another systemic problem in the local government internal control system. There were 
1,617 reported cases on budget misallocations, or about 1.54% of the total audit 
findings reported during the period of the study. This involves, for example, the 
allocation of social assistance funding to inappropriate recipients. While this type of 
problem does not deal with any alteration to expenditure items in the budget, it does 
impact upon the overall outcomes of the disbursement of funds. Social assistance 
funding is allocated selectively to a small number of recipients to protect them from 
social risks, including for social rehabilitation, social security, social empowerment, 
social insurance, poverty reduction and disaster management programs and activities 
(MoHA 2011). Hence, allocation of social assistance funding outside those areas may 
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 threaten the effectiveness of fund allocation and further jeopardise the accountability 
of public resources management.  
“In Rejang Lebong District, Bengkulu Province, grant and social assistance 
funding for the financial year 2011 worth Rp2.99 billion was granted to local 
government agencies to finance unbudgeted operational expenses of the 
agencies, leading to inappropriate use of monies and ineffective disbursement 
of funds.” (IHPS I/2012)  
Another example of this problem deals with the allocation of special allocation funds 
from central government. 
“In Mamasa District, West Sulawesi Province, budget allocations from the 
special allocation fund worth Rp32.78 billion were spent on activities outside the 
scope of special allocation fund allotment, causing the intended use of special 
allocation funding to provide financial resources for improving basic physical 
infrastructure not to be achieved.” (IHPS II/2012) 
The application of an internal control system in a local government should ensure its 
compliance with external regulations, both in relation to local government financial 
management and other non-financial aspects such as, for example, specific 
regulations in forestry, fisheries and environment. This study also exposes the inability 
of local governments’ internal control systems to detect and prevent the non-
compliant practices of local governments in regard to those specific regulations. While 
this problem is mainly administrative in nature, it underlines the lack of accountability 
in regard to the overall local government activities. BPK’s audit reports on local 
government between 2009 and 2014 have reported 1,667 cases where local 
government did not comply with a number of non-financial management regulations. 
This figure represents about 1.59% of the total audit findings reported for that period. 
“A number of IUP (Mining Exploitation Permit) holders that do not have approval 
on their feasibility studies of environmental impact have constructed special 
jetties [for their mining activities] without approval from the Ministry of Transport, 
have not submitted reclamation and mine closure planning documents and have 
carried out mining activity in forest areas without having permission from the 
Ministry of Forestry.” (IHPS II/2014) 
5.4. Chapter Summary 
This chapter has discussed and examined the audit findings reported in BPK’s audit 
reports on local government that were published between 2009 and 2014. Despite 
this examination of the local governments’ PFM operational practices being made 
several years after the PFM reform was started in 2004, most local governments were 
still struggling to fulfil the requirements stipulated in the PFM regulatory framework. 
BPK’s audit reports disclose a number of systemic problems in relation to the three 
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 major PFM operational components: internal control system, budget execution, and 
financial accounting and reporting. 
The implementation of internal control systems was characterised by the lack of 
proper standards, procedures and guidelines of action for local government 
employees that had led to some common problems in the budget execution and 
financial accounting and reporting processes. In budget execution, local governments 
have been struggling to optimise their local revenue collection efforts; while on the 
disbursement side, overpayment of expenses has contributed to inefficiencies in the 
management of local government budgets. This chapter also has revealed problems 
in other components of budget execution, including procurement, asset management 
and treasury management. In financial accounting and reporting, systemic problems 
were mainly related to the lack of adequate, complete and proper documentation of 
transactions, inaccurate transactional recordings, inappropriate financial reporting 
processes and inadequate financial information systems. It is plausible to conclude 
that those identified problems disaffirm the achievement of the PFM objectives to 
establish efficiency and effectiveness as well as to ensure the accountability of local 
government operations in public goods and services provisions. 
The presentation of the analysis in this chapter concludes the first research stage of 
this study. It has addressed the first research question by identifying systemic 
problems in the PFM operations of Indonesia’s local governments. Its coverage 
included all local governments’ audit reports from all types of audit published by BPK’s 
regional offices throughout Indonesia. The next chapter, Chapter 6, begins the second 
research stage of the single case study to describe a number of relevant PFM 
operational contexts within the selected local government for addressing the second 
and third research questions of this study.
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 Chapter 6 
Case Study (Part I): PFM Operations and Their Systemic Problems 
This chapter commences the application of the second research stage of this study. 
It forms the first part of the single case study report to investigate the relevant PFM 
operational contexts that are essential for addressing the second and third research 
questions, especially in the guidance of the development of the semi-structured 
interview questions and the analysis of data gathered from the interviews. The 
selection of West Lombok District as the single case study has been discussed in 
Section 3.3.1. This current chapter describes and elaborates on relevant aspects, 
mainly regarding the PFM operational arrangements in West Lombok District, to also 
provide the background and context for the case study. It is divided into three major 
sections, commencing with a brief profile of West Lombok District, including its 
historical background, organisational structure, budget performance and economic 
development. The next section describes the PFM operational design employed by 
West Lombok District, based on the more detailed PFM framework that is stipulated 
in its regulations. The final section discusses a number of PFM operational problems 
that were identified in BPK’s audit reports on West Lombok District published between 
2009 and 2014. 
6.1. Profiles of West Lombok District 
Geographically, West Lombok District is located in Central Indonesia. The district 
occupies the western part of Lombok Island and is part of West Nusa Tenggara 
Province 27 . First established in 1958, West Lombok District has undergone two 
regional expansions (Pemkab Lombok Barat 2014d). Mataram, which was originally 
the capital of West Lombok District, became a city in 1993 and enjoyed the status of 
an autonomous local government. The capital of West Lombok District was then 
moved to Giri Menang, Gerung in 2000. In 2008, North Lombok District was 
established as a new district, separated from West Lombok District. Currently, West 
Lombok District has a total area of 1,053.92 square kilometres consisting of 10 sub-
districts, 3 urban villages, 119 villages and 841 sub-villages (Badan Pusat Statistik 
2016). 
27  See Appendix 3 for the geographical location of West Lombok District. 
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 6.1.1. Leadership 
Law 32/2004 stipulates that a direct general election must be held to elect the Head 
of the region. The first direct election in West Lombok was held in 2009, resulting in 
Zainy Arony being elected as West Lombok Regent for 2009 to 2014. He was able to 
secure his position in the following direct election held in 2014, confirming his second 
term as West Lombok Regent for 2014 to 2019. In the first period of his leadership, 
Zainy Arony launched West Lombok’s Vision for 2010-2014 to establish an advanced, 
independent and dignified West Lombok society by articulating the values of “Patut 
Patuh Patju” (Pemkab Lombok Barat 2014a). Patut portrays goodness, 
commendation, balance and modesty; Patuh represents the values of harmony, 
peace, tolerance and mutual respect; and Patju signifies diligence and 
encouragement28. The strategy to achieve this vision includes the development of a 
democratic society that upholds the spirit of akhlakul karimah29 and local culture, by 
providing high quality educational and health services; accelerating economic growth, 
based on local resources, to improve public welfare in accordance with the principle 
of sustainable development; accelerating infrastructure development throughout the 
region; and strengthening law enforcement through the establishment of an honest 
government and active public participation (Pemkab Lombok Barat 2014a).  
Upon the successful achievements of his first term, Arony added the attainment of a 
wealthy society in West Lombok as another aspect of his vision for 2014 to 2019. In 
2015, however, he involved in a corruption case that resulted in prison sentences 
(Surya 2015) causing him to resign from his post. The Vice-Regent, Fauzan Khalid, 
was then inaugurated as West Lombok Regent for 2016 to 2019 (Saleh 2016). This 
change, however, has not diverted the strategic direction of West Lombok since the 
West Lombok Vision for 2014-2019 has been incorporated into local regulation 
(Pemkab Lombok Barat 2014c). 
6.1.2. Economic Development 
One main indicator to measure the economic growth of a region is the regional gross 
domestic product (RGDP). Table 5.1 displays the economic growth rate of West 
Lombok between 2009 and 2013, based on 2000 constant price. During that period, 
the economic growth of West Lombok increased steadily. Agriculture and tourism are 
the leading industries in West Lombok, contributing approximately 25.33% and 
28  From http://lombokbaratkab.go.id/sekilas-lobar/makna-lambang, accessed 14 August 2014. 
29  Akhlakul karimah is an Islamic-based value meaning “high noble morality”. 
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 23.42%, respectively, to the aggregate RGDP in 2013 (Pemkab Lombok Barat 
2014a). 
Table 6-1 
West Lombok Regional GDP Trend 
Year Regional GDP (in million Rupiah) 
RGDP 
Growth (%) 
RGDP per Capita 
Growth (%) 
2009 1,690,045 6.26 4.79 
2010 1,770,784 4.78 6.82 
2011 1,875,977 5.94 4.88 
2012 1,970,465 5.04 3.82 
2013 2,070,967 5.10 3.87 
Source: Badan Pusat Statistik (2013; 2014) 
The situation in which economic development in West Lombok has been boosted by 
these two leading industries is aligned with the MP3EI 30  economic development 
strategy of the Indonesian Central Government. The Bali and Nusa Tenggara 
Economic Corridor, consisting of Bali, West Nusa Tenggara and East Nusa Tenggara 
provinces, is one of the five corridors under the MP3EI program, which aims for them 
to become “the gateway for tourism industry and national food support” (Coordinating 
Ministry for Economic Affairs 2011). Located near Bali, the major tourist destination 
in Indonesia, and supported by its geographic conditions, the development of the 
tourism industry in West Lombok has been very successful. A total of 389,000 tourists 
visited West Lombok in 2014, which was a great increase on the 212,000 people who 
visited in 2010 (Badan Pusat Statistik 2016). Additionally, to support national food 
security, the majority of West Lombok’s utilised land, approximately 78.39% of the 
total 86,182 hectares, is used for the agricultural sector (Badan Pusat Statistik 2016). 
6.1.3. Human Resources 
Home to over 700,000 people, West Lombok’s population has the potential to support 
further economic growth, with the majority of its population, more than 75%, being 
categorised within the productive age range of 15 to 64 years (Pemkab Lombok Barat 
30  MP3EI stands for Masterplan Percepatan dan Perluasan Pembangunan Ekonomi Indonesia. It is the 
Masterplan for Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia’s Economic Development 2011-2025. It 
represents the main strategy of the central government to develop and improve the economic 
development of local governments throughout Indonesia based on their potential and strategic 
resources. For the Bali and Nusa Tenggara regions, including West Lombok District, the tourism 
industry and food security are the focus of economic development under the MP3EI program. 
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 2014a). Nevertheless, as almost half of its population do not finish primary education 
and only less than 5% have enjoyed studying at colleges and universities (Pemkab 
Lombok Barat 2014a), West Lombok faces a big challenge in how to capitalise on its 
human resources potential. Similar to the majority of the population in Lombok Island, 
Sasak is the majority ethnic group in West Lombok, with other ethnic groups such as 
Balinese, Javanese, Sumbawa and Bugis also residing in West Lombok. In terms of 
religion, approximately 93.84% of West Lombok’s residents are Moslem, with a small 
proportion of Hindus, about 6%, and a tiny proportion of Christians and Buddhists 
making up less than 0.17% (Badan Pusat Statistik 2016). 
During 2009-2013, West Lombok identified problems in its human resources, 
economy and infrastructure. To address those problems, West Lombok has been 
focusing its development on: 1) its education facilities, specifically to support 
vocational studies in fisheries, mining, tourism, agriculture, automotive and 
information technology; 2) its public health facilities, including the establishment of a 
community health centre in each village; 3) local economy infrastructure, through the 
revitalisation of traditional and art markets; and 4) its public infrastructure facilities 
such as roads, bridges and irrigation31. This development strategy has enabled West 
Lombok to also improve the capacity of its people. The human development index32 
of West Lombok has increased from 60.61 in 2010 to 63.52 in 2014, although it is still 
below the national average of 68.9 (Badan Pusat Statistik 2015). 
6.1.4. Budget Overview 
The efforts to establish West Lombok’s vision require a resilient fiscal capacity to 
finance its policies, programs and activities. An overview of its budget realisation 
between 2009 and 2014 (see Table 6.2) reveals two major issues that could hinder 
the effectiveness of West Lombok’s budget to further foster its economic development 
and support the achievement of West Lombok’s vision. 
The first issue deals with its revenue side. Even though West Lombok experienced 
an increasing trend in its budget realisation figures, it still relied heavily on the Central 
and Provincial Government transfers to finance its programs and activities. The 
proportion of Central and Provincial Government transfers to total revenue was 
84.42% in 2014, higher than the average figure for all cities and districts in Indonesia, 
31  West Lombok video profile, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sSO8yvNKLBA, accessed on 21 
August 2014. 
32  The Human Development Index was introduced by the UNDP in 1990 to capture many dimensions 
of human capacity consisting of indicators to measure life expectancy, literacy and access to income 
(UNDP, 1990). 
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 which was 73.15%33. However, this percentage is lower than in 2009, displaying 
progress toward greater fiscal autonomy and implying the success of the local 
revenue mobilisation strategy, which has the potential to further enhance its economic 
capacity. 
Table 6-2 
West Lombok District’s Budget Realization 
 
Source: BPK (2010a; 2011b; 2012; 2013a; 2014b; 2015c) 
Another issue is in relation to the expenditure side of the budget. During 2009 to 2014, 
more than 80% of the budget was allocated to the operational components of West 
Lombok’s expenses, leaving less than 20% for capital expenditure. The majority of 
operational expenses were consumed by personnel costs, mainly consisting of the 
district employees’ salaries, and other financial allowances and incentives for the 
employees. It is suggested that the ideal number of employees for West Lombok, 
given its general allocation fund figure, is only around 4,000 employees34, but, in 2015, 
West Lombok employed 8,309 employees (Badan Pusat Statistik 2016). 
6.1.5. Organisational Structure 
As part of the decentralisation policy, local governments in Indonesia have been 
granted autonomy to manage their local affairs. According to Law 32/2004, the 
mandatory affairs that must be managed by local government are regional planning, 
land management, public safety, infrastructure, health, education, social issues, 
manpower and employment, cooperatives and small and medium enterprises 
33  See http://keuda.kemendagri.go.id/datin/index/1/2014. 
34  Interview with West Lombok’s Local Secretary Assistant on 15 July 2015. 
Revenues 513,605 649,615 864,044 852,082 994,525 1,142,644
Local Revenues 32,327 49,993 133,284 94,444 110,062 169,109
Revenue from Transfers 427,196 583,041 726,243 754,316 853,791 964,571
Other Revenues 54,082 16,581 4,517 3,322 30,672 8,964
Expenses 526,059 649,889 837,256 866,048 949,076 1,115,214
Operational Expenses 468,094 541,858 658,019 711,918 799,938 911,466
Capital Expenses 56,950 106,460 176,505 151,605 148,217 202,898
Unexpected Expenses 500 850 2,239 1,982 188 57
Transfer Spending 515 721 493 543 733 793
Surplus/(Deficit) (12,454) (274) 26,788 (13,966) 45,449 27,430
(in million rupiah)
2012 2013 2014Items 2009 2010 2011
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 (SMEs), environment, civil registry, investment, public administration and other basic 
public needs. In addition to those mandatory affairs, West Lombok District has 
included a number of optional affairs that have potential to improve the prosperity of 
the region. Those optional affairs include maritime and fisheries, agriculture, forestry, 
energy and mineral resources, tourism, industry, trade and transmigration (Pemkab 
Lombok Barat 2008a). 
To organise the above-mentioned affairs, West Lombok District has established 42 
local government units that include a District Secretariat, a Local Parliament 
Secretariat, an Inspectorate, 9 Agencies, 15 Services, 4 Offices, 1 Local Hospital, and 
10 Sub-Districts (Pemkab Lombok Barat 2011). Services (or Dinas) are the 
implementing units of regional autonomy responsible for the delivery of goods and 
services to the public, while Agencies (or Badan) and Offices (or Kantor) serve as 
supporting units of the district. The Secretary, the Inspector, Heads of Services, 
Heads of Agencies and the Head of the Local Hospital all hold echelon II positions; 
while Heads of Office and Heads of Sub-Districts (or Camat) hold echelon III positions. 
The overall organisational structure of West Lombok District is depicted in Figure 6-1 
below. 
Figure 6-1 
Organisational Structure of West Lombok District 
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 6.2. Arrangements for PFM Operations 
The legal framework for PFM operations, as already described in Section 4.3, serves 
as the general model that is applied to all local governments in Indonesia. Adjustment 
to the general model is permitted to accommodate any specific need of each local 
government. For example, in West Lombok District, its local revenue collection 
procedure allows receiving treasurers to delay depositing the collected revenue 
monies into the local treasury account for up to two working days (Pemkab Lombok 
Barat 2013). This adjustment has been made to accommodate the lack of 
transportation means and communication media in remote areas across West 
Lombok. In the area of local tax revenue collection, in cooperation with one major 
national bank, West Lombok District has recently initiated an online payment process 
to make it easier for local taxpayers to pay their tax obligation (Romiadi 2016). 
There are two main regional regulations that govern the financial management of 
West Lombok District; they are Local Regulation 5/2007 regarding General Provisions 
of Local Financial Management and Regent Regulation 31/2013 regarding Local 
Financial Management System and Procedures. Local Regulation 5/2007 serves as 
an omnibus of regulations that provides a comprehensive and integrated 
interpretation of the higher PFM regulations. It encompasses the three main stages 
of financial management: budget preparation; budget execution; and accounting and 
reporting. Regent Regulation 31/2013 provides a more detailed system and set of 
procedures for each financial management stage, as presented in its appendices that 
consist of: Appendix I regarding System and Procedure for Budget Preparation, 
Appendix II regarding Budget Execution Guideline, and Appendix III regarding 
Financial Reporting and Accounting System. 
In relation to PFM operations, the budget execution and the accounting and reporting 
process, the 42 local government units in West Lombok District are the spending units 
or satuan kerja perangkat daerah (SKPD). They have separate budgets and are 
responsible for their execution, including the preparation of their own unit’s budgetary 
report and financial statement. Apart from its role as a spending unit, the Revenue 
and Financial Management Service or Dinas Pendapatan dan Pengelolaan Keuangan 
Daerah (DPPKD) also serves as the FMU that is responsible for the overall financial 
management of the District. 
The Regent, as the Head of the District, is the financial authority holder in West 
Lombok and represents the District in regard to the ownership of local-owned 
companies. He issues a Regent Regulation to establish the devolution of his financial 
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 management authority to the District’s Secretary (as the Financial Management 
Coordinator), the Heads of SKPD (as the COOs and budget users), and the Head of 
DPPKD (as the CFO) who also serves as the District’s General Treasurer (Pemkab 
Lombok Barat 2013). 
In executing his role as local financial management coordinator, the District Secretary 
is also supported by three Assistant Secretaries as the Vice-Coordinators. Meanwhile, 
any Head of SKPD may delegate his role as the budget user to his subordinate, an 
echelon III officer within the SKPD, as the Proxy of Budget User. A Budget User/Proxy 
of Budget User is authorised to carry out actions that can trigger the disbursement of 
the SKPD’s budget, including conducting the verification of invoices, issuing payment 
orders and signing of contracts/agreements with suppliers regarding the provision of 
goods and services35. The day-to-day activities of the Head of DPPKD, as the General 
Treasurer, are carried out by the Head of the Financial Management Department, an 
echelon III officer within DPPKD, who serves as the Proxy of General Treasurer. 
In spending units, Heads of SKPD are also responsible for appointing an echelon III 
within his SKPD as a technical administration officer who is responsible for the 
monitoring of programs and activities, reporting the progress of programs and 
activities, and preparing the budget administration documentation required for the 
disbursement of funds to execute programs and activities. He also appoints a financial 
administration officer within his SKPD who is responsible for the verification of the 
completeness, validity and accuracy of payment requests, the preparation of payment 
orders, the verification of daily revenue deposits, the recording of financial 
transactions and the preparation of the SKPD’s financial statements. 
As the General Treasurer, the Head of DPPKD assigns the Head of Financial 
Management Department, an echelon III officer within DPPKD, as the Proxy of 
General Treasurer by appointment of the Regent. The Regent also appoints the 
disbursing and receiving treasurers, including assistant treasurers who are 
responsible for treasury management within each SKPD. Receiving treasurers and 
assistants of receiving treasurers are established within DPPKD for the collection of 
local taxes, transfer of funds from the central/provincial government and gathering of 
other lawful incomes. Receiving treasurers and assistants of receiving treasurers are 
also established within some SKPDs that have the authority to collect non-local tax 
revenue, such as the Investment and Licensing Agency, the Mining and Energy 
35  Signing a contract for the provision of goods and services is the responsibility of a CMO who is 
appointed by the budget user or the Head of SKPD. Regent Regulation 31/2013 stipulates the 
possibility of a Proxy of the Budget User to also be appointed as the CMO. 
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 Service, the Population and Civil Registration Service and the Parks and City Interiors 
Service. Disbursing treasurers and assistants of disbursing treasurers are established 
within all SKPDs by appointment of the Regent. Treasurers and assistant treasurers 
are functional positions that are responsible administratively to their Head of SKPD 
and functionally to the General Treasurer. 
6.3. PFM Operations Problems 
While a number of local governments were struggling to prepare timely financial 
statements at the beginning of the PFM reform, West Lombok District was able to 
finalise its audited financial statements within the required timeframe. Only two non-
significant delays for the completion of audited financial statements occurred during 
the period of the study, which were for for FY 2006 and FY 2008. In terms of external 
auditor’s opinions on financial statements, West Lombok District had managed to 
attain a qualified opinion from BPK for eight financial years consecutively, before it 
finally attained an unqualified opinion for its 2014 financial statement. 
Table 6-3 
Audited Financial Statements of West Lombok District 
Financial 
Year 




2006 10 July 2007 Qualified 
2007 14 June 2008 Qualified 
2008 9 July 2009 Qualified 
2009 2 June 2010 Qualified 
2010 25 May 2011 Qualified 
2011 28 May 2012 Qualified 
2012 28 May 2013 Qualified 
2013 30 June 2014 Qualified 
2014 25 May 2015 Unqualified 
As previously mentioned, the preparation of financial statements for FY 2006 until FY 
2014 had still adopted the modified cash basis. The full accrual method began to be 
adopted for FY 2015. Despite the change to the full accrual method, West Lombok 
District has been able to maintain an unqualified opinion for its 2015 financial 
statement, which was completed on 10 June 2016 (BPK 2016) and its 2016 financial 
statement, which was completed on 31 May 2017  (BPK 2017). 
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 6.3.1. Statistics on Audit Findings 
The analysis of PFM operational problems in West Lombok District was based on 
BPK’s audit reports published between 2009 and 201436. There are a total of 222 
audit findings items disclosed in the audit reports during that period. Figure 6-2 
summarises the classification of those audit findings based on the four main audit 
finding groups. As shown in the pie chart, most of the audit findings deal with 
deficiencies in the internal control design and its implementation, which were 
disclosed 125 times in the audit reports or more than half of the total audit findings. 
The problems that led to state losses and shortfalls in revenue were reported 41 times, 
representing 18.47% of the total audit findings. The rest of the findings were about 
3Es problems and administrative matters, which were reported 31 times (or 13.96%) 
and 25 times (or 11.26%), respectively. 
Figure 6-2 
Classification of Audit Findings in West Lombok District 
 
Figure 6-3 further displays the statistics of audit findings based on audit types. The 
figure shows that financial audit reports did not disclose any 3Es problems, while 
performance audits did not disclose any problems that were administrative in nature. 
Special purpose audit reports were quite comprehensive because they exposed 
findings in all four audit finding categories. In general, the audit findings statistics in 
36  See Appendix 6 for the list of audit reports on West Lombok District published between 2009 and 
2014. 
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 West Lombok District are relatively similar to those of the overall findings for local 
governments in Indonesia, as have been discussed in Section 5.3. The similarity of 
audit findings in terms of their statistics and pattern, compared with the overall local 
government situation for PFM operational problems, displays the typicality of West 
Lombok District and enhances its appropriateness as the case study for this research. 
Figure 6-3 
Audit Findings in West Lombok District per Type of Audit 
 
6.3.2. Identified Systemic Problems 
The previous chapter has discussed the systemic problems identified in the PFM 
operational practices throughout all local governments in Indonesia. This section 
specifically discusses the presence of those problems in West Lombok District, based 
on its PFM operational components as displayed in Table 6-4. Out of 20 systemic 
problems identified for the whole local governments, there were 18 problems that also 
occurred in West Lombok, consisting of 194 audit findings or 87.39% of the total 222 
audit findings. 
6.3.2.1. Revenue Collection 
An overview of its budgets since FY 2006 shows that West Lombok District has 
struggled to optimise its local own-sourced revenue collection efforts. One of the audit 
findings highlighted inadequate local tax collection management, in this case the 
collection of hotel and restaurant service taxes, in West Lombok District (BPK 2014b). 
DPPKD, the SKPD that is responsible for hotel and restaurant tax collection, makes 
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 minimal effort to ensure timely payment of hotel and restaurant service taxes. There 
were cases where hotels and restaurants did not pay their taxes on time and delayed 
the submission of their periodic tax returns. This circumstance was compounded by 
a slow response for DPPKD to conduct an audit on taxpayers and issue a Notice of 
Tax Underpayment Assessment. To further complicate the problem, the BPK’s audit 
report discovered the failure of DPPKD to issue a Notice of Tax Collection, increasing 
the risk of uncollected taxes. In 2013, a minimum Rp4.30 billion of hotel and restaurant 
taxes, including any penalties and interest, were not collected (BPK 2014b). 
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 Table 6-4 
Systemic Problems in West Lombok District 
 
The practice where revenue monies were directly used to pay the SKPD’s expenses 
was also reported quite frequently. From FY 2008 to FY 2011, direct use of revenue 
was one of the items causing the qualified opinions of BPK on West Lombok’s 
financial statements. The amount of revenue monies directly spent were Rp2.79 
billion in 2008, Rp28.77 billion in 2009, Rp9.35 billion in 2010 and Rp7.14 billion in 
2011 (BPK 2009; 2010a; 2011b; 2012). 






Total audit findings reported               222 100.00%
Total identified systemic problems               194 87.39%
Revenue collection                14 6.31%
1 Uncollected revenue and delays in revenue collection 
processes
                10 4.50%
2 Direct use of revenue                   4 1.80%
Disbursement process                36 16.22%
3 Overpayment of expenses                 13 5.86%
4 Incomplete documentation on expenses payments                 13 5.86%
5 Volume shortages                   7 3.15%
6 Improper procurement processes                   3 1.35%
7 Disbursement on fictitious activities/transactions                  -              -   
8 Higher acquisition costs of inputs                  -              -   
Asset management                14 6.31%
9 Lack of asset safeguarding                 14 6.31%
Treasury and cash management                  1 0.45%
10 Improper cash handling                   1 0.45%
Accounting and reporting                36 16.22%
11 Inadequate and inaccurate transaction records                 20 9.01%
12 Inappropriate financial reporting processes                 14 6.31%
13 Inadequate financial management, accounting and 
reporting system
                  2 0.90%
Internal control                93 30.63%
14 Low performance and quality of service delivery                 25 11.26%
15 Irregularities in the implementation of technical and/or 
internal regulations
                23 10.36%
16 Inadequate and weak implementation of SOPs                 20 9.01%
17 Lack of planning for activity                 17 7.66%
18 Non-compliance with regulations on other specific                   3 1.35%
19 Improper policy implementation                   3 1.35%
20 Misallocation of budget                   2 0.90%
143 
 While this practice provides more flexibility to each SKPD to manage its revenue, as 
discussed earlier, it weakens the accountability of the disbursement processes. Direct 
use of revenue potentially involves the omission of expense items in the budgeting 
processes. Hence, those expense items have not been authorised by local parliament 
or have been explicitly stipulated in the local government’s annual budget. It also 
involves non-compliant payment procedures for the expenses because proper 
procedures for the verification and issuance of payment requests, payment orders 
and warrants for disbursement of funds have not been followed.  
An area where flexibility in financial management is important is health services. West 
Lombok converted the status of its Local Hospital to a public service agency or BLU 
in 2012 (BPK 2012). This change provided autonomy to the Local Hospital in 
managing its financial affairs, including use of its revenue to directly fund its 
operational expenses (GoI 2004a). Nevertheless, its annual budget and financial 
statement were still required to be consolidated within the District’s budget and 
financial statement (GoI 2004a). 
6.3.2.2. Disbursement Processes 
Systemic problems in the disbursement process mostly deal with the overpayment of 
expense items due to lack of verification procedures. In West Lombok, this problem 
had caused, among others, double payment of expenses because of reissuance of 
warrants for disbursement of funds, payment of official travel allowances that 
exceeded the prescribed limit and payment of inappropriate cost components that 
were not in contract agreements. 
“The result of a sampling test on the contract agreements and proofs of payment 
for consultancy services showed that sixteen under 6-month consultancy 
payments, which included the [allocation of] non-personnel direct expenses in 
the contract agreement, were billed for prohibited items, i.e. for office equipment 
rental. The result of documentation analysis showed that the consultant already 
had the office equipment required [to carry out the consultancy work].” (BPK 
2011a) 
In addition, there were payments of grants and social assistance funding to 
inappropriate recipients and for inappropriate purposes. Permendagri 13/2006 
stipulates the conditions whereby social assistance in the form of money and/or 
provision of goods can be allocated, with the aim of improving public welfare. 
Nevertheless, in West Lombok, there were payments from social assistance funds 
that were made to other government and quasi-government institutions, such as the 
Indonesian Sports Committee, that did not match with the objectives of the social 
assistance fund (BPK 2011a). 
144 
 In administrative matters, the recipients of District’s grants and social assistance 
funding, including political parties that received financial assistance, mostly failed to 
submit their fund utilisation reports within the specified time-frame and format. This 
failure raises suspicions and increases the risk of misuse of such funds. Inadequate 
documentation, in fact, had occurred since the commencement of social assistance 
funding, for example, in the form of missing proposals of activities. 
“The issuance of a warrant for disbursement of funds (SP2D) was not 
accompanied with complete documentation. The examination of the issuance 
mechanism of SP2D for the social assistance fund disclosed that the 
submission of payment requests and payment orders for social assistance 
funding amounting to Rp22.47 billion was not supported by required 
documentation. The disbursing treasurer prepared and submitted payment 
requests and payment orders to the Head of DPPKD as the Budget User without 
attaching receipts from the recipients and other required documentation such 
as proposals [of activities]. Payment requests and payment orders were 
prepared in four copies but were not administered and archived properly by the 
Budget User and the Proxy of General Treasurer.” (BPK 2010a) 
In the disbursement process, there were also cases where there was a volume 
shortage in the completion of construction work, where the delivery of goods and 
services were not in accordance with the contract agreement and where improper 
procurement processes, such as contract splitting, had occured. 
6.3.2.3. Asset Management 
Lack of asset safeguarding, in the form of inadequate documentation of asset 
ownership, non-compliance to public asset regulations and missing assets had 
triggered BPK to issue a qualified audit opinion on the West Lombok financial 
statements for FY 2008 until FY 2013. 
“Based on the examination of the documentation of the ownership of land, there 
were 8.58 million square metres of land area owned by West Lombok District 
that did not have a certificate of ownership. Further examination of the land’s 
ownership certificates and a list of fixed assets that supported the presentation 
of the monetary value of land in the Balance Sheet showed that these two forms 
of documentation could not be compared, causing [the auditor’s] inability to 
adequately determine how many parcels of land had not been equipped with a 
certificate of ownership. In addition, there were parcels of land covering an area 
of 115,148 square metres that were in legal dispute as they were not supported 
by sufficient evidence of ownership.” (BPK 2012) 
“Based on physical examination of eight SKPDs, there were problems as 
follows: (1) district’s vehicles amounting to Rp4.74 billion were missing, (2) 
licences of district’s vehicles amounting to Rp5.62 billion were missing, (3) 
certificates of vehicles’ ownership amounting to Rp6.74 billion were missing, 
and (4) 120 vehicles were not recorded in the vehicle inventory.” (BPK 2014b) 
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 A number of FGD participants also viewed weakness in asset management as the 
most prominent problem in West Lombok’s management of financial operations. 
Regional expansion through the establishment of a new district, North Lombok, in 
2008, worsened the problems when inaccurate verification of assets caused 
inaccurate records of assets in the database. Assets which were physically located in 
North Lombok were recorded and presented in West Lombok’s financial statement, 
and vice versa. The absence of proper accounting treatments, especially for 
capitalisation of expenses, had further prohibited the proper presentation of assets in 
West Lombok’s financial statements. 
The policy of West Lombok District to provide grants in the form of equipment and 
assets, instead of a pecuniary grant, was not followed by proper bookkeeping and 
procedures on the transfer of assets. In 2009, BPK’s audit report on its financial 
statement stated that procured assets valued at Rp1.66 billion in Agriculture Services 
from the Livestock and Plantation Productivity Improvement Program had been 
granted and handed over to farming and fishing communities in West Lombok. The 
handover report of those assets had been signed by both Agriculture Service officials 
as well as the representatives of the farming and fishing communities, but there was 
no approval or authorisation for the transfer of those assets from the Regent (BPK 
2010a). 
6.3.2.4. Cash Management 
In regard to cash management, there was only one audit finding that disclosed the 
presence of delays in depositing the cash balance in the possession of the disbursing 
treasurers at the year’s end. Though it is considered to be a systemic problem at the 
whole local government level, the presence of this practice in West Lombok District 
was minimal and was only identified in the early years of the PFM reform. This type 
of problem was reported on West Lombok’s financial statement audit reports for the 
FY 2008 and FY 2009, and involved the cash amounts of Rp39.28 million and 
Rp133.58 million, respectively (BPK 2009; 2010a). Nevertheless, this problem reveals 
a risk of misuse of cash balances by the treasurers and, potentially can lead to 
inaccuracy in the presentation of cash account balances in the financial statements. 
6.3.2.5. Accounting and Reporting 
Problems in the accounting and reporting component of PFM operations in West 
Lombok were mainly in relation to inaccuracies in transaction recording, improper 
financial reporting processes and an inadequate financial information system. 
Inaccuracies in transaction recording refers to errors in bookkeeping processes 
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 whereby valid source evidence for financial transactions must be collected, sorted 
and recorded accurately into the proper accounts. There were frequent instances 
where accurate financial transaction recording could not be maintained due to, for 
example, the absence of a bank reconciliation procedure for cash accounts, the 
absence of a physical inventory check for fixed assets and inventory accounts, 
mistakes in calculating accumulated depreciation values of fixed assets and the like 
(BPK 2011b; 2012; 2014b). In another instance, inaccuracy in transaction recording 
was simply caused by the unavailability of valid sources of evidence for financial 
transactions. For example, the presentation of the local tax receivable figure in the 
financial statement was not supported by Notices of Tax Underpayment Assessment 
and Notice of Tax Collection (BPK 2011b) that would serve as valid sources of 
evidence for recording local tax receivable transactions. This indicates that the nature 
of the accounting and reporting problems stemmed from inadequate administration of 
the underlying transactions by the relevant SKPDs. 
In regard to financial statement reporting process, until FY 2012, the processing of 
financial information for the preparation of the District’s financial statement was not 
carried out properly (BPK 2013a). In general, West Lombok maintained two separate 
accounting systems, one at District level carried out by the Accounting and Reporting 
Division within the DPPKD and the other one at the level of SKPD carried out by 
Finance Section within each SKPD. The accounting procedures of those systems 
were limited to only cash receipting and cash disbursement. Accounting procedures 
for assets and non-cash transactions were not available. This limitation impeded the 
SKPDs in the optimal preparation of reliable financial statements. Consequently, West 
Lombok could not prepare its own financial statement by consolidating the financial 
statements of all accounting units (i.e. SKPDs) within the District. Instead, the financial 
statement reporting process was carried out centrally and manually by the Accounting 
and Reporting Division. Each SKPD was required to submit all its evidence of financial 
transactions to the Accounting and Reporting Division for the preparation of West 
Lombok’s financial statement, which consisted of a Balance Sheet, Budget 
Realisation Report and Cash Flow Statement. 
The problem in the financial statement reporting processes was exacerbated by the 
lack of financial information and appropriate accounting system. The implementation 
of Sistem Informasi Pengelolaan Keuangan Daerah (SIPKD), an information system 
for local government’s financial management developed by the MoHA, was not 
effective. Out of six SIPKD modules that had been implemented in West Lombok 
District (i.e. Planning, Budgeting, Payroll, Bookkeeping, Accounting and Reporting, 
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 and Assets), only two modules had been fully utilised (i.e. the budgeting and 
bookkeeping modules). Exchange of financial information between DPPKD, as the 
FMU, and all SKPDs as the accounting units, did not occur through SIPKD, forcing 
the adoption of a manual process in the preparation of financial reports, as explained 
in the previous paragraph. 
6.3.2.6. Internal Control System 
The main problem in the internal control system component was low performance and 
lack of quality in service delivery. West Lombok District, as a local government, has a 
responsibility to carry out its public service delivery effectively. An internal control 
system, among other things, ensures adequate assurance of the effectiveness of a 
District’s program implementation and achievement of its overall objectives in public 
service delivery. 
Lack of human resources and the absence of a clear policy, for example in the 
management of scholarships for poor students, were the two main factors that 
retarded the effective delivery of such programs and the achievement of West 
Lombok’s public service objectives (BPK 2014a). In the management of advertising 
tax, West Lombok has not yet developed and implemented a clear service standard 
governing the process and timeline for the application of a tax on billboard advertising 
(BPK 2013b). In addition, even though Regent Regulation 06B/2013 regarding 
Billboard Management has streamlined the entire process for the installation of 
billboards/advertisements under one agency, the Parks and City Interiors Service, in 
practice, the issuance of permits and the payment of advertising tax are still handled 
by DPPKD (BPK 2013b). This practice decreases the quality of service delivery to the 
public because it is necessary to go to both agencies to finalise their obligations in 
relation to billboard advertising. 
The other systemic problem in the internal control component that was identified in 
West Lombok District relates to irregularities in the implementation of technical and/or 
internal regulations. In the management of social assistance funds, for example, the 
decision to allocate funding and the authorisation of fund disbursement preceded the 
submission of social assistance proposals from the recipients (BPK 2011d). In the 
scholarships program for poor students, the actual allocations of the scholarships 
funds were not in accordance with the list of recipients that had already been 
stipulated in the Regent’s Decree (BPK 2011d). In the management of special 
allocation funding for school rehabilitation, according to the Minister of Education’s 
Regulation, the Local Government’s Education Service prepares a fund allocation 
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 plan and carries out a selection process to determine the schools that will receive the 
rehabilitation fund. Schools that are severely damaged and located in remote areas 
must be given priority. Nevertheless, BPK found that West Lombok’s Education 
Service failed to conduct a proper survey, causing a number of schools that were 
severely damaged and located in remote areas not to be allocated rehabilitation 
funding (BPK 2011e). While these irregularities may not directly cause any state 
losses, they display inadequate administrative procedures that could impede the 
effectiveness of fund allocation to achieve the intended objectives. 
Another problem in the internal control system component relates to the absence, 
inadequacy and ineffective implementation of SOPs. In the financial assistance for 
poor students program, for example, West Lombok’s Education Service applied the 
procedure used by West Nusa Tenggara Province for the administration of 
educational sharing grants for disadvantaged students at junior and senior high 
school levels (BPK 2014a). While it did specify the criteria for poor students to be 
eligible to receive the scholarship, the mechanism of scholarship allocation, the terms 
of use of scholarship funds, and the accountability and reporting mechanism of the 
utilisation of funds; it lacked the requirement for reliable supporting documentation in 
order to determine the recipients of the scholarship funds. There were no criteria used 
to prioritise potential recipients and no requirements for verification of whether or not 
the potential recipients had already been granted a scholarship from other sources. 
The procedure also did not set a clear timeline and schedule for the implementation 
of the scholarship program, from the dissemination of information, the submission of 
proposals and the distribution of scholarship funding, up to the reporting of the 
utilisation of those funds. Neither had the format of the accountability report from the 
schools or the requirement for submitting an overall accountability report from the 
Education Service to the Regent been set. This demonstrates that the adoption of an 
external procedure requires a number of adjustments to ensure its suitability for local 
needs and characteristics. 
Inadequate planning of a program or activity highlights another systemic problem in 
the internal control system component. It might occur very early during the budgeting 
process where certain expense items were not budgeted in the appropriate budget 
accounts. In FY 2012, West Lombok District initiated a policy to give grants to its 
communities in the form of assets (BPK 2013a). Permendagri 22/2011 regarding a 
Guideline for the Preparation of Local Government Annual Budget 2012 stipulated 
that the budget for procurement of assets that would be granted to the communities 
should be classified in the goods and services expenditure component. Nevertheless, 
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 West Lombok’s Annual Budget classified those expenses as capital expenditures. 
While the misclassification of expenditure items, in this instance, might not impede 
the disbursement of grants, it did impact the presentation of both capital expenditure 
and goods and services expenditure figures in the financial statement. 
On another occasion, lack of planning also occurred in the preparation stage of an 
activity or program. For example, in its strategic planning document, the Health 
Service failed to include two performance indicators that were required by the 
Technical Guidance for Minimum Service Standard on Nutrition Improvement 
Program (BPK 2010b). Failure to include adequate performance indicators might 
divert the focus of the program, causing ineffectiveness in the achievement of the 
program’s objectives. The Health Service also did not include the requirement to carry 
out an annual evaluation of the program’s implementation in its annual work plan. At 
the level of Health Community Centres, a number of centres did not have reliable 
planning documents because they failed to include an assessment of the current 
health situation in the area, which was stipulated in the Planning Guidance for 
Community Health Centres issued by the Directorate General of Community Health, 
Ministry of Health, in 2006. 
Infrequent systemic problems in the internal control component, such as improper 
policy implementation, non-compliance with regulations in a specific area and budget 
misallocations, were also found and reported in the audit reports on West Lombok 
District. Improper policy implementation deals with, for example, the application of 
outdated mineral tax rates and garbage collection fees, causing potential revenue 
shortages (BPK 2011c). Non-compliance with specific regulations involves non-
conformity of local tax collection management to the general provisions of taxation 
and operational guidelines for local taxes (BPK 2014b). Misallocation of budget took 
place in the distribution of financial assistance to the public, such as via the 
scholarship funds for poor students. In one such instance, a junior high school had 
disbursed the scholarship funding for school facilities including computers and 
classroom renovations (BPK 2011d; 2014a). 
6.3.2.7. Other Identified Problems 
To provide a complete picture of the weaknesses in West Lombok’s PFM operations, 
the rest of the audit findings reported in audit reports are also discussed in this section. 
Table 6-5 displays the other 28 audit findings, or 12.61% of the total audit findings, 
that have been reported during the period of the study between 2009 and 2014. 
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 Table 6-5 
Other PFM Operations Problems in West Lombok District 
 
Lack of an effective internal audit function is obviously one of the problems present in 
West Lombok. The Inspectorate is the unit within the District that carries out the 
internal audit function. One of the FGD participants talked about the shortcomings 
faced by the Inspectorate because it only has a limited number of staff. This condition 
was compounded by the failure of the Inspectorate to effectively deploy its already 
limited resources in monitoring the more crucial local government activities. For 
example, in 2010, the Inspectorate had conducted an internal audit assignment in the 
Health Service. While the audit work did include the assessment of a number of 
institutional and administrative issues in the Health Service, it did not include a review 
of the implementation of minimum health service delivery standards (BPK 2010b). 
Since the Inspectorate is directly responsible to the Head of the Region or the Regent 
(GoI 2008; Pemkab Lombok Barat 2011), the limited resources of the Inspectorate 
also suggest a lack of awareness by the District’s leaders, specifically about the 
importance of the internal control environment and activities and, in general, about 
the overall internal control system of the District. A lack of internal audit function aligns 
with the conclusion made by the World Bank in its own assessment report on 
Indonesia’s public financial assessment report and performance indicators, in which 
it mentioned the sub-optimal performance of local government inspectorate generals 
being due to their limited focus on risk-based auditing and their lack of trained internal 
auditors (World Bank 2012). 
Typically, the second problem among the other PFM operations problems, 
expenditure outside the budget, relates to the issue of the direct use of revenue in a 
number of SKPDs that have the power to collect non-tax local revenues. The collected 
monies were disbursed to pay their operational costs. From the revenue side, this 
practice has caused understatement of local government’s revenue figures in their 








Impact to PFM 
Objectives
1 Ineffective internal audit function 12            5.41% Internal Control Accountability
2 Expenditure outside the budget 
mechanism
6              2.70% Disbursement 
Process
Accountability
3 Ineffective utilisation of budget 4              1.80% Internal Control Effectiveness
4 Investments are not supported by 
adequate documentation
1              0.45% Financing Activity Accountability
5 Others 5              2.25% - -
Total other weaknesses 28            12.61%
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 financial statements. On the other hand, from the disbursement side, this practice 
weakens the accountability of the disbursement process because the expenditures 
are not included in the budget and the payment process does not follow the fund 
disbursement process that is stipulated in the PFM operational regulatory framework. 
Expenditure outside the budget might also occur when, for example, capital 
expenditure costs were incorrectly classified as goods and services expenses in the 
budget document and also were reported as goods and services expenditures in the 
budget realisation report (BPK 2009). Nevertheless, these problems were mostly 
reported in the early implementation of the new accounting standard. 
Other PFM operational problems identified in West Lombok involved ineffective 
utilisation of budget disbursement and improper capital investment mechanisms. One 
of the audit findings highlighting ineffective utilisation of budget was involved in the 
procurement of goods and services using the special allocation funds for the 
education sector. In one instance, the procured goods, for example, books for library 
collection, were reported missing. In another instance, a library building was being 
used for classroom activities. Both instances displayed the ineffective utilisation of the 
special allocation fund for the education sector (BPK 2011e). Among the financing 
activities, there was one instance where capital investments in a number of local 
government owned corporations had not been granted appropriate formal approvals 
from the local parliament (BPK 2014b). 
6.4. Chapter Summary 
This chapter has discussed the general profile of West Lombok District, especially in 
terms of its PFM operational system and practices, including its systemic problems. 
There are no major differences, in terms of PFM design, structure, procedures and 
processes, between West Lombok District and the general framework stipulated in 
the trilogy of financial laws that were already highlighted in Chapter 4. In terms of the 
audit findings on West Lombok District, the pattern and statistics of the systemic 
problems identified were relatively parallel to those of all local governments that were 
already presented in Chapter 5. The consistency of systemic problems identified in 
West Lombok District with those of overall local governments in Indonesia confirms 
the typicality of West Lombok District in terms of its PFM operations and strengthens 
its appropriateness as the single case selected for this study. 
The following chapter, Chapter 7, continues the case study report by presenting a 
discussion regarding the motives of PFM actors in West Lombok District and the 
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 Chapter 7 
Case Study (Part II): Public Employees’ Motives and Non-Compliance in 
PFM Operations 
Chapter 5 discussed a number of systemic problems in PFM operations throughout 
all local governments in Indonesia as a result of the non-compliance of those who 
were involved in the PFM operations. Chapter 6 further elaborated upon those 
systemic problems in the context of West Lombok District, the selected local 
government examined in this study. This chapter further extends the discussion of 
those systemic problems to form the second part of the case study report. It discusses 
non-compliant behaviour that leads to the emergence of systemic problems in PFM 
operational practices from the perspectives of West Lombok District’s employees and 
officials. The discussion in this chapter is derived from the interviews with PFM actors 
(i.e. public employees and officials who were involved in various PFM operational 
stages and processes) in West Lombok District. 
This chapter is separated into three sections. It commences with the presentation and 
analysis of the general perspectives among the respondents of this study regarding 
the main objectives of PFM operations, as well as their understandings about the 
requirement to comply with the PFM operational rules and regulations. The second 
section discusses various motives at work that emerged from the respondents’ 
responses, which drove their decisions to join the public sector and influenced their 
actual behaviour in carrying out their official duties in PFM operations. An analysis of 
the respondents’ responses about the manner in which the identified motives facilitate 
PFM actors to commit non-compliant behaviour is presented in the third section of 
this chapter. The results discussed in this chapter mainly address the second 
research question of this study. 
7.1. Perspectives of PFM Actors on PFM Objectives and Compliance 
This section attempts to expose the PFM actors’ understanding regarding the overall 
objectives of PFM within the local government sector. Various aspects of PFM 
objectives, according to the local government PFM legal framework that was 
discussed in Chapter 4, are supported in a number of respondents’ responses, 
confirming the PFM actors’ comprehension of what is expected from them in 
exercising their roles in PFM operations. 
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 Literature in the field of public bureaucracy has emphasised public accountability as 
the main principle in public sector administration and management, including the area 
of financial management. This principle emerges extensively in the various responses 
from the respondents of this study. Most of the time, PFM actors in West Lombok 
District clearly link the objective of financial management to their responsibility to be 
accountable for their roles in the PFM operational processes. An echelon IV employee 
in the District Secretariat mentions the importance of maintaining accountability 
throughout the PFM stages, from the planning stage through to implementation and 
the reporting and monitoring processes (R#22, Q#3). He further asserts that the 
ultimate goal of local government’s PFM processes is to improve people’s welfare. 
The emphasis on the attainment of people’s welfare as a form of accountability seems 
also to be well understood by a section head in the Investment and Licensing Agency 
when he states: “the goal of local government financial management is to ensure that 
all revenues are recorded and spent for the greatest benefit of people in West 
Lombok.” (R#15, Q#35). Another respondent, an echelon III officer in DPPKD, 
specifies the manner in which accountability is attained through maintaining the 
conformity of local government’s financial management to the programs and 
objectives that are already stipulated in the local government budget, despite the fact 
that, in actual practice, deviations from what have been described in the budget may 
also occur. Another theme that emerged regarding the measurement of accountability 
in PFM was the attainment of an unqualified audit opinion from BPK for the local 
government’s financial statement. Another echelon III worker in DPPKD highlighted 
this theme by mentioning that: 
“I guess the bottom line of our financial management is that we can prepare and 
generate a good [financial] report. We’re audited by BPK. We must prepare a 
reliable financial statement in accordance with applicable rules and standards. 
This year (e.g. 2015), we’ve prepared the [financial] statement [for financial year 
2014] and we obtained an unqualified opinion from BPK. Of course, we feel 
happy [with it]. That's actually the outcome [of financial management] that we 
expect.” (R#03, Q#31&32)  
Other than accountability, the need for efficiency in financial management was also 
understood by the respondents across different working units. In the management of 
assets, for example, a section head in the Local Asset Office commented on the 
necessity for all working units to focus on the optimisation of their assets’ utilisation. 
Further, she mentioned that: 
“The district must not purchase any useless assets that are not relevant to the 
roles of the units. If we still have good equipment that can be used, we do not 
need to allocate money to buy new equipment. The optimum utilisation of assets 
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 is our main priority. We should prevent waste. We don't need to buy any 
unnecessary goods.” (R#40, Q#79)  
Nevertheless, some respondents mentioned that more detailed rules and procedures 
are required to ensure that employees work more efficiently and reduce any 
unnecessary spending. This practice is typical in a bureaucratic organisation that 
relies heavily on formal legal authority in terms of its regulations and procedures, 
which are applied to all of its members. The inefficient practice of providing additional 
money to employees by creating a temporary team to perform ad-hoc tasks has been 
prominent in West Lombok District. Despite the impact of the obvious inefficiency of 
those practices, they can only be stopped by the stipulation of more stringent criteria 
and procedures for the establishment of ad-hoc teams. 
“Now we have been more efficient. No more waste in our spending. Everything 
now has rules. In the past there was waste. We provided an additional 
honorarium for our employees [through the establishment of ad-hoc teams], 
while there was no [budget] allocation for the community [development]. It is 
now more regulated. The establishment of ad-hoc teams is now limited to only 
work that spans across sectors or agencies, such as a financial administration 
team and development assistance team.” (R#46, Q#81) 
One respondent from the Health Service further restricted the definition of efficiency 
only in terms of following rules and regulation. This understanding forces the necessity 
for establishing good quality rules that can accommodate the requirements for both 
accountability and efficiency. 
“It is not good if it wasn't properly managed according to the rules. I guess the 
purposes are for efficiency and effectiveness, certainly following the corridor 
which has been set in the existing regulations.” (R#42, Q#80) 
Another objective of PFM reform is the effective utilisation of public money. Regarding 
this objective, respondents related effectiveness to the impact of financial 
management in improving people’s welfare, accommodating public needs and 
contributing to regional development. One of the officials in the Education Service 
mentions the achievement of a minimum standard of service delivery in the education 
sector as the main criterion for effective financial management in the educational 
sector (R#26, Q#46). A respondent from the Parks and City Interiors Service 
highlights the responsibility of local government for providing comfortable and 
convenient public spaces and facilities. He mentions that: 
“The budget allows us to not only provide green open spaces but also city 
planning and decorations to maintain the beauty of the city. Leisure parks and 
amusement parks are also needed, including the arrangement of street lighting. 
A budget is needed to cover the operational and maintenance costs of the street 
lighting.” (R#30, Q#55) 
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 Some respondents commented on the obligation for the District to be transparent in 
its financial management. Adequate publication of the budgeting process, the budget 
execution process and the reporting of financial statements are considered important 
to ensure the transparency and accountability of the District’s financial management 
(R#2, Q#83). Another respondent succinctly comments that “the goal of local financial 
management is to provide accurate information to everyone” (R#16, Q#88). 
Despite the PFM objectives in Indonesia’s local government being multiple in nature, 
which includes compliance, economy, efficiency, effectiveness, accountability and 
transparency, the emphasis on compliance with relevant PFM rules and regulations 
including the annual budget laws is frequently mentioned by the respondents of this 
study. However, respondents also identified the tension caused by trying to 
accommodate efficiency and effectiveness while, at the same time, being bound by 
the rules and regulations. One example regarding the emphasis on the compliance 
aspect of the PFM objectives is provided by the Head of DPPKD when he comments: 
“[....] the first important aspect is the adherence [of financial management] to 
the provisions stipulated in the rules. Then the second aspect is related to 
effectiveness but, at least, we have to overcome the non-compliance problem 
first. If compliance is met, God willing, our financial management will be better 
off.” (R#01, Q#628) 
The perspective of the highest PFM authority holder in the District seems also to have 
been very well understood by most of the PFM actors in West Lombok District. A 
number of respondents across various hierarchical positions who participated in this 
study also displayed their personal perspectives toward the importance of adherence 
to rules and regulations while carrying out their roles and responsibilities in PFM 
operations. They believe that the attainment of efficiency and effectiveness is 
bounded by the requirement to comply with rules and regulations. One of the section 
heads in the Health Service confirms this perspective by stating that: 
“Certainly financial management aims for efficiency and effectiveness [of the 
local government’s activities]. However, it is not good if it isn't properly managed 
according to the rules. In my opinion, the purposes are for efficiency and 
effectiveness by following the boundary which has been set in rules and 
regulations.” (R#42, Q#48) 
Further analysis of the respondents’ responses reveals that the emphasis on 
compliance among the PFM actors emanates from their personal commitments and 
the fact that their work is already highly regulated. The echelon III officer who is 
responsible for local tax collection processes mentions his commitment to follow the 
rules by stating that: 
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 “As much as possible I will try to do the job according to what I should do and, 
of course, the existing rules because we cannot escape from the rule of law in 
conducting our work, and we will make every effort to remain within the corridors 
of these regulations.” (R#06, Q#91) 
In another instance, the perspective on compliance emerged from the feeling to repay 
what the local government has given to its employees. A section head in the District 
Secretariat supports this perspective as he considers that the position he holds 
currently is a trust from the District that needs to be repaid by carrying out his duties 
according to the rules and regulations (R#22, Q#136). He also stipulates that the 
financial compensation he has received in the form of salary, honorarium, allowances, 
etc., including the facilities to perform his duties, such as computers, office supplies, 
etc., must also be acknowledged through his compliance with rules and regulations 
that are applied to his duties. Even a small item such as not coming late to the office 
is considered as one compliance aspect that employees need to follow strictly (R#01, 
Q#132). 
The emphasis on compliance with rules and regulations in the operations of PFM 
supports the bureaucratic characteristic of PFM operations as a public administration 
tenet. Members of a public bureaucracy are forced, by the pressure to fulfil their 
accountability to the public, to conduct their duties in accordance with rules and 
regulations. Nevertheless, this case study observed that the understanding of the 
PFM actors that they must comply with rules when carrying out their duties does not 
necessarily direct them to always follow the rules in their actual day-to-day activities. 
The discussion in the previous chapter has confirmed this observation, whereby the 
BPK audits frequently reported a number of problems in various PFM operational 
processes in West Lombok District that were a result of the non-compliant behaviour 
of its employees. This observation also confirms the argument discussed in the 
literature that the strong image of public bureaucracies adhering to rules rarely 
emerges in reality. 
The discussion in the rest of this thesis can be expected to provide explanations on 
why the public employees’ perspectives on the importance of compliance are not 
actually evident in their actions. Specifically, the discussion focuses on the two major 
themes that have emerged from the respondents’ responses. These two major 
themes are the motives of PFM actors in the workplace and the shortcomings of 
bureaucratic structures in West Lombok District’s PFM operational practices. The 
latter theme will be discussed further in Chapter 8, while the former is discussed 
further in the rest of this chapter. However, to gain an understanding regarding the 
various motives of the PFM actors in the workplace, before the discussion on how the 
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 motives in the workplace facilitate non-compliant behaviour, the following section 
discusses the motives that are visible at work among the PFM actors in West Lombok 
District who participated in this study. 
7.2. PFM Actors’ Motives at Work 
In Chapter 2, literature regarding public bureaucracy highlighted motivational factors 
for work, in the context of the public sector, in the form of a spectrum ranging from 
purely self-interested to public-interested motives. The analysis of the interviews with 
the respondents of this study has confirmed the presence of both extremes of motives 
among PFM actors in West Lombok District. In addition to this finding, the interviews 
also highlighted the influences of the social and economic contexts of the respondents 
upon their motivations to join and remain working as public servants. While, in 
general, the results of analysis of the interviews display the tendency of respondents 
towards self-interested motives at the early stages of their careers in the public sector, 
including their initial decisions to join the public sector, later, it is the public-interested 
motives that emerge as they start to exercise their roles in the organisation and gain 
more understanding about the nature of local government as a public institution. In 
conclusion, regarding the work motivational factors of public employees, this study 
confirms Perry and Wise’s (1990) assertion that people in the public bureaucracy 
possess a mix of motives. They may exhibit a combination of different motives when 
conducting their various roles in the public sector throughout their careers. 
7.2.1. Having a Job and Earning a Living 
The majority of respondents mentioned that, at the time of first joining the public 
sector, they had practical, self-interested reasons for applying, such as to have a job 
and to earn a living. A senior employee who joined the district after finishing her 
bachelor degree, and has been working in the the Accounting and Reporting Division 
for about nine years, mentions that:  
“Initially, there was no desire to become a civil servant. When I graduated from 
university and also my contract at my old workplace lapsed, there was a 
vacancy for a civil servant. I decided to just give it a try. Importantly, I just wanted 
to look for a job.” (R#11, Q#252) 
Another respondent, who holds an echelon II position and has a very long tenure as 
a public servant in West Lombok District, also reinforces the absence of public-
interested motives when he first applied for a vacancy in the public sector by stating 
that “I applied for this job [as a public servant] because I wanted to earn a living. 
Frankly, in my answer to the questions asked during the recruitment test, I said that I 
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 don't want to serve for the district, but I want to earn money from this job.” (R#1, 
Q#176) 
7.2.2. Social Status and Influence of Relatives 
The practical motive of having a job and earning a living inevitably displays the 
obvious self-interested motives for financial income among the respondents of the 
study. Other than these money-related self-interested motives, the prestige of a civil 
servant’s occupation, as perceived by the community, and the influence of parents 
and relatives who had worked in the public sector also inspired some of the 
respondents to join and remain working in the public sector. A section head in the 
Investment and Licensing Agency mentions that: 
“Actually my motivation [to work in the public sector], I am sorry for this, because 
when we were little kids, a civil servant was considered as an honourable 
occupation. Certainly we wanted to become a civil servant [……] Parents are 
also certainly proud if they have children who became a civil servant.” (R#17, 
Q#273 and 274) 
A family that has most of its members working in the public sector tends to influence 
other family members to follow their paths and look for a job in a public institution. 
Such motivation applied to a division head, an echelon III official, in the Parks and 
City Interiors Service when he stated: “What was my motivation at that time? Maybe 
[it was] because I had a lot of relatives who were also working as civil servants.” 
(R#30, Q#149). A staff member in DPPKD also expresses a similar motivational factor 
for joining the public sector by commenting that “Initially, I saw my parents, my mother 
and my father who used to work as civil servants. I also have brothers and sisters who 
currently work as civil servants. I also want my children to become a civil servant just 
like me” (R#5, Q#164 and Q#148). 
7.2.3. By Chance 
One of the respondents who joined the public sector in the mid-1980s specifies that 
the economic condition of West Lombok, which at that time was mainly dominated by 
its agricultural sector, with only a few industries, had limited the options for new 
graduates from universities to look for a proper occupation outside the public sector 
(R#38). Public employment, in such a situation, is often used by the government in 
developing countries to reduce the unemployment level because it is easier than 
implementing a policy to create job vacancies in the private sector (Rodrik 2000). As 
a result, public sector employment attracts many individuals from various 
backgrounds. Due to the poor recruitment process and patrimonial culture that can be 
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 found easily in the public bureaucracy of developing countries, it is unlikely that any 
public institution could recruit individuals who already possess public-interested 
motives. As an extreme case, a number of respondents in this study mentioned that 
they did not have any specific motives to enter the public sector. They viewed their 
admission to the public sector as their destiny, a fate that had already been 
predetermined for them. They did not see the fitness of their competency, capacity or 
public-interested motives as important elements when making the decision to take on 
roles in public institutions. A staff member in the Investment and Licensing Agency 
who graduated from high school specifically states that “Initially I never imagined that 
I could become a civil servant because, basically, I was a poor person and only 
graduated from a senior high school. It is maybe my fate to become a civil servant.” 
(R#18, Q#142). Even an echelon III who joined West Lombok District after finishing 
his bachelor degree from the Institute of Public Administration (under the 
management of the MoHA) also mentions that “[...] it could be said that I actually 
wasn't motivated to become a public servant. Maybe it was just my destiny, my fate.” 
(R#36, Q#147). 
7.2.4. Convenience 
Apart from the motivation to enter public employment, respondents of this study also 
highlighted other self-interested motives as the main factor that encouraged them to 
remain working in the public sector. These include convenience in terms of flexible 
working hours and security of income in the form of fixed and continuing monthly 
salaries, as well as retirement benefits. 
The flexible working hours influenced a respondent who also practises as a vet 
outside the office. He is able to utilise his spare time at work, especially during his 
lunch break from 12pm to 1 pm, to leave the office and provide treatment to his 
patients. While he understands that his action is not appropriate and can be 
considered as a type of corruption, he stated that his low workload as an echelon III 
employee has provided him with an opportunity to have a side job and earn extra 
income outside his salary as a public servant. Female employees, on the other hand, 
often prefer to work in the public sector due to its flexibility in working hours, enabling 
them to also adequately carry out their domestic responsibilities as housewives. One 
of the female respondents specifically mentions her enjoyment in working as a civil 
servant by stating that: 
“I viewed working as a civil servant to be enjoyable. Previously, when we still 
worked for six days a week, we went to the office in the morning and could 
return home in the early afternoon at 2 pm. We have a lot of time for our family. 
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 I was motivated by that. As a civil servant, I can have a balance between my 
career and my role as a housewife.” (R#40, Q#241) 
In terms of security of income, despite public sector employment providing a relatively 
lower salary than the private sector, it has an advantage in terms of the certainty of 
always earning a certain income on a monthly basis. There was a strong perception 
among the respondents that once they joined the public sector, it was hard for them 
to be sacked or fired unless they made an extraordinary mistake (R#42). The private 
sector, on the other hand, is prone to lay-offs, especially when there is financial 
distress. An echelon III worker in DPPKD, when asked about her motivation to work 
in the public sector, commented that: 
“[…] because of security reason of having a fixed income. In the private sector, 
the income may be higher, but it is uncertain. It's different for civil servants. In 
the public sector, we have certainty about our income. Maybe the amount is 
smaller but we certainly receive it every month.” (R#13, Q#265) 
Another feature of income security in public sector employment, the surety to receive 
a retirement benefit, has motivated an echelon IV female respondent (who also holds 
a master’s degree qualification) to work in West Lombok District and she mentions 
that “In fact, I was keen to become a civil servant because I would definitely have a 
peaceful life after retiring. That's my actual motive - to feel secure when I retire.” 
(R#42, Q#263) 
Another echelon IV respondent with a master’s degree qualification also specifies 
that, despite the drawbacks of the bureaucratic system practised in the District, which 
limit him from exercising his skills and knowledge optimally, he feels it is more 
convenient to work in a public institution due to the security of income after he retires 
(R#46). The same motive of retirement benefits also emerges among respondents 
who are younger, with less than 10 years of tenure in the District, prompting their 
intention to remain working in the public sector until they reach the retirement age. 
7.2.5. Financial Compensation 
While conducting their duties, the existence of other self-interested, monetary-based 
motives is also evident from the employees’ perspectives. The structure of financial 
compensation in public sector employment in Indonesia may contribute to this 
conclusion. In addition to the basic salary, which is stipulated on the basis of job rank, 
job grade and tenure, and which is applied consistently to all public institutions in 
Indonesia, civil servants at local government level may also earn other income in the 
form of additional allowances (MoHA 2006). In the era of decentralisation, according 
to Permendagri 13/2006, local governments could provide additional allowances to 
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 their employees as long as the allowances were given based on objective criteria and 
they had adequate fiscal resources. In the case of West Lombok District, the 
components of income received by its employees in addition to the basic monthly 
salary include monthly allowances, honorarium and incentives. 
All employees are entitled to earn monthly allowances. Similar to their basic salaries, 
monthly allowances are calculated based on job ranks and grades. Although the 
amount of allowances has not increased since 2009, a respondent in this study who 
serves as a section head in the Public Works Service views monthly allowances as a 
positive factor in his motivation to work. 
“My motivation to work is driven by my responsibility as a civil servant. I have to 
fulfil my responsibilities whatever the consequences. I don't prioritise money, 
but I do need additional income. Luckily the local government has paid [a 
monthly] welfare allowance in addition to our monthly salary. I feel grateful for 
that.” (R#49, Q#208) 
Employees who are carrying out specific roles, beyond their routine duties outlined in 
their job descriptions, may also be entitled to an honorarium. For example, for the 
fiscal year 2014, the Regent had issued a decree that stipulated the assignment of 
certain officials and employees to a number of PFM operational positions such as 
budget users, receiving treasurers and disbursing treasurers in all working units in the 
district (Pemkab Lombok Barat 2014b). The decree also stipulated the honoraria for 
those officials and employees as a result of their involvement in the PFM operational 
processes. A female employee in the Public Work Service, who had been assigned 
an additional responsibility within a procurement work group outside her main duties 
as a section head, displays her gratitude for the district’s attention to her financial 
needs by stating that: 
“I am also assigned to a working group in the procurement service unit. There 
is an honorarium paid because of my involvement as a member of the working 
group. If there is a project, we are also involved in a contract review committee 
for which we are also entitled to separate honoraria. Thus, we get compensation 
for our overtime or sometimes we also need to work at home. I am glad that 
there is attention from the local government by providing an additional 
honorarium for the involvement in a working group or for the additional tasks 
outside our job description.” (R#47, Q#206) 
While the first three components of income illustrate the financial compensation 
scheme available in West Lombok District, the last component of financial incentives 
is considered as part of a performance management and reward system. Financial 
incentives are offered to motivate employees to carry out a specific duty with a certain 
performance target. In tax collection activities, for example, employees who are 
involved in tax collection processes might receive financial incentives if they can 
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 achieve the tax revenue target (Pemkab Lombok Barat 2012). Such performance-
based incentives have stimulated employees to work harder in order to achieve the 
target. One of the staff members in DPPKD who was involved in tax collection 
processes stated that “we are motivated [to work] here because there is additional 
income. Apart from the salary, I also get an extra incentive when collecting taxes. 
[Employees at] other units do not have extra income [like that].” (R#05). Officials at a 
higher hierarchical level in DPPKD who were involved in tax collection activities also 
expressed similar feelings. An echelon IV official who served as a section head 
mentioned, “If we achieved the target, we would get [financial] incentives. It boosted 
our motivation to work [harder]” (R#10), while an echelon III official who served as a 
division head stated, “We were motivated by the pressure to achieve the revenue 
target.“ (R#6). 
7.2.6. Power and Promotion 
Other than money-related motives, another self-interested motive, that of gaining 
power through promotion and career advancement, also appeared in respondents’ 
responses when they were asked about their motives for carrying out their roles and 
responsibilities in PFM operational processes. The motive to gain more power through 
promotion emerges once employees are satisfied with their income but still need 
recognition from the organisation and their colleagues. An echelon IV officer at the 
District Secretariat states his view on this matter by mentioning that: 
“[...] once we’ve already achieved the level [of income] that we want, there is 
another thing in a non-material form which is also expected: career recognition. 
Throughout our career, if we never get any promotion, for example, it would 
negatively impact our motivation to work.” (R#22, Q#220) 
Promotion can be viewed as a recognition of an employees’ capability and provides 
an opportunity for career advancement in the organisation, which eventually leads to 
increased income. In addition, a higher position in the district’s hierarchy seems to 
gain more respect from superiors, colleagues and other employees. Recognition and 
respect as a result of promotion were viewed by a female respondent, who was 
promoted after she finished her master’s degree, as one factor that motivated her to 
perform better work. She stated that:  
“When we were promoted, based on my personal experience, it actually 
motivated us to work better. I felt appreciated. Someone has observed and 
assessed our work and we feel our work is recognised. It motivates us to work 
better. Other than that, we also feel respected by our bosses and colleagues. 
When we are asking for help, they respond to it promptly. It motivates us to not 
to be lazy.” (R#47, Q#229) 
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 Interestingly, another perspective of this power-related motive shows an inclination 
toward a more public-interested motive for work. In this case, the motivation for 
gaining promotion comes from the employees’ perceptions that, to be able to fulfil 
public interests, they need to have power and authority. This perception persuades 
employees to look for promotion and attempt to attain a higher hierarchical position in 
the organisation. More power and authority, as a result of promotion, enable them to 
implement their ideas on how to provide better services to the community and to 
accommodate public needs. A respondent who was a section head in the Public 
Works Service specifically mentioned the difficulty of implementing his good idea for 
assisting development in the region. He stated that:  
“I hope before I retire I still can get a better position. I still have 13 years more 
before my retirement. So it is reasonable to expect a promotion in my career. I 
have three years’ experience in the current job rank (i.e. III/D) and I already hold 
a master’s degree qualification, so I have potential to keep improving my career. 
It means that I want to devote, to contribute optimally, to my community. Now, 
even though I have good ideas on how to develop my region, I don't have an 
opportunity to implement them. If I had a higher position in the office, of course, 
it would be easier for me to share and implement my ideas.” (R#46, Q#228) 
7.2.7. Display of Work Proficiency 
There was also feedback from respondents that highlighted their motivation to display 
a high quality of work. The motivation to display proficiency at work is partly driven by 
the self-interested expectations that it will lead to a higher salary, a positive personal 
reputation and/or career advancement (R#27, R#28 and R#45), although those 
expectations are not explicitly stated. Interestingly, the majority of responses 
regarding displaying work proficiency came from respondents who already held 
higher echelon positions within the hierarchy.  An echelon III employee who was also 
a division head in the Health Service mentioned: “It is important for me to display a 
good performance. I never think about rotation or promotion. I will get it if that is my 
fate. The main thing is to show our performance.” (R#45, Q#331). A similar idea was 
also expressed by an echelon II officer in the District Secretariat in regard to his 
income-oriented motive. He mentions that:  
“I have a principle that working is not only about looking for money. [They’re a] 
hypocrite if anybody says that he is working not for money. Of course, it is for 
money. But we get the money through our professionalism and proper manner. 
Professionalism is displayed in our good work. Then, money will follow later [as 
a result of our good work].” (R#27, Q#324). 
In contrast, the motivation to display good work could also be driven by the intention 
to be able to contribute to the public’s needs. For example, a division head in the 
District Secretary states that:  
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 “[...] I have no other motivation except to improve my performance. That's the 
only thing I can do to contribute to regional development. In a smaller scope, 
the development of the district and, in a larger scope, the development of the 
province.” (R#39, Q#328) 
7.2.8. Loyalty to the Organisation 
Some respondents felt grateful for being able to work in local government offices. 
Becoming a public servant has provided them with a noble social status in the 
community and adequate livelihood to support their needs. They hold a view that their 
status as public servants and the financial compensation which they have earned 
have to be recompensed by displaying responsibility in carrying out the roles and 
functions that have been assigned to them. Such a view stimulates their loyalty to the 
organisation, motivating them to be responsible for their duties by accomplishing their 
tasks completely and performing better in their jobs. Hence, the feeling of 
responsibility to their duties as public employees motivates them to carry out their 
tasks as specified in the detailed job descriptions. A female staff member in the 
Accounting and Reporting Division mentions that: “In the office, I am the property of 
the government. I would try to work with full responsibility. I am already paid here. I 
have to do my duties.” (R#14, Q#308). A similar response was also provided by a 
section head in the Public Works Service who stated that: 
“[...] we have to work because the government has paid our salaries. We don't 
consider other additional income as the compensation for our work. So even if 
we didn't get any additional allowances, it doesn't matter for us. We have 
assumed our monthly salaries as the financial compensation for our work as a 
civil servant, thus we have to do all the tasks that have been assigned to us. 
That is my motivation to work.” (R#49, Q#298) 
One interesting characteristic of the loyalty motive to the organisation emerged from 
the respondents who had experienced working in West Lombok District for more than 
30 years. Their long tenure as public employees has shaped a very strong feeling of 
loyalty to the organisation, causing them to neglect self-interested motives of financial 
income and power or promotion as motivational factors that influence their behaviour. 
One of them, a staff member at the Parks and City Interiors Service, who is also a 
member of a procurement committee, mentions that: “It never came to my mind to 
fulfil my duty because of money. I carry out my duty, because it is my responsibility, it 
is my obligation to do my job. Sometimes I continue my work at home, yet I expect 
nothing from that.” (R#37, Q#295). While another one, an echelon III officer in the 
Health Service highlights this characteristic by commenting that: 
“I am not ambitious and don't have any ambition. I had a very long experience 
as an echelon IV. I was working as head of a section in the Health Service for 
about fourteen years. I never had any ambition for getting a promotion and 
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 becoming a higher level officer. I just kept trying to do my best. [...] The most 
important thing is that I already get paid by the government, and I have to 
commit to do my duties”. (R#41, Q#317) 
7.2.9. Presence of Public-interested Motives 
It is also evident from the interviews that, over time, some respondents gain more 
understanding in regard to their expected contributions while exercising their roles in 
the District. This normative understanding has then changed the personal motives of 
public employees and they have become more motivated to perform their duties in 
the public’s interest. Such a transformation has been displayed by a number of 
respondents who have held quite long tenure working in West Lombok District. For 
example, a female staff member who has a tenure of more than 22 years in the District 
mentioned that her initial motive to work in the public sector was merely to have a job 
but, over time, she gradually gained more understanding about her main roles in the 
organisation being to provide service to the community. She states that: 
“Now, I feel more ‘into’ the community. I want to provide the public with better 
services. When I started working here, I felt that it was important to have a job 
rather than just be unemployed. We couldn't be unemployed while our parents 
had paid our education and were working hard for us. Apparently, as the time 
went by, I found out that the community requires excellent services from the 
[local] government.” (R#4, Q#357 and Q#358). 
A similar pattern of gradual change from self-interested to more public-interested 
motivation for work was also experienced by a male respondent who held an echelon 
IV position and had 13 years of experience working in West Lombok District. He 
mentions that: 
“In the end, my motivation now is to take part in the development of West 
Lombok. At least, to have the same economic level and growth with other 
districts. I want to provide a good service to our community. Such motivation 
was formed after many years of being a civil servant. Now I have more concern 
on how I can contribute to the development of our district and our society.” 
(R#30, Q#372) 
The presence of public-interested motives does not only emerge from such a gradual 
transformation as a result of the employees’ attachments to their roles in public 
institutions. In some cases, public employees have already possessed motives of 
public-interest since the first time they joined the public service. Their decision to work 
in the public sector was significantly influenced by their inclination to provide service 
to the community and to contribute to regional development within the district. They 
understand the normative consequences of becoming a public servant and maintain 
their commitment to serve the public throughout their career in the public service. A 
division head in the Health Service touches upon this issue by mentioning that: “I 
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 initially intended to serve the public. Just that. Until now I am still committed to it.” 
(R#41, Q#380). Another respondent who also served as a division head in the Health 
Service revealed his intention to devote himself to the community by deciding to work 
in local government. He expresses his public-interested motive to join the public 
sector by mentioning that “I wanted to dedicate myself to my region. I was born here. 
After I finished my education in Yogyakarta, I came back here to serve my community. 
My motivation for becoming a civil servant was to devote myself to my district.” (R#45, 
Q#397). A similar motive is also displayed by an echelon II official who explicitly 
mentions his dedication to serve the community. He states that: 
“My motivation [to work in the public sector] is to serve [the community] because 
I embrace a personal motto to dedicate my life to the people. That is my 
motivation to work. [...] Because my motto is to serve people, I work for the 
people. It becomes my motivation to work.” (R#33, Q#374) 
Officials in higher level positions within the hierarchy also display a tendency to 
possess dedication to serve the public. The responsibility attached to their positions 
seems to direct their personal perspectives toward seeing the functions of PFM 
operations as providing services to the public, hence influencing their motives at work 
to also prioritise people’s needs and interests. A number of responses from 
respondents who held positions in higher echelons supported this conclusion. For 
example, an echelon IV officer who served as a section head in the Public Works 
Service mentioned that: 
“It is our priority as a civil servant to provide service to the community: to ensure 
that people feel convenient and safe, and the economy also grows quickly. [...] 
So we try our best to allocate our limited amount of budget into urgent projects 
such as for natural disaster recovery and improvement on the road network to 
connect residential centres to government centres and economic centres, and 
the connections between villages. So we have to focus to provide adequate 
infrastructure for the people.” (R#47, Q#63) 
Other than attachment to higher level positions, some interviewees’ responses also 
linked the possession of public-interested motives to the nature of the local 
government units which they worked. Respondents who worked in local government 
units that directly provided service to the community tended to better understand the 
normative consequences of a public servant’s role and were more inclined to have 
public-interested motives while carrying out their duties. A comment from an official 
in the Parks and City Interiors Service, who was responsible for waste collection, may 
represent such a conclusion when he mentions that: 
Since the beginning of my work as a civil servant, I always interact with the 
public directly. [...] I always work hard. I need to be available at any time. [...] So 
I always prioritise the public needs. For me it is not unusual. If I don't put my 
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 interests into public needs, I would become confused because I always think 
about the public. It is my main responsibility and indeed my job. And I personally 
have passion in it. (R#28, Q#369) 
Several other respondents who worked at Education Service and Health Service also 
delivered similar messages. In showing his inclination towards public-interested 
motives, a respondent who was an echelon IV official in the Investment and Licensing 
Agency criticised the local government’s policy which, in his view, did not represent 
the public needs, by mentioning that: 
“[The monies] were used for ceremonial purposes only; for example, for a New 
Years’ Eve fireworks display. Tens of millions of rupiah might be spent on that. 
That money can actually be used to build a community health care centre in a 
village.” (R#15, Q#364) 
Unfortunately, the presence of public-interested motives is not shared equally among 
all employees working in local government. A department head in the Parks and City 
Interiors Service expressed this matter by commenting that: 
“In my opinion, for a service delivery agency with a limited budget, creativity is 
needed. That's first. Secondly, we need people who have strong passions, who 
have principles to assist the community, and who have high social values. 
Otherwise it would be difficult for us. In fact, not all of my staff have such 
characteristics.” (R#28, Q#371) 
7.3. Implications of PFM Actors’ Motives in Causing Non-Compliance 
The previous section has highlighted a number of motives at work that were found 
among PFM actors in West Lombok District. The main finding from the previous 
section displays the complexity of public employees’ motivations for work, ranging 
from self-interested to public-interested motives. Hence, both types of motive play  a 
role in contributing to, or have implications in, the emergence of non-compliance 
problems in PFM operations. The first theme that emerges from an examination of 
the interview data is related to the impact of self-interested motives upon non-
compliant behaviours of the PFM actors in the PFM operational practices. The 
following section discusses this theme in more detail. 
7.3.1. Self-interested Motives 
The analysis of the interview transcripts of this study has revealed the implication of 
the self-interested motives of the respondents in the emergence of non-compliance 
in the PFM operational context. Along with the failure of local government to establish 
proper institutional instruments, motives of self-interest have caused a deviation in 
the actual behaviour of the respondents from the expected behaviour as stipulated in 
rules and regulations. One of the institutional instruments that is lacking in West 
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 Lombok District is an attractive financial compensation system. An unattractive 
financial compensation system demotivates the employees in the workplace, causing 
them to ineffectively carry out their organisational duties, which potentially leads to 
non-compliance. A staff at Accounting and Reporting Division who had been working 
in West Lombok District for about nine years put forward the inadequate financial 
compensation system in West Lombok District as one factor that leads employees to 
become undisciplined in regard to their responsibilities. He mentioned that:  
“[…] because the financial compensation is not good, the employees become 
undisciplined. They fail to prepare timely and complete reports, fail to attend 
meetings, and fail to accurately input the financial [transaction] data to the 
system. […] In my opinion, [an adequate] financial compensation is necessary 
to improve employees’ motivation to work. Often, it is not because we cannot 
do the tasks, but often because there is no [financial compensation] policy that 
can motivate us to do and accomplish those tasks appropriately. There are 
disappointments [among employees].” (R#12, Q#854 and Q#856) 
As already mentioned earlier in this chapter, the two major components of income for 
West Lombok District’s employees are basic salary and monthly allowances. Both 
components are calculated based on job ranks and grades, including tenure of work 
for basic salary. As a result, employees who are still at the lower level receive less 
income compared to those who have loner tenure and hold higher job ranks or grades. 
In addition, most of the lower-level staff do not have access to the other two 
components of income, which are an honorarium (only given to certain employees 
who conduct additional duties outside their main job descriptions) and a financial 
incentive that is given to employees at certain local government units with specific 
public service duties, such as tax collectors, doctors, midwives, and teachers. Thus, 
the propensity for non-compliant behaviour is higher at lower-level employees 
because the financial compensation system for them seems to be unattractive. 
7.3.1.1. Having a Side Job 
The lack of an attractive income scheme, especially for those who are in a lower-level 
position, has led some employees to take other employment outside their main 
occupation as public servants. Unfortunately, this comes with negative consequences 
for the organisation because, frequently, they have to perform their side job during 
office hours, distracting them from their duties as a public employee in PFM 
operations. A respondent who worked in the Accounting and Reporting Division 
confirmed the poor financial compensation system, especially for staff like him, in 
West Lombok District. He further explained his decision to seek additional 
employment and how that decision was damaging his commitment to deliver his 
duties as a public servant. He states: 
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 “Finally, I decided to have a side job to fulfil my domestic [financial] needs and 
to improve my standard of living, at least to a more reasonable standard. We 
cannot rely on our income as a civil servant here. I am forced to do it although 
it affects my job here. […] Sometimes I’d got a phone call while I was doing my 
work here causing me to leave the office for a while and, ultimately, it delays my 
work [here]” (R#12, Q#438 and Q#439) 
The phenomenon of having a side job was also present among respondents who held 
echelon IV and III positions. However, their motives were mainly to utilise their spare 
time while in public sector employment. They kept their occupations as public servants 
as their main priority and allocated only their after-hours or weekend time for doing 
their side jobs. Despite their higher hierarchical levels in the organisation, the practice 
of having other employment outside their occupations as public employees could 
potentially degrade the quality of their work, including the possibility for non-
compliance in PFM operational processes. 
In an extreme case, however, the unattractive financial compensation system may 
lead to an employee’s decision to leave public sector employment. One of the 
respondents of this study was considering leaving the public service completely and 
looking for a job in the private sector. After working with the government for almost 
nine years, she believed that what she was earning as a public servant was not 
adequate to fulfil her family’s financial needs, and that working in the public sector 
was no longer attractive for her in the long run. While the instance of public servants 
leaving for the private sector is quite rare in Indonesia, it may have an impact on the 
performance of the public organisation such as a local government. The cumbersome, 
time-consuming and very bureaucratic process of recruiting new employees may 
cause difficulties for the public organisation when trying to find new employees to 
replace the experienced employees who have resigned from their public service jobs. 
7.3.1.2. Getting a Personal Loan 
Another phenomenon arising from the unattractive income model in West Lombok 
District is the practice where employees borrow monies from a bank by pawning their 
letter of employment as a public servant, which is also quite common among lower-
level staff. They mention that they cannot rely on salaries and welfare allowances as 
a public servant to finance their family’s needs for housing, transportation, education, 
etc. A female employee of the Education and Cultural Service says that: “I hope that 
I can pay back my debt as soon as possible because I pledged my public servant’s 
employment letter to the bank. I can’t rely on my salary [here], it won’t be sufficient [to 
cover my household needs].” (R#21, Q#419). While another staff member at the 
Investment and Licensing Agency mentions that: “My wife and I have applied for a 
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 loan from the bank to finance our small house. When the loan is paid off, I hope we 
can save some of our income to send our children to a university.” (R#18, Q#418). 
The practice of owing money to a bank comes with the consequence of reducing the 
employee’s monthly income because the repayment to the bank is directly deducted 
from his/her salary. The disbursing treasurer who is responsible for administrating 
employees’ salaries sometimes faces a difficult situation in rejecting his colleagues’ 
requests for applying for a bank loan. A respondent of this study who was also a 
disbursing treasurer in the Investment and Licensing Agency mentioned that: 
“It was difficult when they asked [my approval] for their loan application to the 
bank. I told them, ‘You already passed your limit. You only have 30% of your 
salary while the bank only allows a minimum 40% of your salary’. But they 
insisted and sometimes they escalated the issue to their superiors.” (R#16, 
Q#417) 
This practice has been identified as one critical factor that may diminish the motivation 
of the public employees to be responsible for their duties. However, West Lombok 
District does not have any policies that can address and scale down this practice to 
minimise its impacts on employees’ motivation for work. There were incidents where 
public employees who had pawned their salary lost their motivation to perform their 
responsibilities as public employees. They were reportedly absent from regularly 
coming to the office because they might have been busy doing other business outside 
the office to earn extra income to pay off their bank loans (R#27, Q#422). 
The presence of these two phenomena (e.g. employees having side jobs and 
employees pawning their salaries to the bank) highlight the existence of self-
interested motives in terms of financial income and money issues in public sector 
employment, particularly among lower-level employees in the context of this study in 
West Lombok District. The absence of an attractive income scheme, however, does 
not always lead the employees to decide to resign their jobs as public servants. The 
failure of local government to provide an adequate financial compensation scheme 
has caused them to look for alternative financial resources. They struggle to fulfil their 
self-interested motives of gaining more income to be able to meet their household 
needs. Their struggles, in the end, potentially create a negative impact on the overall 
performance of the organisation, including the possibility of the employees to 
committing non-compliant behaviour while they are carrying out their responsibilities. 
7.3.1.3. Unfair Financial Compensation 
In another instance, the unattractive income scheme can be viewed as unfair by the 
employees, especially in relation to the workloads and responsibilities attached to 
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 their jobs. A respondent who had been working as a treasurer in the Investment and 
License Agency for more than four years highlighted this issue by commenting that: 
“I am tired of being a treasurer. [I have] too many tasks and more 
responsibilities. But [unfortunately] I do not receive any significant additional 
income. I was appointed as a treasurer because of the discretion of the head of 
the agency. I have no other option except to fulfil this responsibility.” (R#18, 
Q#921) 
Another respondent who was appointed as a CMO in the procurement process of the 
Education and Cultural Service also expressesed a similar concern. He mentioned 
that the honorarium he received as a CMO was relatively small compared with his 
responsibilities. To make it worse, he did not receive any extra monies to cover his 
costs for visiting sites to monitor construction progress as part of his responsibilities 
as a CMO. As a result, he had to cover the operational costs of performing his role as 
a CMO from his honorarium. 
In this case, the emergence of non-compliant behaviour does not come from the 
distractions to compensate the lack of income by having other employment or 
borrowing money from the bank; instead, it comes from the accumulation of 
disappointment among the employees. They manifest their disappointments in the 
form of resistance to properly carry out their duties, increasing the possibility for the 
occurrence of non-compliance. One of the respondents specifically highlights this risk 
of employees’ accumulated disappointments in the workplace leading to non-
compliant behaviour by mentioning that: 
“Sometimes they were told to do something, they said yes but they never did it. 
It was a form of resistance after the accumulation of disappointment at work. I 
see [that it is because] the distribution of financial compensation is not in 
accordance with their responsibilities and their actual contributions [to the 
organisation].” (R#12, Q#912) 
7.3.1.4. Lack of Reward System 
The disappointment in the unfair financial compensation system has been further 
exacerbated by discrepancies in the implementation of an individual performance-
based reward system. In West Lombok District, an individual performance-based 
reward system is still absent in most local government units except in units that are 
carrying out certain public service provisions to the community. In the Health Service, 
for example, annual awards are presented to individual employees in a number of 
categories including doctor of the year, dentist of the year, nurse of the year, midwife 
of the year, sanitarian of the year, etc. Those who are selected are entitled to a reward 
in the form of prize money or a religious trip, to Mecca for those who are Moslem or 
other holy places for those who are not Moslem. However, such a reward system is 
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 not applied to employees whose duties are administrative in nature, including those 
who work in the PFM operations of related areas. One of the echelon III officials who 
participated in this study mentioned that West Lombok District does not have an 
instrument that can provide valid performance measures for all individual employees. 
This situation often extends the feeling of disappointment among the employees and 
further decreases their motivation to perform well in their duties, thereby increasing 
the risk of non-compliance problems. One of the respondents, who was responsible 
for financial administration in the Parks and City Interiors Service, specifically 
addressed this situation by mentioning the lack of appreciation from the District for 
her hard work in conducting her duties. She stated that: 
“Often we have worked very very hard, but we feel very disappointed because 
our works were not appreciated. There is no fair individual performance 
measurement system that is implemented, thus we feel very disappointed. We 
have been struggling to perform our work, but no reward for that.” (R#32, 
Q#892) 
The disappointment may also come from an unclear policy on employees’ promotion. 
Similar to their income need, promotion also represents a self-interested motive 
because it can be seen as a reward or appreciation for the qualification and dedication 
of the employees. It displays career advancement for the employees that, in most 
cases, has consequences on their incomes because a higher position usually comes 
with higher job/grade allowances. A section head in the Investment and Licencsng 
Agency expressed his view that the impact of the unfair policy on employees’ 
promotion has led to more disappointment for the employees. He mentions that: 
“I am sorry to say, a lot of employees are disappointed [here] in the sense that 
they are already qualified but they do not get any promotion [to a higher 
position]. It is a pity. The district is oppressing its employees. On the other hand, 
employees who are not qualified are getting promoted. There are qualified 
employees who get nothing, while the unqualified ones can get a promotion.” 
(R#17, Q#931) 
This situation shows the failure of West Lombok District to empower its promotion and 
career advancement policy as a reward instrument to motivate its employees. The 
impact of unclear career and promotion policies upon the feelings of disappointment 
among public employees, potentially, influences the employees to commit non-
compliant behaviour while carrying out their duties. 
7.3.1.5. Resistance and Ignorance Factors 
Apart from lacking a proper financial compensation and reward system, another 
theme that can explain occurrences of non-compliance in PFM operations, which can 
emerge as a result of self-interested motives, is the resistance among West Lombok 
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 District’s officials and employees to see the importance of PFM operations. 
Resistance indicates the efforts of employees to make personal gains in the form of 
less difficult work by allowing them to have some idle time at the workplace. Idle time 
can provide the employees with the opportunity to get away from their jobs and 
responsibilities to accommodate other personal needs. 
In the early stages of PFM reform, resistance was represented in the form of 
employees’ reluctance to change and to follow the new PFM practices (R#08, Q#523). 
They kept following the old habits that had been practised for a long time and did not 
want to learn the requirements of the new PFM rules and regulations. In cash 
management for example, instead of preparing a cash disbursement plan based on 
the schedule of each program and activity, as required by the new PFM regulations, 
they kept allocating cash disbursements equally for every quarter, resulting in a 
number of unavoidable non-compliant practices in the actual cash disbursement 
processes (R#23, Q#528).  
Another example of resistance was found in asset management, one of the major 
non-complaint PFM areas in West Lombok District that has been frequently disclosed 
in BPK’s audit reports. However, in this area, employees were not aware of the 
presence of regulations that they needed to follow when carrying out their 
responsibilities in asset management. A respondent who worked at the Office of Local 
Assets, the unit that is responsible for managing and administering assets across all 
SKPDs, stated that: 
“West Lombok actually already has a Regent Decree that regulates the 
management of assets. Assets transactions including acquisition, change of 
ownership, utilisation, write-off, security and access are regulated by the 
decree. But most units do not know about it. Their ignorance slows down the 
effort to develop the awareness that we have regulations for guiding our asset 
management.” (R#40, Q#736) 
A similar perception was also mentioned by a respondent who was responsible for 
specifically administering assets in the Health Service. He believed that the majority 
of audit findings regarding asset management were mainly caused by the negligence 
of the previous West Lombok District’s employees and officials who were responsible 
for managing and administering the assets. Their ignorance had resulted in an 
inaccurate assets database, which made the efforts to safeguard local government’s 
assets more complicated. In the end, non-compliance such as the failure to possess 
valid and proper legal ownership evidence of the assets or assets being listed as 
missing were frequent problems that were found and disclosed in BPK’s audit reports. 
The implication of ignorance among West Lombok District’s employees in the past 
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 put pressure on him, as the current assets administrator in the Health Service, to find 
a solution for improving asset management in his unit, especially to rectify any 
inaccuracies in the assets database. 
Sometimes ignorance of PFM operations in West Lombok District can also be 
attributed to employees’ unwillingness to learn any PFM-related rules, regulations and 
procedures that are relevant to their roles and responsibilities. A staff member in 
DPPKD explicitly stated that he rarely opens and reads the standard booklet that 
provides detailed guidelines and information regarding his duties due to its thickness 
and large size. He further argued that the problems that are present in the financial 
management processes might be caused by employees’ negligence and reluctance 
to learn the guidelines. In other units, especially in the units that have responsibilities 
for providing services directly to the public, there is a tendency among their employees 
to disregard any regulations and procedures regarding financial management and 
administrative matters. They certainly know how to perform their roles and execute 
their main activities in delivering the services to the public and community. However, 
they often neglect the financial management implications of their activities. One of the 
division heads in the Health Service admits his staff’s ignorance of financial 
administration matters by commenting: 
“I could say that often we underestimated our job. Maybe the job was only to 
record [financial] transactions for example. It happened a lot in the public health 
centre – we didn't promptly record our activity or our [financial] transaction. We 
kept delaying to record it and suddenly we forgot about it. As a result, it became 
an audit finding.” (R#45, Q#498) 
Employees’ unwillingness to learn and understand PFM operational rules, 
regulations, procedures and standards certainly increases the risk of non-compliance 
in PFM operational processes in West Lombok District. In the local revenue collection 
process, a number of bank accounts had been used to deposit revenues collected 
from local taxes, without proper authorisation from the Regent as required by the PFM 
regulations. This problem of non-compliance has been reported in BPK’s audit 
findings and, according to the Head of the Treasury Division, the problem was mainly 
caused by the failure to include those bank accounts into the Regent’s Decree in a 
timely manner. The officials who were responsible for local tax collection activities 
simply did not know that a proper authorisation from the Regent must be obtained 
before any bank accounts could be used in PFM operational processes, including the 
depositing of tax revenue monies. 
Another example of ignorance was also highlighted by one of the section heads in the 
Accounting and Reporting Division who was responsible for the preparation of 
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 consolidated financial statements for West Lombok District. She was upset by the 
attitude of most officials in West Lombok District who did not have appropriate respect 
for the accounting processes. In their view, accounting is only seen as the final 
process in the financial management cycle for the presentation of the end result in the 
form of a financial statement. She felt that this misleading perception has caused most 
spending units not to care about accounting and to consider the preparation of a 
financial statement as the responsibility of the accounting division only.  
 “I have an expectation that they respect accounting. We all know that 
accounting is the end of the financial management process. The main feature 
of accounting is that it has no influence to the implementation of the financial 
management procedures because it just presents the end result. Nevertheless, 
because it just presents the end result, accounting is often ignored by most of 
the spending units.” (R#19, Q#477) 
The situation where spending units do not pay attention to the accounting processes 
can explain the inability of spending units to prepare their own financial statements 
that will allow the preparation of West Lombok’s financial statement through the 
consolidation process. As disclosed in BPK’s audit reports, instead of preparing a final 
financial statement by consolidating financial statements from all spending units, the 
preparation of the financial statement in West Lombok District was carried out 
centrally by the Accounting and Reporting Division (BPK 2013a). 
Another non-compliance issue in the accounting component that was reported by 
BPK relates to the failure to maintain valid evidence of financial transactions. This 
problem could also be caused by the carelessness of the accounting staff in SKPDs 
to properly archive the relevant documentation. A respondent of this study who 
worked at the District Secretariat and was responsible for administering 
documentation regarding procurement processes complained about his own 
negligence to do a simple task of archiving financial transactional evidence. In this 
case, he confirms his carelessness by commenting: 
“We were worried because some of the findings were caused by our negligence. 
I feel disappointed that we couldn't even meet a very simple requirement. There 
was a case of audit findings where we couldn't provide the receipt [of a financial 
transaction] because it was tucked somewhere.” (R#22, Q#489) 
In other cases, the ignorance of employees who were involved in PFM operational 
processes could lead to non-compliance that has a financial impact upon the local 
government, for example, causing a state loss. A financial administration officer in the 
Parks and City Interiors Service provided an indication of this issue. She pointed out 
that inaccuracies in the administration of official travel expenses had caused 
employees to receive greater travel allowances than they should (R#32). She 
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 admitted that one reason for this non-compliance issue in the past was her 
carelessness to examine closely the applications for travel expenses from each 
division. She failed to observe a risk in the official travel planning process where an 
employee from one division who had been assigned to an official travel duty in his/her 
division could also be potentially assigned to a different official travel duty in another 
division at the same time. In other cases, non-compliance in official travel areas 
involved the attempt by employees to take the advantage for earning more travel 
allowances by falsifying official travel documents to create fictitious trips (R#27). 
Problems of non-compliance as a result of administrative ignorance and personal 
motives to gain more income from official travel have led to the overpayment of travel 
allowances in the disbursement process and have resulted in inefficiencies in overall 
PFM operations in West Lombok District. In BPK’s audit report, inefficiency as a result 
of non-compliant behaviour is classified as a state loss. BPK recommends that the 
individuals who receive ineligible travel allowances must return the overpaid amount 
to the local government’s bank accounts. In most cases, overpayment of travel 
allowances that are disclosed in BPK’s audit findings would be required to be returned 
soon after it has been verified that the regulations have been violated and the amount 
of state losses have been validated by the State Losses Board. Follow-up on BPK’s 
recommendation for requesting the individuals to return the money seems to be very 
well executed in West Lombok District. 
A section head in the Parks and City Interiors Service confirms the effective follow-up 
action by commenting: 
“According to BPK's audit report, you have caused a 10 million rupiah state loss. 
How would you resolve it? He said that it would be returned, then the money 
was returned. Often, our employees here were just trying their luck. If it has 
been declared that they have violated the rules and have caused state losses, 
they would return the money.” (R#27, Q#457) 
While the interview data does provide evidence of how the employees’ carelessness 
in the management of official travel has caused overpayment of travel allowances, 
the similar carelessness of employees and officials could also be blamed for other 
expense overpayment problems such as in the area of grants/social funds 
management and volume shortages in construction work. 
7.3.1.6. Control Mechanism 
The establishment of a proper internal control mechanism for monitoring and direct 
supervision of actions by immediate superiors is important for reducing the risk of 
individual employees to remain ignorant or to take advantage of others’ ignorance at 
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 the expense of the organisation. The effectiveness of direct supervision by an 
immediate supervisor was mentioned by a respondent who served as section head in 
the Public Works Service when she said that: 
“[...] although I have a clear job description, sometimes I forget and neglect to 
adhere to it. So, I am very happy to have a boss who has detailed records about 
my performance. He keeps reminding me to follow the guidance, to achieve the 
target and to set priorities on the tasks that I need to accomplish. I am really 
glad about that. It prevents me from committing any mistakes [at work].” (R#47, 
Q#500) 
The importance of direct supervision and control by a superior, as part of the internal 
control system to effectively prevent non-compliant behaviours among PFM actors, 
was also highlighted by the Head of DPPKD who was responsible for managing and 
administering the overall PFM operations in West Lombok District. He specifically 
commented that: 
“If the internal control system works, God willing, it will support compliant 
practices from our employees. Compliance could not be achieved if the 
bureaucratic process through an internal control system was not taking place. 
Why do we have a section head if he/she does not perform proper supervisory 
activities against his/her staff?” (R#1, Q#964) 
Discussion in the previous sections has been dominated by the presence of self-
interested motives among public employees who are involved in PFM operational 
processes and how these motives allow PFM actors to commit non-compliant 
behaviours, causing inefficiencies in the overall PFM operations in West Lombok 
District. Lack of an adequate incentives system and effective control mechanism 
seem to have allowed PFM actors in West Lombok District to pursue their self-
interested motives. The findings discussed in this section, so far, support the 
proposition derived from the political economy perspective of a public bureaucracy 
theory, which assumes that the behaviour of individual public employees is influenced 
by their needs to fulfil their rational self-interested motives. From this perspective, to 
ensure the behaviour of individual public employees is consistent with the behaviour 
stipulated in rules and regulations, public organisations have to establish an effective 
incentives system and a proper control mechanism (Beetham 1996; Downs 1967). 
7.3.2. Public-interested Motives 
Other than from self-interested motives, non-compliance could also emerge as a 
result of employees’ efforts to prioritise service delivery to the public. In this case, 
public-interested motives may have driven the employees to deviate from the 
requirements already stipulated in the regulations in order to better serve the public. 
These typical non-compliance problems are commonly found in local government 
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 units that deliver services directly to the community. One example is the direct use of 
local revenues within a particular local government unit to finance its own operational 
expenses for carrying out its service delivery functions. In West Lombok District, this 
non-compliant practice of direct use of revenues has been reported in BPK’s audit 
reports on a number of local government units including the Education and Cultural 
Service, the Health Service, the Population and Civil Registration Service, the 
Forestry Service, the DPPKD, and the Parks and City Interiors Service (BPK 2009; 
2010a; 2011b; 2012; 2013a; 2014b). Another example is found in the local revenue 
collection processes when receiving treasurers do not deposit the collected local 
revenue amounts to the local treasury bank accounts in a timely manner, according 
to the provision stipulated in the Regent Regulation. Both instances are further 
discussed in the following two subsections. 
7.3.2.1. Rules Preventing Timely Public Service Delivery 
Complex, bureaucratic and time-consuming processes of certain budget mechanisms 
are often considered as the main reasons that cause local government units to directly 
use their collected local revenues to finance their operational expenses for providing 
public services. They do not want the complexity of the budget mechanism for paying 
operational expenses to prevent them from providing timely, efficient and effective 
public service deliveries. Comments from respondents of this study who worked in 
the Health Service provide evidence to support this point of view. They criticise the 
requirement to follow the budget mechanism for the disbursement of expenses related 
to the provision of health services to the community and view the requirement as the 
main obstacle for them to provide better health service to the public. One of the 
respondents, who was a division head in the Health Service, mentions this complexity 
by stating that: 
“Under the Minister of Home Affairs’ regulations, the administration of public 
health care centre revenues must follow the budget mechanism. Our revenue 
[from providing health services to the public] must be transferred to the local 
government bank account. The revenue monies can't be directly used [to pay 
our expenses related to the provision of health services]. After we ask for 
reimbursement, we then can spend it to pay our expenses. The time span from 
when the revenue was received until it is actually spent [to pay our expenses] 
was quite long. Such bureaucratic procedures are quite complicated to follow.” 
(R#41, Q#634) 
Further, on a specific occasion in 2015 when the interview was conducted, he 
mentioned that the total revenues from public health care centres across the District 
for the first semester (e.g. until June 2015) had not been fully reimbursed to the 
centres (R#41, Q#635). The District had only reimbursed the revenues from January 
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 and February 2015. Such a situation complicates the financial administration of public 
health care centres because they need to immediately cover their operational 
expenses such as fees for the doctors and paramedics and the costs of purchasing 
medicines, medical equipment and other medical consumables. 
The pressure to maintain the level of health service delivery to the public while, at the 
same time, facing the rigid reimbursement process of the operational budget has 
forced officials within the Health Service to violate the rules by directly using its own 
revenues to finance its operational expenses. Such non-compliant practices, in fact, 
provide flexibility for them to continue providing health services to the community 
without being impeded by the bureaucratic process of the operational budget 
reimbursement processes. However, allowing such practices in the actual delivery of 
health services jeopardises the accountability of, and control over, the overall financial 
management of the Health Service. The typical tension in a public bureaucracy 
between having flexibility in the actual practice of its service delivery and maintaining 
an adequate public accountability level has resulted in a policy to upgrade the status 
of public health care centres across West Lombok District. In 2015, after being 
assessed thoroughly, the status of all public health care centres in West Lombok 
District had been changed into BLUs, despite several recommendations from the 
assessment committee still have to be followed up (Pemkab Lombok Barat 2015). 
Under the BLU model, local government units that provide services to the public are 
given the authority to manage their own financial affairs and administration, including 
the ability to directly utilise their own revenue to cover their expenses, hence 
improving their flexibility in service provision. However, they still need to consolidate 
their annual financial statements into the District’s annual financial report. 
7.3.2.2. Rules That Do Not Support Efficient Practices 
Another situation to emerge from this study, in which public-interested motives 
potentially have driven non-compliant behaviour, is when the requirement stipulated 
in regulations has not been efficient in its actual practice. The collection process for 
local revenues including taxes and levies, especially in remote areas across West 
Lombok District, which still maintains manual cash collection provides an example to 
this non-compliance problem. To accommodate the remoteness and lack of 
transportation and communication media, West Lombok District has allowed the 
receiving treasurer in some rural areas to deposit the collected local revenue monies 
into the local government’s bank account within two days after the collection date, 
rather than the 24 hours that is stipulated in the PFM regulation. Nevertheless, there 
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 were instances where receiving treasurers did not follow the rules to deposit the 
collected revenue monies within the specified timeline. This reluctance to follow the 
rules in the revenue collection process was also highlighted by a respondent from the 
Investment and Licensing Agency, who used to be a receiving treasurer in a remote 
area, in his comment that “it was just a little bit bothering and not efficient if we have 
to deposit only 300 or 400 thousand rupiahs37 of the revenue monies. The bank is 
also quite far from here. I see [that] the regulation is too rigid and is not flexible”. 
(R#17, Q#619). He further mentioned that he often delayed depositing the monies for 
a few days even though he knew that it was not permitted. He defended his practice 
by commenting that it could improve the efficiency of the revenue collection task 
because he did not need to frequently visit the bank to deposit very small amounts of 
revenue monies. 
Problems of non-compliance that are a result of employees’ public-interested motives 
do not occur frequently, especially in the main scope of this study, that is the financial 
management and administration of a local government. Interviews with the 
respondents of this study displayed the occurrence of this kind of non-compliance 
problem only on the two examples mentioned above (e.g. the direct use of local 
revenue and the delay in depositing revenue monies). Those two non-compliance 
problems were driven by the perspectives of the respondents about the rigidity of rules 
that hindered them from being more responsive to the public’s needs and from being 
more efficient in accomplishing their tasks. 
The nature of BPK’s audit findings that focused on the negative consequences of non-
compliant behaviour, such as causing state losses, inefficiency and ineffectiveness, 
has also prevented the identification of non-compliant behaviour among PFM actors 
that are driven by public-interested motives. Lack of identification, in BPK’s audit 
findings, of non-compliant behaviours that have the potential for positive impacts upon 
PFM operational processes has limited this case study to further examine the 
influences of those public-interested motives on the non-compliant behaviours of 
employees. 
7.4. Chapter Summary 
This chapter has discussed the general perspectives of the PFM actors in West 
Lombok District about the PFM objectives. It also has identified the PFM actors’ 
37  Approximately equal to A$30 to A$40. 
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 motives in carrying out their official duties and analysed the roles and influences of 
those motives to their inclination to be involved in non-compliance. 
In general, this chapter has shown that the PFM actors in West Lombok District 
possess adequate understanding about the objectives of the PFM operations, which 
places compliance with rules and regulations as the main objectives of the PFM, along 
with other objectives of economy, efficiency, effectiveness, transparency, equity and 
ethics. It has also revealed the variety of PFM actors’ motives in the workplace, 
ranging from a simple financial-related, self-interested motive to a more community 
service-oriented, public-interested motive. Further, it has been shown that both self-
interested and public-interested motives can facilitate PFM actors to commit non-
compliant acts and contribute to PFM operational problems. Lack of an adequate 
incentives system and effective control mechanism seemed to have allowed PFM 
actors who were motivated by their self-interested motives to be involved in non-
compliance. For PFM actors who possessed a public-interested motive, their 
involvement in non-compliant behaviour was mainly triggered by their perspective 
about the rigidity of rules that hindered them from being more responsive to the 
public’s needs and from being more efficient in accomplishing their tasks. 
Chapter 8 continues the discussion regarding shortcomings in the bureaucratic 
structures of West Lombok District’s PFM operational practices, which is another 
theme that emerged from this study that also facilitates the PFM actors to commit 
non-compliant acts. 
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 Chapter 8 
Case Study (Part III): Bureaucratic Structures and Non-Compliance in 
PFM Operations 
The discussion in the previous chapter has focused on the personal motives of PFM 
actors in West Lombok District and how those motives could have influenced them to 
commit non-compliant behaviours that triggered the emergence of the systemic 
weaknesses disclosed in BPK’s audit reports. In addition to the personal motivation 
of PFM actors, this study also reveals another theme – the shortcomings in 
bureaucratic structure – which has allowed the PFM actors in West Lombok District 
to breach the rules and regulations while exercising their PFM operational duties. 
The first section of this chapter investigates the shortcomings in the qualities of the 
PFM operational rules and regulations that have influenced the enthusiasm, 
knowledge and ability of PFM actors to comply with those rules and regulations. In 
the second section, the impact of dysfunctional vertical and horizontal divisions of 
labour arrangements in PFM operations upon non-compliance is elaborated and 
discussed. Meanwhile, the third section explores the conditions whereby human 
resources management practices have failed to actualise another prominent feature 
of bureaucracy: the establishment of expertise among the employees. In addition to 
the three major sections on bureaucratic structures, the last section of this chapter 
discusses the influences of parties external to West Lombok District in relation to the 
problems of non-compliance in its PFM operations. 
8.1. Ineffectiveness of Rules 
The impersonal nature of a bureaucracy is characterised by over-reliance on the 
application of rules and regulations to force the actions of its members toward specific 
behaviours in order to attain its objectives. PFM operations in West Lombok District, 
and also in all other local governments within Indonesia, certainly meet this criterion. 
Appendix 1 listed rules and regulations that govern the operational components of 
PFM, confirming the presence of impersonal character of bureaucracy in PFM 
operations within local governments in Indonesia. Other than the major organic PFM 
laws, numerous rules and regulations are also set by the central government in the 
form of government regulations and presidential regulations. More detailed guidance 
is also provided by the Ministry of Home Affairs, which plays a very significant role in 
the arrangement of PFM operations within local governments in Indonesia. At local 
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 government level, local regulations together with the head of local government 
decrees further regulate the PFM operational processes. SOPs are also applied to 
each specific process across the operational components of PFM in every local 
government unit. 
In general, including at local government level, Indonesia has a proper and adequate 
PFM legal framework (World Bank 2007; 2012). Some respondents of this study, 
especially those who were at higher echelon levels confirmed the adequacy of the 
PFM rules and regulations in the context of local government. They believed that the 
current PFM rules and regulations support the establishment of good financial 
management in local governments. Therefore, efforts from the PFM actors to comply 
with those rules and regulations could assist the attainment of the PFM objectives. 
The Head of DPPKD specified his point of view regarding the adequacy of PFM rules 
by commenting: 
“So the rules have been established to [ensure] good financial management. 
Now, we all strive to make financial management in accordance with the 
mechanism, in accordance with the procedure, and in accordance with the 
rules. When this is done, this will inevitably generate good financial 
management. As we follow the rules, automatically the financial management 
objectives will be achieved.” (R#1, Q#573 and Q#574) 
Nevertheless, at the implementation level, several issues have emerged that inhibit 
the PFM actors from fully complying with PFM rules and regulations. These issues 
deal with the qualities of the rules and regulations that make them ineffective in 
influencing and directing the behaviours of the PFM actors to comply with the 
requirements. 
8.1.1. Contradictory Rules 
One of the major problems that have led to the ineffectiveness of rules deals with the 
contradictory regulations set by central government, especially in relation to 
accounting and financial reporting processes. Respondents who were involved in 
accounting and financial reporting processes frequently mentioned the differences 
between the requirements stipulated in the Permendagri and the GAS in regard to the 
presentation of financial statements. A section head in the DPPKD highlighted this 
contradiction by mentioning: 
“[...] regulations for the preparation of financial statements are also ambiguous. 
To date (i.e. 2015), there are two [versions of the] financial statements. One 
refers to the Permendagri and the other one refers to the Government 
Accounting Standard. The report [sent] to the Ministry of Home Affairs conforms 
to the code of accounts in budgeting. [While] the financial report that refers to 
the accounting standard fulfils the requirements stated in the public finance laws 
186 
 and has to be reported to the Ministry of Finance and be audited by BPK.” 
(R#08, Q#584) 
The overlapping roles of the MoHA and the Ministry of Finance in regard to local 
governments’ financial management have resulted in some confusion among local 
governments’ PFM actors. The Head of Accounting and Reporting Division raised her 
concerns regarding this issue. She viewed that the involvement of the MoHA in local 
government financial management has differentiated the arrangements for budgeting 
and financial reporting between local governments and central government agencies. 
It also has contributed to ambiguity in terms of which central government authority 
has the primary responsibility for local government financial management. To 
overcome this ambiguity, her preference would be for local government financial 
management to follow the regulations stipulated by the Ministry of Finance, which 
represent the derivative regulations of the trilogy of PFM laws and have been 
implemented adequately throughout central government agencies (R#13, Q#589). 
This choice is supported by the quality of financial management at central government 
level after the reform in 2004, which surpasses that of local governments38. The 
MoHA, on the other hand, should focus only on administrative matters of local 
governments. An accounting staff member in West Lombok District, however, 
explained that contradictions in the regulations for the preparation and presentation 
of financial reports relate to minor differences in the classification of accounts. 
Nevertheless, that has impacted upon the way she carried out her duties because of 
the need to present two different reports for the same financial transactions, hence 
increasing the risk of misstatement of financial information in the financial reports. 
8.1.2. Misinterpretation of Rules 
Other than ambiguity in regard to the procedures for the preparation and presentation 
of financial information in financial statements, misinterpretation of the requirements 
stipulated in the rules and regulations that govern local government’s PFM operations 
was also mentioned by a number of respondents of this study. Failure to correctly 
interpret the rules and regulations increases the risk of non-compliance among the 
PFM actors. In most cases, misinterpretation emerges from the absence of more 
detailed rules in the form of local government regulations, SOPs and other technical 
guidelines, which allow each PFM actor to have a different interpretation of how to 
implement the PFM rules (R#36). One of the accounting staff in DPPKD lamented the 
38  For financial year 2014, the percentage of central government agencies that achieved an 
“unqualified” auditor opinion for their financial statements was 70.93%; while the percentage of local 
governments achieving that was only 46.75% (BPK 2015b). 
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 lack of initiatives from West Lombok District to establish more detailed PFM 
operational rules even though, in the decentralisation era, local governments are 
being given the authority to develop policy for their own regions, including for PFM 
operations. He stipulated his disappointment by stating that: 
“In the midst of [this] regional autonomy era local governments are given the 
authority to make policy for their regions; still we didn't dare to take the initiatives 
[….] Rules which haven't been made are rules which are based on local 
government initiatives. It means initiatives to develop rules which could facilitate 
the work without waiting for any instruction from the legislation. Local 
government may prepare its own local regulation to simplify the processes. This 
kind of initiative still can't be seen here.” (R#12, Q#675 and Q#677) 
In an extreme situation, the absence of more detailed regulations inhibits PFM actors 
from gaining knowledge of how to properly implement the PFM rules. However, well-
established detailed rules may also result in the same outcome because they do not 
necessarily guarantee proper comprehension among the PFM actors regarding the 
requirements stipulated in the rules. One factor that has emerged from the 
respondents’ comments in regard to the inability of well-established and detailed PFM 
operational rules to be properly followed by the PFM actors is the failure to effectively 
disseminate those rules to all relevant units and PFM actors, thereby increasing the 
risk of PFM actors misinterpreting the rules while conducting their duties. In asset 
management, for example, the stipulation of a local regulation regarding asset 
management in 2012 was not followed by a proper dissemination of the regulation. A 
section head in the Office of Local Assets commented on this problem by stating: 
“Efforts to disseminate the requirement for all local government units to report 
their assets [to the Office of Local Assets] periodically, to propose asset write-
offs, and to conduct physical stock-taking were not performed adequately. 
Hence, units didn't know what to do [in regard to their asset management 
responsibilities]. They didn't know where to submit the report. That was the main 
reason. In addition, local government didn't have a system for administering the 
assets, causing its units to not report their assets.” (R#40, Q#739 and Q#726) 
SOPs in regard to schools’ financial management and administration, to give another 
example, were not adequately disseminated due to the very large geographical area 
of West Lombok District constraining heads of schools and relevant schools’ financial 
administrators from attending any dissemination sessions of SOPs (R#26, Q#738). 
There were also cases when the dissemination of rules, regulations and SOPs was 
ineffective because they missed the targeted audiences. The PFM actors who were 
affected by those rules, regulations and SOPs did not receive invitations and, thereby, 
failed to attend the dissemination sessions (R#14, Q#846). Dissemination of PFM-
related regulations in the paper form was also not effective. In many cases, the 
distribution of regulations in paper form, as an attachment to an official letter to the 
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 heads of local government units, remained stuck on their desks (R#8, Q#770). They 
might have been busy and simply forgot to forward the regulations to the relevant 
divisions, sections or individual employees within the unit. As a result, relevant PFM 
actors may not have read or even known about the existence of certain regulations 
that were relevant to their roles and functions. Another factor that has contributed to 
the difficulty of effectively disseminating the regulations is the mobility of the 
employees due to the nature of their responsibilities. In the Health Service, for 
example, one of the section heads mentioned this factor by commenting: 
“I found the difficult part was the dissemination [of the regulation]. Once the new 
regulation is issued, we have to disseminate it to our employees. Equal 
dissemination to all employees is something which can't be ascertained. Our 
employees are also often outside their offices because of having external 
activities.” (R#42, Q#595) 
In another case, as already discussed in Chapter 7, misinterpretation of rules may 
come from a lack of understanding among the PFM actors due to their unwillingness 
to learn the relevant directions and instructions provided in the rules, regulations, 
SOPs and other technical guidelines before they carry out their duties and 
responsibilities in PFM operations. A staff member in the Accounting and Reporting 
Division admited her reluctance to read and learn the guidelines by stating, “I rarely 
read the guidelines; very rarely. [Usually] I just asked my superior if there was any 
problem and I need any clarification on what I should do” (R#03, Q#731). 
8.1.3. Defective Rules 
The ineffectiveness of rules is also indicated by the failure of the PFM actors to gain 
correct interpretations of the rules and regulations simply because they are unclear, 
causing potential multi-interpretations of rules among the PFM actors. An echelon III 
in the Parks and City Interiors Service highlighted this theme as one of the factors that 
inhibits his staff from appropriately conducting their duties according to the intended 
objectives of the rules. He mentioned that: 
“If rules and regulations were made properly, automatically we could ensure that 
they (e.g. my staff) were doing their job appropriately. But some rules were 
unclear; there would be different interpretations and perceptions in their 
implementation. That inhibited us from moving forward.” (R#36, Q#608) 
A section head in the Public Works Service also mentioned his experience, in regard 
to the presence of multi-interpretations of rules in the disbursement process, when he 
submitted documentation to the local treasurer for processing payment to a third party 
for completion of a construction project. He believed that he had properly interpreted 
the requirements stipulated in the relevant rules for the submission of such payment 
189 
 requests. However, frequently he had to make amendments because the local 
treasury staff found that his payment requests did not comply with the regulations. 
Specifically he commented that: 
“Interpretations can be different because each division has a different 
perspective. I found this situation quite often even though we have read the 
regulations again and again. We submitted a payment request to the local 
treasury, but they returned it back to us because of different interpretations 
between us in regard to payment request guidance and procedures. So we have 
to carefully check our [payment] request before we have any problems.” (R#46, 
Q#613) 
Multi-interpretation of rules displays an inherent defect in the rules and regulations, 
which leads to non-compliant actions as a result of the failure of the PFM actors to 
correctly interpret the rules according to their intended objectives. In another example, 
the inappropriateness of SOPs for the actual situation is an indication of defective 
rules because it would be difficult for the PFM actors to adjust their practices to the 
requirements stipulated in the SOPs. A section head in the DPPKD who was 
responsible for the local tax revenue collection process mentioned, “Indeed, we could 
still find weaknesses in our SOPs in the sense that SOPs do not reflect the actual 
situation we face. Consequently, they cannot be properly followed and executed.” 
(R#10, Q#740) 
Other than revealing a number of problems that display the shortcomings of PFM 
rules and regulations, which have led to their improper implementation, responses 
from respondents of this study also highlighted one positive finding in relation to the 
approach for improving the compliance of PFM operations with relevant PFM rules 
and regulations. The positive finding occurred in the accounting and financial 
reporting component of PFM operations and was triggered by the adoption of 
information technology within the accounting processes. 
Before 2013, there was no effective accounting information system for West Lombok 
District to use in the preparation process of its financial statements. The financial 
statement processes were carried out centrally and manually by the Accounting and 
Reporting Division. The financial statement of West Lombok District did not come out 
of a consolidation process from each local government unit’s financial statement; 
instead, each unit was required to submit all financial transaction evidence to the 
Accounting and Reporting Division. As time went by, with assistance from a proper 
FMIS, West Lombok District gradually improved the way it managed its accounting 
and financial reporting practices. 
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 Since 2013, West Lombok District has adopted Sistem Informasi Manajemen Daerah 
(SIMDA)39 for its FMIS (R#24, Q#656). This has not only helped the accounting staff 
across local government units to record financial transactions and prepare financial 
reports, but has also established better controls in other PFM operational 
components. In the disbursement process, SIMDA rejects any payment authorisation 
requests that would exceed the budget ceilings (R#02, Q#640). Via the payment 
method of bank transfer, SIMDA enables cashless payment transactions by the 
disbursing treasurers, reducing the risk of unauthorised use of money by the 
treasurers (R#20, Q#654). In asset management, SIMDA has effectively assisted the 
Office of Local Assets to develop an accurate record and database of the District’s 
assets (R#44, Q#658). In the accounting process, SIMDA has allowed timely 
reconciliation procedures throughout the year, improving the accuracy of accounting 
data and information (R#14, Q#645). One of the accounting staff in DPPKD 
convincingly concluded that “SIMDA has forced us to comply with regulations. That’s 
the benefit of having SIMDA. It can also cut off the opportunities for any non-compliant 
behaviour” (R#5, Q#643 and Q#644). According to BPKP (2016), SIMDA has been 
designed in accordance with central government PFM laws and regulations that are 
relevant for local government. Hence, the proper adoption and implementation of 
SIMDA is expected to improve local government’s compliance with those rules and 
regulations. 
8.2. Dysfunctions in Division of Labour 
Apart from the shortcomings in rules as the rational legal authority instrument, another 
major feature of a bureaucratic organization in the PFM operations , the division of 
labour arrangements, has also suffered from a number of drawbacks. In this study, 
the drawbacks in division of labour have emerged both vertically, along the hierarchy, 
and horizontally, among the units. 
39  SIMDA or Sistem Informasi Manajemen Daerah is an application that is adopted by West Lombok 
District for its financial management and information system to assist the accounting process and the 
preparation of financial statements. There are two FMIS applications that are available for local 
governments in Indonesia: (1) SIPKD and (2) SIMDA. While SIPKD is developed and maintained by 
the Directorate General of Local Government Financial Management within the MoHA, SIMDA is 
developed and maintained by BPKP (Badan Pengawasan Keuangan dan Pembangunan) or the 
Development and Financial Supervisory Agency, a presidential unit that has the task of supervising 
the national development program and financial management of central and local governments. 
About 78.41% of local governments have adopted SIMDA as their FMIS, while the rest are using 
SIPKD (BPKP 2016). 
191 
                                                   
 8.2.1. Personal Loyalty to Superior 
A hierarchical structure that represents vertical division of labour in a bureaucracy 
requires superiors to give commands and instructions to their subordinates, while 
subordinates have to obey the instructions from their superiors (Blau and Meyer 
1987). This study has uncovered a strong commitment among the PFM actors to be 
loyal to their superiors by following their orders. A staff member in the DPPKD 
mentioned that he maintains a loyalty to his superior and always attempts to carry out 
his duties scrupulously to secure his position in the workplace (R#5, Q#137). A 
member of the procurement committee in the Public Works Service specifically 
emphasised the requirement for public employees to be loyal to their superior by 
commenting “[...] as a civil servant, we don't have other options except to be loyal to 
the policies and instructions from our leader. If we don't, we’d better resign [from the 
public sector].” (R#38, Q#112) 
A strong personal loyalty to superiors, however, does not necessarily increase the 
level of compliance with the organisational rules or ensure the achievement of the 
organisational objectives. The impersonal nature of the authority attached to the 
superiors, which limits the provision of commands and instructions from the superior 
only to matters that are relevant to their official functions in the organisation (Blau and 
Meyer 1987), does not always exist in actual practice. Superiors may give instructions 
that deviate from the rules and fall outside their institutional functions that have been 
established for them. In such situations, the existence of personal loyalty to a superior 
among subordinates may potentially spoil the normative function of a hierarchy to 
efficiently deliver the rational-legal authority mandate. Instead, a hierarchy may 
contain ingrained non-compliance problems that can emerge when those who are in 
the higher hierarchical levels have a lack of concern for the interests of the 
organisation. One comment from a respondent of this study, a section head in the 
Public Works Service, provides an illustration of the inherent non-compliance risks 
when subordinates have a significant level of personal loyalty to their superiors. She 
mentioned that: 
“If the head of agency had supported and agreed to accommodate a request 
from the parliament, for example, I had only one option, which is to follow his 
decision because I am just a subordinate. When our leader at the top has asked 
me, I know that he has already considered a lot of factors before he made the 
decision. I don't know and I don't need to know what his consideration is. But, 
the decision certainly changed the budget layout and it happened frequently.” 
(R#47, Q#141) 
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 Interestingly, from the perspective of the PFM actors who hold higher hierarchical 
positions, there is no desire from themselves to force their subordinates to be loyal to 
every single instruction from them. For example, an echelon III officer at the District 
Secretariat expressed the importance of adhering to the rules and always asks 
subordinates to examine the appropriateness of any instructions from their superiors 
to the applicable rules, procedures and mechanisms. In great detail he specifies that: 
First, we have to do our job according to the rules. That's the most important 
one. We must know the rules. If our boss proposes to do a certain thing, we 
must study it. We should examine whether the proposal is allowed or not 
allowed. Then, we report it to him according to the applicable mechanism. If it 
is allowed, it is clearly stated that the proposal is okay. But if it is not allowed, 
we must reject the proposal. We are working by a system where the 
mechanisms and regulations inside the system are the important things to 
adhere to. We shouldn't break any rules or regulations in our work. Compliance 
to the regulations, in my opinion, is very important.” (R#39, Q#114) 
Another respondent, a higher level officer who held echelon II position in the District 
Secretariat, also articulated his demand to every subordinate to challenge any 
instruction from their superiors that seems to be irrelevant and not to comply with the 
rules and regulations. He specifically mentions that:  
“[…] in our work, especially with the boss, do not always justify what he said. 
Any disagreement with the boss shouldn't always be interpreted as disloyalty. 
What we must do is to tell the truth to him, to let him know what the rules are. 
Our boss is also a human being who has limitations and can make any mistakes. 
It is just coincidental that he currently has a position as our superior.” (R#27, 
Q#100) 
The reliance of bureaucracy upon legal instruments has resulted in the importance of 
establishing loyalty to the organisation, manifested in the form of compliance with the 
organisational rules and objectives. This organisational loyalty has been 
acknowledged by Weber as the only type of loyalty that exists in a bureaucratic 
organisation as a rational attitude to buttress the hierarchy and to establish expertise 
(Souryal 2011). Yet, in the workplace, Souryal and McKay (1996) have identified 
personal loyalty to superiors as another type of loyalty that is commonly found in an 
organisation. 
Personal loyalty to superiors is defined as “the unspoken actions, words, or signals 
by subordinates to submit to the person of superiors, rather than to the organization 
they serve […]” (Souryal 2011, 122). According to Souryal (2011), personal loyalty to 
superiors generates a dysfunctional hierarchical system within the bureaucracy. It 
emerges from the assumption held by subordinates that the display of personal loyalty 
to their superiors may secure their future careers. Personal loyalty to a superior can 
generate a significant deviation from the normative function of a public bureaucracy 
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 within the society. It has potential to diminish the occurrence of every member of 
bureaucracy, regardless of rank or status within the hierarchy, performing their duties 
according to the rules, regulations and work standards. Hence, personal loyalty to 
superiors may predispose employees to be non-compliant in the actual performance 
of their duties. 
8.2.2. Silo Mentality 
In regard to the horizontal division of labour, the separation of employees through 
departmentalisation within a bureaucratic organisation aims to establish specialisation 
and to develop expertise among the employees. Nevertheless, it also comes with a 
potential negative side-effect when the employees tend to think and work in a silo. 
They may narrow their focus on their own department or unit, allowing the occurrence 
of non-compliance if they neglect the attainment of the overall objectives of the 
organisation. 
One of the negative outcomes of this silo mentality that has emerged from this study 
is the phenomenon where there is a lack of coordination and communication among 
the relevant units of the organization. Often, in the planning stage of a program or 
activity within a spending unit, there is no communication between the functional 
section that exercises the actual activity and the finance section that prepares the 
cash disbursement plan. A respondent who worked in the finance section of the 
Education and Cultural Service illustrated this problem by highlighting the 
unsynchronised planning of an activity when, for example, the actual activity is 
scheduled to be exercised in the first quarter but the disbursement plan shows that 
the schedule for cash disbursement of that specific activity is in the third quarter 
(R#24, Q#537). He also mentioned a frequent practice in West Lombok District 
whereby the cash disbursement plans allocate the budget outflows equally for every 
quarter and do not reflect the implementation schedules of the programs and activities 
(R#23, Q#528). This typical, unsynchronised practice in the planning stage of a 
program or activity displays the lack of communication and coordination among the 
relevant units and could potentially disrupt the implementation of the program or 
activity. The money required to fund the program might not be available when the 
program is scheduled to be implemented. A section head in the Education and 
Cultural Service, who worked in the finance section and was involved in the 
disbursement process, often received complaints from the employees who worked in 
the functional units about why the money was not available to enable them to exercise 
their programs. They did not understand that the problem was actually caused by their 
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 own lack of planning, resulting such an unsynchronized cash disbursement. She 
illustrated the situation by commenting:  
“When they started the activity and found the problem, they always blamed the 
finance unit. They didn't want to understand the situation and the inconsistency 
between the schedule of the activity and the cash disbursement plan.” (R#23, 
Q#536) 
Another case that illustrates this lack of coordination and communication also 
occurred in treasury management. The implementation of the TSA system as part of 
the treasury’s function has resulted in the requirement for all local government units 
to report the bank accounts that are used in their operations to the Local Treasurer. 
Nevertheless, there was an instance where the lack of coordination and 
communication between spending units and the Financial Management Division, that 
managed the overall treasury function within West Lombok District, had caused a 
number of bank accounts used in the PFM operational process not to be recognised 
as West Lombok District’s official bank accounts (BPK 2013a). In a specific case, the 
Health Service had notified the Financial Management Division regarding the use of 
certain bank accounts for handling its health care services revenue. However, the 
Financial Management Division failed to include those bank accounts in the Regent 
Decree as official bank accounts of West Lombok District. As a result, the Bank was 
not aware that those accounts were used by a government institution and, hence, 
treated them as personal accounts, imposing tax on the interest incomes derived from 
those accounts. This condition does not comply with the provision stipulated in Law 
36/2008 regarding Income Tax. Article 2.3.b of Law 36/2008 specifically stipulates 
that government units, which are established by government’s rules and regulations, 
are financed by the government’s budget, report their income in the government’s 
budget and are subject to government auditing, are exempt from income taxes 
requirements. The response from the Head of the Financial Management Division, 
who was also one of the respondents of this study, regarding this non-compliance 
issue, was to point out that the focus of his staff on their own work had resulted in 
failure to maintain adequate coordination and communication with other units. He 
simply stated that “[…] maybe there was lack of coordination and communication. 
Each one of us was too busy with our own work and forgot to follow up on those 
things.” (R#09, Q#535). 
In another PFM operational area – the accounting and financial reporting process – 
the silo mentality has resulted in the perception among the spending units that the 
responsibility to maintain proper accounting practices and to prepare a fair financial 
statement is the responsibility of the accounting and financial management unit only. 
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 Most of the spending units focus on their technical responsibilities for delivering public 
goods and services and neglect their other responsibility to properly manage their 
financial affairs. The spending units are not aware that their silo mindset has created 
issues and problems in the Accounting and Reporting Division. Mistakes from 
spending units, such as slow reporting and frequent errors in their reports, most often 
are accumulative and culminate in the Accounting and Reporting Division (R#12, 
Q#544) threatening the overall quality of West Lombok District’s financial 
statements40. 
A similar silo attitude among the employees in the Accounting and Reporting Division 
has further complicated the problems. Instead of collaborating and coordinating with 
other units to formulate solutions to overcome these problems and to improve the 
overall process of accounting and financial reporting, staff in the Accounting and 
Reporting Division defend their unit and explicitly blame other units for causing the 
problems. The Head of the Accounting and Reporting Division displays this silo 
mentality by commenting that “[…] accounting is only responsible for recording the 
transactions based on the evidence we receive. The validity of the evidence is the 
responsibility of the spending units.” (R#13, Q#546). She also pointed out that the 
treasurer in each spending unit is the other party who should be responsible for any 
inaccurate, inadequate and inappropriate financial transaction evidence. She 
mentioned that:  
“The key is the treasurer. He must accurately administer his financial 
transactions. Accounting only receives the transactional evidence. [It is the] 
treasurer who does the examination to ensure the validity of the transaction and 
the completeness of the documentation.” (R#14, Q#547) 
The institutional arrangement of asset management, which is quite similar to that of 
accounting and financial reporting, also displays a similar silo effect problem. The 
failure to create and maintain a comprehensive and reliable asset database at the 
district level has been caused by the attitudes of the spending units that do not 
consider asset management to be one of their responsibilities. Separation of functions 
under the division of labour concept has fragmented the understanding of the 
employees at the spending units regarding asset management. They put more focus 
on their public service duties and leave the responsibility of asset management to the 
Office of Local Assets. As a result, spending units have failed to prepare timely, 
complete and accurate periodical reports regarding assets in their possession, 
40  See Table 6-3 for the quality of West Lombok District’s financial statements, as represented by BPK’s 
audit opinions during the period of this study. 
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 including updating of the assets database (R#40, Q#548). Staff members at the Office 
of Local Assets have viewed this situation, the lack of timely, complete and accurate 
assets databases within each spending unit, as a limitation that hinder them to 
perform their roles optimally for overseeing the overall asset management in West 
Lombok District (R#40, Q#548). Such a limitation has generated reluctance among 
the staff at the Office of Local Assets to be more active in collaborating with the 
spending units to ensure that the organisational objective in asset management, 
which is to provide and maintain a proper assets database for the whole district, is 
achieved. 
The cases which have been discussed in this section have illustrated the outcomes 
of a silo mentality, one of the dysfunctions commonly found as a result of horizontal 
division of labour within a bureaucracy, in the emergence of various PFM operational 
problems in West Lombok District, especially in cash planning and disbursement, 
accounting and reporting, and asset management. 
8.2.3. High Workload 
Another source of non-compliance in PFM operations that has emerged in this study 
comes from the flawed design of the division of labour in West Lombok District to 
optimally distribute the workloads to each unit and each employee. It has created an 
imbalanced distribution of workload whereby employees in one unit may have more 
work than employees in another unit. Employees who have a low workload may have 
plenty of time to be meticulous and cautious when carrying out their duties. Other 
employees view the low workload as an advantage because it provides an opportunity 
for them to have side jobs outside their official duties as public servants. One of the 
respondents who worked in the Parks and City Interiors Service mentioned, “I could 
not just sit here at the office doing nothing. It is not useful for me to just stay here.” 
(R#28, Q#239). As a result, he often left the office during office hours, usually from 
11 am to 1:30 pm, to perform his side job (R#28, Q#239). 
On the other hand, employees at the Public Works Service who are supervisors of 
construction projects often have an enormous workload. They have a main 
responsibility to ensure the quality and quantity of construction works. They must 
closely monitor the projects to avoid any deviation from the plans. They also need to 
further examine the construction works to ensure that the efficiency and technical 
specifications of the project are being met in accordance with the contracts. In sum, 
they have to monitor the overall progress of the projects. These already overwhelming 
responsibilities of construction project supervisors are further exacerbated by the 
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 common practice of assigning more than one construction project to each supervisor. 
One of the respondents who was also a member of the procurement committee 
mentioned that “often, a supervisor has a lot of construction projects to monitor. He 
couldn't focus on monitoring [all] the projects, causing delay in the completion of a 
project.” (R#38, Q#558). 
The assignment of monitoring more than one construction project to a supervisor is 
not without a valid reason. A scarcity in the number of employees who have adequate 
and valid certification to fulfil the role of a construction project supervisor has hindered 
the District in assigning those responsibilities to other employees. As a result, it is 
quite common for an official in the Public Works Service to have multiple positions. 
One respondent who was a section head in the Public Work Service highlighted this 
common practice by stating: 
“Honestly, I feel overwhelmed with the workload here. I am working as a 
planner, a supervisor, and I am also involved in the procurement committee. I 
am assigned in the procurement committee through a Regent Decree that 
stated my additional role within the procurement service unit.” (R#47, Q#566) 
Hence, it is clear that a heavy workload has hindered the employees from properly 
executing their roles and duties under the division of labour arrangement. Discussion 
in the previous paragraph has shown that when construction project supervisors are 
assigned monitoring tasks beyond their normal capacity, the quality of work is often 
diminished. In this specific instance, the substandard monitoring work has resulted in 
delay in project completion. 
Another factor that emerges from the analysis of the responses from respondents who 
worked in the Public Works Service shows the reluctance of supervisors to control 
and oversee their staff’s project mintoring tasks. A comment from a respondent who 
held an echelon III position and served as a division head in the Public Works Service 
stated that he was reluctant to oversee the works of the construction project’s 
supervisor. He mentioned that such reluctance had contributed to the frequent volume 
shortage problems in construction projects. Specific to this instance, he mentioned 
that: 
“Technically, audit findings regarding volume shortage were usually committed 
by the contractor. Nevertheless, the auditor always warned us and accused us 
with lack of supervision. In reply, I honestly argued that I didn't closely rebuke 
my subordinate because their workload had been overloaded with fieldwork 
supervision work here and there.” (R#48, Q#561) 
He further confirmed that the PFM operational problems in construction projects were 
mostly caused by the intense and demanding workload. He specified that “[…] based 
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 on what I have seen and what I have felt so far, I admit that the drawbacks [in 
construction projects] are because there are too many things to be monitored.” (R#48, 
Q#562). 
A similar scenario where a high volume of workload may diminish the effectiveness 
of division of labour within a bureaucratic organisation is also displayed in another 
component of PFM operations in West Lombok District. It is in the disbursement 
process, especially regarding the roles of the treasury section in the verification 
process of payment requests. An increase in the volume of payment requests may go 
beyond the normal capacity of the employees to perform the proper verification 
procedures. In that situation, mistakes and errors may occur unknowingly. A 
respondent who worked as the Head of the Treasury Section within the DPPKD 
admitted the failure of his staff to properly verify the payment orders. He mentioned 
that: 
“[...] probably because there were a lot of documents to be reviewed and 
verified, they forgot. [...] Often, when we prepared and were about to submit the 
payment orders for approval, we thought they were all correct. But when we did 
request the final approval from the general treasurer, the payment orders were 
returned back to us because they were still some mistakes found”.” (R#9, 
Q#569) 
He also mentioned that mistakes may already have been made during the preparation 
of the payment requests by the spending units (R#9, Q#570). Those mistakes and 
errors are then accumulated within the treasury section. That creates pressure for the 
treasury staff because they need to rectify the errors while, at the same time, they are 
also required to complete the verification process as soon as possible. As a result, in 
the condition where there is a heavy volume of payment transactions, tiredness and 
fatigue among the verification staff in the treasury section may result in other errors 
and mistakes. In one of his comments regarding the issuance of warrants for 
disbursement of funds, he further illustrated how difficult it was for his staff to carry 
out a flawless verification process when there is a high volume of transactions. 
“It is stated that the warrant disbursement must be issued within 2x24 hour [after 
a complete payment order submission]. But, was it possible? The 
documentation is thick and a lot. Yesterday, we had 17 payment order 
submissions from the Public Works Department in just one single day. All of 
them should be verified and examined within one day”. (R#09, Q#571) 
The above cases of construction projects and disbursement processes show the 
importance of considering the workload and volume of transactions being allocated to 
the individual members of a bureaucracy within certain divisions of labour 
arrangements. In other words, an optimum balance between the division of labour 
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 arrangements and the human resources allocated to carry out the roles and functions 
attached to those arrangements is required to ensure the functionality and 
effectiveness of division of labour within any bureaucratic organisation. The failure to 
establish such optimum balance contributes to the dysfunctional division of labour 
that, among other things, can lead to a number of problems including non-compliance, 
as has been shown in the above-mentioned cases. 
Other than the dysfunctional division of labour arrangements, this study also revealed 
a case where West Lombok District introduced an adjustment to its organisational 
structure to accommodate the increasing workload and volume of transactions in one 
of its PFM operational components, namely asset management. A lack of asset 
safeguarding in the form of missing assets, an inaccurate asset database, the 
absence of adequate legal ownership documentation and inadequate asset 
transactional recording had been identified as one of the major non-compliance 
problems in West Lombok District. Concerns about the importance of asset 
management and wide coverage of the efforts to enhance asset management 
triggered a major institutional and structural change in West Lombok District. In 
addition, a substantial number of audit findings regarding asset management that had 
been disclosed in BPK’s audit reports were required to be addressed and followed up 
appropriately. This situation further increased the volume of work that needed to be 
handled by asset management. 
The structural change that was implemented in 2012 represented an adjustment to 
the division of labour arrangements for asset management in West Lombok District. 
Before 2012, asset management throughout West Lombok District was under the 
authority of DPPKD. A division within the DPPKD was established to carry out the 
overall asset management functions in West Lombok District (Pemkab Lombok Barat 
2008b). However, that arrangement seemed not to be working properly. The inclusion 
of a local assets division within the DPPKD, which had other important roles, was not 
effective for overseeing asset management for all local government units. The 
respondent who held a position as a section head in the current Office of Local Assets 
specified this inadequate institutional arrangement in the division of labour for asset 
management as one of the reasons that had contributed to a number of audit findings 
in asset management. She mentioned that: 
“[…] it was because of the institutional arrangement. Previously, assets were 
managed by a small unit within the DPPKD, which also had other more 
important roles than only managing the assets. As a result, they couldn't focus 
on asset management, causing a number of problems in asset management.” 
(R#40, Q#559) 
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 To enhance its asset management functions, in 2012, West Lombok District 
reorganised its organisational structure. A new independent unit, the Office of Local 
Assets, was established to anticipate the increasing workload in asset management 
functions (R#40, Q#572). Instead of being responsible to other agencies or services, 
the new independent office was directly responsible to the Regent even though, 
administratively, the new office is under the authority of the District Secretariat 
(Pemkab Lombok Barat 2011). This new arrangement has resulted in improvements 
in asset management in West Lombok District. A staff member in the Health Service 
who was responsible for administering local assets within the Health Service has 
confirmed this progress and mentioned that the improved management of assets has 
enabled West Lombok District to attain an unqualified external auditor opinion in 2015. 
Specifically, he stated that: 
“[…] asset management was previously not well organised. West Lombok 
District only started to have awareness to improve their asset management in 
2012 when we established a new Office of Local Assets. And finally we could 
get an unqualified audit opinion for the first time this year (i.e. 2015). Now we 
have begun to improve the governance of our asset management.” (R#44, 
Q#793) 
Findings in this study in relation to the improvement of asset management in West 
Lombok District highlight the necessity to examine and adjust the division of labour 
arrangements continuously. Failure to accommodate changes in the processing of 
financial transactions within the optimum division of labour arrangements may risk the 
overall effectiveness of division of labour within a bureaucracy. Hence, it can be 
concluded that division of labour does not need to be implemented in a rigid manner. 
However, as the division of labour within a bureaucracy is established through the 
legal instrument of its rules, its flexibility would depend on how the bureaucracy can 
effectively anticipate any changes in its operations and accommodate those changes 
into its rules and regulations in a timely manner.  
8.3. Failure to Develop Expertise 
A derivative feature of bureaucracy from the division of labour principle is the 
development of expertise among the individual members of the bureaucracy. 
Expertise, in terms of both the ability to perform functional responsibilities and 
knowledge about the rules that govern the overall operation of a bureaucratic 
organisation, would contribute to the effective performance of a member’s duties 
(Blau and Meyer 1987) thereby assisting in achievement of the organisation’s goals. 
Nevertheless, even though the separation of employees through departmentalisation 
aims to establish specialisations and develop expertise, it does not automatically 
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 result in the attainment of the intended objectives. In addition to division of labour 
arrangements, the establishment of expertise among the employees also requires 
proper human resources and personnel management policies. Failure to effectively 
implement those policies may impair the division of labour arrangement in its 
development and establishment of employees’ expertise. 
BPK’s audit reports on West Lombok District’s financial statements have disclosed a 
number of issues pertaining to the inadequacy of the human resources management 
policies in West Lombok District. The audit reports revealed that the placement of 
personnel across various PFM operational processes, from budgeting to financial 
reporting, was not adequate. Personnel in the Accounting and Reporting Division, for 
example, had limitations in terms of their capabilities and competencies to exercise 
their roles properly, engendering challenges for West Lombok District in its efforts to 
establish sound financial administration functions (BPK 2014b). West Lombok District 
also had not prepared extensive descriptions regarding the skills and competency 
requirements for any positions across its various PFM operational processes (BPK 
2013a). The absence of descriptive requirements of employees’ skills and 
competencies to carry out certain PFM operational functions indicated a drawback in 
the procedures for employees’ placement, rotation and promotion because there was 
no adequate evidence that an employee had been placed in a job position that 
matched his/her expertise and knowledge (BPK 2013a). Most treasurers, who were 
responsible for revenue collection, budget disbursement and asset management did 
not have proper understanding pertaining to their main duties, roles and 
responsibilities as treasurers (BPK 2013a). In general, BPK had highlighted the failure 
of West Lombok District to maintain proper human resource management policies 
and practices, including the lack of clear procedures on employees’ recruitment, 
training, promotion, rotation and payroll, and noted the absence of periodical review 
of employees’ performances (BPK 2013a). 
BPK’s assessment discussed in the previous paragraph shows that one of the 
prominent features of bureaucracy, which is the actualisation of expertise among its 
members, was at risk and potentially not well-established in the PFM operational 
processes of West Lombok District. Responses from the respondents of this study 
further confirmed the lack of human resource management policies and practices in 
West Lombok District for ensuring the capability, skills and competencies of those 
who were involved in the PFM operational processes and were responsible for them. 
The following sections discuss a number of themes that emerged from the interviews 
with respondents of this study and highlight the failure of West Lombok District to 
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 ascertain whether the expertise and competency levels of its PFM actors matched 
their roles in the PFM operational processes. 
8.3.1. Inappropriate Employee Placement Policies 
A number of respondents of this study found that they were placed in roles that 
prevented them from optimally contributing to the overall performance of local 
government. The genuine public interest motives of public employees do not 
necessarily result in the fulfilment of public needs if they are not placed in the positions 
and jobs that match their competencies. An echelon III in the Parks and City Interiors 
Service describes this circumstance by mentioning: 
“So my motivation is to build West Lombok: to improve people's welfare. 
Unfortunately, often we are placed in the position where we couldn't make an 
optimal contribution because it doesn't match our capability and educational 
background.” (R#30, Q#392) 
Employee placement practices in West Lombok District have been associated with a 
failure to consider the employees’ competencies, such as their educational 
background. A section head in the Investment and Licensing Agency highlighted this 
situation and expressed his personal opinion that factors other than human resources-
related matters have been dominating the decisions made by West Lombok District 
in regard to its employee placement policies. He mentioned that: 
“It can be said that staff competency is not considered as the main factor for 
employees’ placement decisions. Maybe, it is only considered about 30% [of 
the time]; the other 70% are from other factors outside human resources 
matters. As a result, a lot of staff placements are not in accordance with their 
educational backgrounds.” (R#17, Q#759) 
He further mentions that it is essential for the District to consider educational 
background as the main factor for decisions regarding placement and rotation of 
employees. Such considerations may create a positive correlation between the 
employees’ performances in their working units and the establishment of expertise in 
all local government units. From the perspective of a head of a local government unit, 
it is also important to ensure that every position in the unit is filled by a competent 
individual. The Head of Financial Management Division within the DPPKD, for 
example, urged that the “financial management functions cannot be filled by just any 
person because it requires certain skill and competency”. (R#02, Q#756). A section 
head in the DPPKD also raised his concern that failure to match the educational 
background of the employees with their roles in the unit may hinder the overall 
performance of the unit. Further, he mentioned that employees without relevant 
educational backgrounds may require more time to understand the nature of their jobs 
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 before they could properly carry out their roles and contribute to the overall 
performance of the organisation. He specifically addressed this issue by stating that 
“sometimes a new employee is placed here, but he doesn't have a financial education 
background. He must learn hard [before he can perform]. It certainly has an impact 
on ur performance.” (R#8, Q#757). 
With regard to the findings reported in BPK’s audit report, the absence of a clear 
employee placement policy being implemented in West Lombok District seems to 
have resulted in the omission of staff competency, including educational background, 
being one of the major factors that have to be considered by the District as part of its 
employee placement decisions. In addition to the incongruity of employees’ 
educational backgrounds in respect to their roles and responsibilities in the workplace, 
a division head in the Parks and City Interiors Service also blamed the personnel 
policy of West Lombok District, especially after the implementation of the 
decentralisation policy that tended to lead to more frequent employee rotation, 
thereby hindering the formation of expertise among the employees. He clearly stated 
that: 
“It was difficult for us and other people to understand and carry out our jobs 
within a short period of time. Since the implementation of regional autonomy, I 
found that employees' rotations were almost routinely carried out every year. 
We didn't have enough time to learn and master our new roles because we were 
transferred again to different positions. It has constrained us.” (R#30, Q#753) 
More frequent employee rotations do have a negative impact on the ability of the 
employees to develop their knowledge, skills and expertise for exercising their duties 
in an effective and efficient manner and in compliance with relevant rules and 
regulations. A division head in the Education and Cultural Service asserted that at 
least one year of working time in a certain position is required to gain sufficient 
knowledge and understanding of how to properly carry out the duties attached to that 
position (R#26, Q#752). Meanwhile, based on his experience, a section head in the 
Parks and City Interiors Service believed that even one year was not adequate to 
master a certain job. He mentioned that “only after three years here, I feel that I can 
work properly and begin to understand and follow the rules here.” (R#31, Q#776). 
The effort to maintain the expertise level of each employee under the current condition 
where frequent employee rotations are taking place is also exacerbated by the 
absence of an adequate knowledge transfer process between the former and the new 
employee. A section head in the DPPKD raised this argument as one of the reasons 
for a number of audit findings reported in local tax management. He mentioned that: 
204 
 “In the past, other than missing documentation and data, the problems in the 
management of local taxes were also caused by staff rotation. For example, the 
staff who managed [tax] receivable was transferred to another unit. Ideally, 
there should be a proper knowledge transfer process when we have a staff 
rotation. Unfortunately, staff usually only pay attention to their own 
responsibilities when they are transferred. They don’t care about the needs of 
their successors who require preliminary information that can help them to 
understand their duties promptly. Commonly, they only leave their files and 
documents [without transferring their knowledge on how to properly manage the 
jobs] to their successors.” (R#7, Q#768) 
8.3.2. Lack of Appropriate Promotion System 
The lack of proper employee placement practices in West Lombok District seems to 
also include practices in relation to decision about employees’ promotion. In this 
study, the presence of a patronage system of promotion has been mentioned by the 
respondents, despite the implementation of a merit-based promotion system 
according to the formal human resources policies 41 . Mueller (2009) argues that 
expertise, as one of the basic characteristics of bureaucracy, refers to establishment 
of a meritocracy system in the civil service and it has been commonly linked to the 
establishment of efficiency within the organisation. Nevertheless, in actual practice, a 
patronage system whereby the allocation of positions in the bureaucracy is based on 
political influences also exists and hinders the establishment of competent civil 
servants (Huber and Ting 2016). Mueller (2009, 1) specifically mentions that 
“patronage-based bureaucrats typically lack the skills, experience and especially the 
incentives to produce public goods”. 
One respondent who worked as a section head in the Parks and City Interiors Service 
indicated the presence of patronage practices in relation to employees’ promotion 
decisions by commenting that “[…] sometimes promotion involves politics. It has 
become a phenomenon in every local government as an implication of the 
implementation of regional autonomy. I think everywhere is also like that.” (R#35, 
Q#936). A staff member in the Education and Cultural Service who had been working 
for thirteen years and was expecting promotion to an echelon IV position also 
expressed her disappointment. She restated and emphasised a comment from one 
of the senior officials in West Lombok District who mentioned that employees who did 
41  Law No. 43 Year 1999 regarding Civil Service General Provision stipulates the implementation of a 
merit-based human resources management policy. It mentions that the appointment of a civil servant 
to a position should be made based on the principle of professionalism in accordance with the 
applicant’s competence, performance and seniority as well as other objective considerations. In 
addition, it also states that to ensure objectivity, employees’ promotions should be decided based on 
the appraisal of their performances at work. The adoption of the merit system has been further 
stipulated in Law No. 5 Year 2014 regarding Civil State Apparatus that replaces Law No. 43 Year 
1999. 
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 not have any political connection would find it impossible to get promotions in their 
careers (R#21, Q#933). Meanwhile, an echelon III officer in the Health Service stated 
that external intervention had made it more difficult for the District Personnel Board to 
implement a meritocracy system for employees’ promotion (R#45, Q#941). He further 
mentioned that “[…] politics have affected many personnel management policies 
including for career advancement and promotion. It diminishes the competencies of 
our officials and provides us [with] no assurance on our career here.” (R#45, Q#941). 
Another theme that was highlighted by the respondents, which challenges the 
implementation of a merit-based system for employees’ promotion, deals with the 
practice of nepotism. A section head in the Public Works Service discovered that her 
friend was promoted because he had a relative in the personnel board, despite the 
fact that he did not exhibit outstanding performance (R#47, Q#948). She also 
mentioned that one of her other friends was promoted because he had a very close 
relationship with her own superior, even though he did not perform well at work. An 
echelon III in the Health Service also highlighted a similar issue by stating, “It’s not 
what I want, but the general situation here is whoever is close to the boss, they can 
get a promotion.” (R#46, Q#945). 
Despite the presence of patronage and nepotism in employee promotion practices, 
respondents in this study also specified instances where the District had made 
employees’ promotion decisions based on merit, even though it was not applied 
consistently and uniformly (R#21, Q#933). An echelon III in the District Secretariat 
mentioned that “there are still one or two occasions where people are promoted 
because of political or personal factors. But nowadays employees who perform well 
will certainly have a good career.” (R#39, Q#939). This situation shows that there is 
a growing concern about an individual’s capacity in formulating employee promotion 
policies in West Lombok District (R#47, Q#948). 
8.3.3. Problems in Training Activities 
Other than the dissemination of PFM rules and regulations, which has been discussed 
in the previous section as part of the effort to ensure effectiveness of rules, training 
has also been utilised by West Lombok District as one of the human resource 
management practices. Training activities are adopted to empower PFM actors with 
knowledge, skills and competencies that are relevant for exercising their roles and 
functions in accordance with the requirements stipulated in relevant PFM rules and 
regulations. This study revealed that respondents who carried out local tax collection 
processes felt the positive contribution of training in improving their skills and 
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 capabilities. Their participation in a number of training activities assisted them to gain 
proper understanding about the relevant rules and improved their competencies to 
better exercise their roles. However, the benefits of training activities were not evenly 
shared across all local government units in West Lombok District. Constraints in 
budget allocations for training activities have inhibited equal distribution and 
effectiveness of training activities in other PFM operational components. A section 
head in the Investment and Licensing Agency highlighted this situation by 
commenting: 
“Frankly, we hope that local government could at least provide training to 
support us for carrying out our roles. [However], in my opinion, local government 
only pays a little attention. They do not allocate a budget for training even though 
it is important to support our work.” (R#17, Q#827 and Q#847) 
From the perspective of lower level employees, the subject matters covered in training 
sessions sometimes do not match with their actual needs. They feel that training 
courses are not sufficient to equip them with adequate knowledge and skills because 
they may cover a very general and broad topic or, in other case, they may be too 
technical. A staff member in the DPPKD was disappointed with the general topic 
covered in her training and asked for more time to be spent on training activities to 
ensure they covered more detailed topics relevant to specific roles and duties. She 
mentioned, “We did get training, but the training was insufficient because it was only 
for one week. It would be better if training can be provided more frequently with more 
time allocated to the training so it can be very detailed”. (R#04, Q#840). 
In another case, in the specific area of the accounting and financial reporting process, 
training mostly covered only a very technical detail of SIMDA and failed to empower 
the PFM actors or provide them with the appropriate skills and knowledge to better 
exercise their overall roles and functions. A treasurer in the DPPKD mentioned this 
limitation by stating that “there was training on how to use SIMDA, but [it was] only 
limited to the technical application of SIMDA, not specific training about, for example, 
treasurers' roles and duties.” (R#20, Q#848). 
Problems in the provision of training also exist in the leadership skill training of 
structural level officials or those who hold echelon positions within the hierarchy. An 
echelon IV officer who served as a section head in the Public Works Service admitted 
that she had not attended the level 4 leadership training that is required for all echelon 
IV officials. She further mentioned that “there are also a number of other echelon level 
officers in West Lombok District who have not attended the leadership training 
relevant to their echelon level positions.” (R#47, Q#803). In her opinion, the District 
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 Personnel Board lacked attention to the importance of leadership skills. The Board 
failed to arrange and carry out leadership training for those who had the potential to 
occupy echelon positions within the organisation. As a result, structural officials were 
struggling to perform their leadership roles. 
For example, the leadership roles of echelon IV officers that should empower their 
staff to carry out their functions are being spoiled by their reluctance to delegate the 
work to their subordinates. An echelon IV officer in the Public Works Service further 
expressed her difficulty in performing her leadership role to improve the capabilities 
of her subordinates. She preferred to complete tasks by herself and was reluctant to 
delegate the jobs to her subordinates (R#47, Q#805). She felt that she had not 
provided adequate supervision and feedback to her subordinates for them to improve 
their performances (R#47, Q#806). It can be assumed that the District had not 
provided her with the adequate leadership skills to carry out her leadership functions 
within the organisation as an echelon IV officer.  
Similar to the dissemination of rules, in general, training activities in West Lombok 
District also suffer from the PFM actors’ self-interested motives that led to their 
ignorant behaviour of not having commitment to improve their own skills, knowledge 
and competencies. The Head of the Accounting and Reporting Division owned a 
personal belief that one of the shortcomings hindering the development of expertise 
among employees in West Lombok District was their unwillingness to learn. A section 
head in the DPPKD supported this belief by commenting, “I feel that the awareness 
and willingness of my colleagues in spending units to improve their knowledge and 
skills are still lacking. Motivation among my colleagues for that is almost none.” (R#13, 
Q#845). 
8.3.4. Lack of Work Facilities 
Other than the inherent characteristics of individual employees, the establishment of 
expertise among public employees to efficiently and effectively carry out their roles 
and functions within the organisation is also influenced by external factors in their 
work facilities. In this study, some respondents found that inadequate office facilities 
had inhibited them from properly carrying out their duties. In the preparation of 
financial statements, a staff member in the Accounting and Reporting Division 
complained that the unreliability of the internet connection in his office, and the 
obsolete computer and laptop specifications, had prevented him from preparing a 
timely financial report (R#12, Q#667). A treasurer in the Investment and Licensing 
Agency also complained about the lack of storage facilities for document archiving, 
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 which resulted in problems of missing transactional evidence (R#16, Q#668). In 
general, lack of facilities of work was confirmed by a comment from a section head at 
the Office of Local Assets who stated:  
“There are complaints about the facilities at work. There are differences in work 
facilities from one unit to another. We haven't analysed this issue yet, but 
several units have complained about their work facilities. There are gaps 
between the employees’ duties and the availability and quality of the work 
facilities for supporting their roles. From their reports, therefore, we can 
conclude that a lot of units do not have adequate work facilities that meet the 
[required] standard.” (R#40, Q#673 and Q#674) 
In another PFM operational area, local revenue collection processes, the Parks and 
City Interiors Service was struggling to achieve its local revenue target from waste 
management activities due to the limitations of its facilities for waste collection. A staff 
member in the Parks and City Interiors Service stated that they did not have adequate 
garbage trucks for waste collection (R#34, Q#671). The trucks were old and, in terms 
of quantity, were not enough to collect the increasing volume of rubbish across West 
Lombok. Complaints were frequently received from communities stating their 
disappointment in regard to delays in waste collection. In most cases, lack of facilities 
for waste management had diminished the quality of waste collection activities, 
resulting in reluctance by community members to pay the waste management levies 
and, thereby, causing difficulty in achieving the revenue target for waste 
management. To overcome this issue, he further mentioned that: 
“We have to improve our facilties so that we can achieve our target. The 
quantities of [garbage] trucks and levy collectors should be increased. That's 
all. Because the main problem is in our resources: the equipment and the 
human resources.” (R#34, Q#672) 
8.4. External Parties and Non-Compliance 
Other than the public employees’ dispositions (as discussed in Chapter 7) and the 
bureaucratic environment in which the PFM operates (as discussed in the previous 
sections of this chapter), from the perspective of the PFM actors, there are also 
situations where the behaviours and the characteristics of other parties external to the 
organisation could instigate the emergence of non-compliance problems. In this 
study, some respondents mentioned the influences of local parliament members, 
contractors, suppliers and NGOs upon a number of non-compliance problems that 
had occurred in West Lombok District’s PFM operations. 
While the local parliament members are not necessarily involved in the operational 
components of PFM, they do have significant and very important roles to play in the 
budget preparation process. The PFM legal framework stipulates the requirement for 
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 ongoing discussion and consultation between the local government and the local 
parliament (GoI 2005). This discussion and consultation results in general provisions 
for the preparation of the local government’s annual budget, including the selection of 
priority programs and the ceiling of the budget. At the end of the budget preparation 
process, the annual budget proposed by local government must be approved by the 
local parliament. Following the approval of the annual budget, the local government 
prepares a budget execution document for each spending unit that details the 
allocation of the spending unit’s budget to a number of programs and activities. One 
of the respondents in this study, an echelon III in the Investment and Licensing 
Agency, mentioned an occasion where a member of local parliament had pressured 
the agency to accommodate his request during the preparation of the budget 
execution document. Regarding this occasion, he stated: 
“There were pressures that really disturbed me that came from the local 
Member of Parliament. We had tried to listen and honour them, but often we 
faced a difficult situation where they asked us to include this or that [into the 
budget], which quite often triggered a conflict […]”. (R#25, Q#1023) 
In the end, the reluctance of the agency to accommodate such requests often resulted 
in delays in the authorisation of budget execution documents, preventing the agency 
from promptly implementing its programs and activities. 
In construction works, non-compliance problems could also be triggered by the 
incompetence of external contractors. A section head in the Public Works Service 
revealed the fraudulent practices of some contractors when they participate in the 
procurement process of construction works. The emphasis of the current procurement 
procedures upon the administrative requirements has provided an opportunity for the 
contractors to manipulate their documentation to increase their chances of being 
awarded the contracts. She mentioned that: 
Often, we already follow the procurement procedures according to the 
regulations. We first evaluate the administrative requirement, before we 
evaluate the technical aspect and the bid price. Thus, bid price is the last item 
to be evaluated. There are some "ingenious" contractors who try to exploit the 
sequence of evaluation by preparing their best documentation on their bid 
proposal. I heard that they even hire a professional consultant to prepare the 
proposal. They exaggerate the administrative and technical aspects of their 
proposal and then slash their bid price by twenty to thirty percent [to increase 
their chance to win the contract].” (R#47, Q#1034) 
Another respondent, who worked as a member of a procurement committee in the 
Education and Cultural Service and had extensive experience in supervising various 
construction projects throughout his 30-year career in West Lombok District, provided 
an example where the selected contractors did not have the financial competency to 
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 carry out the construction project effectively, efficiently and timely manner. He 
commented that: 
“[...] there are a number of contractors that are actually not bona fide. They only 
start the work once they receive the contract’s advance payment. Upon signing 
the contract, they would get a maximum 30 percent of advance payment. Even 
so, after they receive the advance payment, they still borrow money from the 
bank to get additional working capital to start the works. They pledge the 
contract document to the bank as the loan collateral. Thus, I think they should 
have adequate working capital to start the construction works. Nonetheless, 
after we issue the [instruction] letter to start the work, they still delay the start of 
their activities.” (R#38, Q#1033) 
The situation that has been described above displays the financial incapability of the 
contractors to be able to carry out the construction works properly. Along with a lack 
of monitoring activities due to the heavy workload among the construction project 
supervisors, as has been discussed in Section 8.2.3, the appointment of incompetent 
contractors as a result of an ineffective procurement system has a higher probability 
for triggering non-compliance problems such as delays in project completion, 
substandard quality of works and shortages in the volume of the completed works. 
From the Education and Cultural Service, the head of the finance section mentioned 
that “delay in project completion was mainly due to the incompetent contractors that 
could not finish the project on time.” (R#23, Q#1029). 
Interestingly, there was also an instance where the commencement of a construction 
project did not comply with the schedule already stipulated in the contract and had to 
be delayed because of intimidation from an individual on behalf of a so-called NGO 
that had requested money from the contractors to start work. A section head in the 
Education and Cultural Service raised this example by commenting: 
“[…] there are individuals from NGOs who are trying to get money for 
themselves. Often, when the project is about to start, they blackmail the 
contractor. They are asking for money. If they don’t give them the money, they 
don't allow them to work. The contractor is also afraid of being fined by us 
because of not working for a day, so they finally gave some money to them. 
Yes, there is pressure from the NGOs and it is a pity for the contractor.” (R#38, 
Q#1012) 
8.5. Chapter Summary 
This chapter has highlighted many shortcomings in the bureaucratic structures of 
PFM operations in West Lombok District. It has also explored and discussed the 
perspectives of the PFM actors in West Lombok District on how those shortcomings 
have allowed the occurrence of non-compliant behaviours among them. In addition, 
examples of how specific shortcomings are linked to and influence the occurrence of 
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 certain systemic problems that have been identified in the PFM operations of West 
Lombok District have also been discussed and elaborated. 
The shortcomings exist in all the major bureaucratic structures. Rules that govern the 
PFM operations of West Lombok District still contain a number of undesired 
characteristics, such as contradictory, misinterpreted, and defective, that diminish 
their effectiveness within the organisation. Meanwhile, hierarchical arrangements 
failed to support the development of organisational loyalty. The division of labour has 
suffered from silo mentality and improper distribution of workloads. Another structure, 
the establishment of expertise, could not be established due to inappropriate human 
resources management and inadequate office facilities. These shortcomings have 
caused dysfunctional bureaucratic structures in PFM operations allowing the 
emergence of various non-compliance problems that have been identified in Chapter 
6. Other than shortcomings in bureaucratic structures, this chapter has also identified 
the roles of the other parties external to the organisation (i.e. members of local 
parliament, NGOs and contractors) in instigating non-compliance problems in the 
PFM operations. 
This chapter ends the presentation of the case study reports to examine factors that 
influence and trigger the PFM actors to commit non-compliant behaviour and actions 
in various PFM operational processes in West Lombok District. The following chapter, 
Chapter 9, present the overall summary and conclusion of this study. 
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 Chapter 9 
Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter presents a summary of the overall thesis. It demonstrates the logical 
sequence of the discussion and analyses that have been elaborated upon in the 
preceding chapters of the thesis. It includes a discussion regarding the overall findings 
and the implications of the findings in relation to the problems of non-compliance in 
PFM operations in Indonesia’s local governments. Contributions of the study to the 
theoretical discussion and the operational practices of PFM at the local government 
level in Indonesia, and in developing countries in general, as well as the limitations of 
this study are also presented before the concluding remarks that end the presentation 
of this thesis. 
This study has been driven by the concern for the effectiveness of the implementation 
of the recent major PFM reform in Indonesia. The reform was initiated in 2003 through 
the enactment of Law 17/2003 regarding State Finance. This law was then followed 
by two further laws, enacted in 2004, which were Law No. 1/2004 regarding State 
Treasury and Law No. 15/2004 regarding State Audit. Together, they compose the 
Trilogy of Financial Laws. Those laws set a new legal framework for PFM practices in 
Indonesia, which had not been changed since the independence of Indonesia in 1945. 
The enactment of these laws has invited a number of studies that aim to assess 
various aspects of the PFM reform in Indonesia. 
In general, this thesis assessed the implementation of Indonesia’s PFM legal 
framework following the PFM reform in 2004. It focused on assessment of the 
operational components of PFM that commence with the preparation of a budget 
execution document and conclude with the preparation and finalisation of the 
government’s financial report. The context of the PFM reform, which was established 
to also support the implementation of a decentralisation policy in Indonesia, has led 
to the scope of this study being at the local government level. This thesis, in particular, 
looked at the problems of non-compliance in the actual PFM operational practices 
within local governments. Emphasis on non-compliance was driven by the results of 
previous studies that have highlighted the impediments to attaining the PFM 
objectives despite the robust design of the PFM legal framework after the reform. 
The implementation of a regional autonomy policy and the recent PFM reform in 
Indonesia have established new arrangements for the PFM operational practices in 
local government. Under the new arrangements, most of the authority regarding 
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 financial management have been devolved from the central government to local 
governments. The devolution of financial management authorities has been equipped 
with proper separation of functions, roles and responsibilities among local government 
officials and units. The arrangement of financial management within PFM operations 
has also accommodated the principles of good governance, whereby the principles of 
unity, universality, annual budgeting and reporting, and allowance for specialty have 
been adopted in the budgeting and budget execution processes. Other important 
features of modern PFM principles, including professionalism, transparency, 
accountability, innovation and accommodation of specific local content, also have 
been adopted to support a sound and robust legal framework for PFM within 
Indonesia’s local governments. 
According to the current PFM legal framework, there are three main elements of local 
government PFM operations in Indonesia: (1) budget execution, (2) a financial 
accounting and reporting system, and (3) an internal control system. Budget 
execution commences with the preparation of budget execution documents. They 
provide a more detailed arrangements on how to properly carry out the major budget 
execution processes that include revenue collection, disbursement, procurement, 
financing, treasury and cash management, and asset management, in accordance 
with the approved local government budget. The financial accounting and reporting 
system has been improved through the requirement to prepare annual financial 
statements that enhance the accountability and transparency of the local 
governments’ financial management. The adoption of a modern government 
accounting standard that follows the accrual basis approach, along with the 
establishment of in-year monitoring by local parliament and post-auditing by an 
external and independent audit agency, further enhance the accountability and 
transparency of the local governments’ financial management. The internal control 
system sets preventive measures to guarantee that budget execution processes and 
financial accounting and reporting procedures are taking place in adherence to the 
provisions stipulated by the PFM regulatory framework, and that they align with the 
public sector goals of efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and accountability. 
These main elements have encompassed the typical PFM operations stipulated in the 
major PFM literature and technical references. 
Unfortunately, the sound and robust legal framework of PFM operations in local 
governments have not necessarily been manifested in the actual practices. BPK’s 
audit reports on local governments have disclosed a significant number of audit 
findings that display compliance gaps in the actual PFM operational practices. Those 
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 gaps represent the existence of non-compliance practices by the PFM actors in 
carrying out their duties in the PFM operations. 
9.1. Problems of Non-Compliance 
The first part of the findings of this study, presented in Chapter 5, discussed non-
compliance in Indonesia’s local government PFM operations. The discussion aimed 
to identify any systemic problems resulting from non-compliance. In this study, 
systemic problems have been defined as non-compliance problems that have 
occurred frequently within various components of PFM operations and that have 
hindered the attainment of the overall PFM objectives to establish efficiency, 
effectiveness, accountability and transparency in the PFM operations of local 
government. Content analysis of BPK’s audit reports was applied to address this 
research objective. The analysis covered all audit reports on local governments that 
were published by BPK’s regional offices throughout Indonesia between 2009 and 
2014. 
The general overview of BPK’s audit reports on local governments revealed that most 
local governments were still struggling to fulfil the requirements stipulated in the PFM 
legal framework. The percentage of local governments that could not finalise their 
financial statements within the specified timeline was quite high in the early years of 
the PFM reform. In addition, the quality of local governments’ financial management 
was disappointing. Most local governments had failed to attain “unqualified” opinions 
from BPK for their financial statements. Nevertheless, throughout the period of the 
study, the trend of delay in finalisation of the financial statements had been 
decreasing, while the trend in BPK’s favourable audit opinions on local government 
financial statements had been increasing. 
Despite the improvement in regard to the timeliness and the quality of financial 
statements, a more detailed analysis of BPK’s audit reports indicated unfavourable 
statistics regarding the compliance levels of many PFM operational practices with the 
PFM rules and regulations. Content analysis of 5,141 audit reports on local 
governments showed that a total of 104,903 audit findings had been reported during 
2009 to 2014, signifying a substantial number of non-compliance incidents in the 
actual practices of local government PFM operations. In general, audit findings 
represent compliance gaps that refer to the deviation of the actual behaviour of the 
PFM actors – the public employees who are involved in PFM operational processes 
– from the expected behaviours that are stipulated in PFM rules and regulations. The 
results of the content analysis of BPK’s audit reports further displayed that those non-
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 compliance practices have led to a number of systemic problems in various 
components of PFM operations. 
The internal control system component of the local governments’ PFM operations has 
been characterised by a lack of proper standards, procedures and guidelines of action 
for local government employees. It also has been characterised by a lack of planning, 
low performance, improper policy implementation, non-compliance with non-
financially related regulations, and budget misallocations, all of which have disrupted 
the role of the internal control system, which is to set preventive measures for 
ensuring the achievement of efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and 
accountability in local government PFM operations. 
In budget execution, local governments have been struggling to optimise their local 
revenue collection efforts. Uncollected revenue and delays in revenue collection 
processes have been reported as the most frequent audit finding items that were 
disclosed in BPK’s audit reports covered in this study. On the disbursement side, 
overpayments of expenses also have been reported frequently, contributing to 
inefficiencies in the management of local government budgets. Other systemic 
problems identified in the budget execution processes included: a lack of assets 
safeguarding, volume shortages in construction work, improper cash handling, 
fictitious activities, improper procurement processes and the direct use of revenue to 
fund operational expenses without proper allotment in the budget. Hence, it is 
plausible to conclude that those identified problems disaffirm the establishment of 
efficiency and effectiveness in overall local government operations. 
The other PFM objectives, to ensure the accountability and transparency of local 
government financial operations, has been hampered by a lack of adequate, complete 
and proper documentation of transactions, inaccurate transactional recordings, 
inappropriate financial reporting processes and inadequate financial information 
systems. These problems underline the weaknesses in the local government financial 
accounting system that have affected the ability of local governments to prepare fair 
financial statements according to the applicable accounting standard. 
9.2. Factors Leading to Non-Compliance 
In this study, further examination was undertaken to identify and analyse factors that 
influence the PFM actors to commit and be involved in non-compliant behaviour. 
Review of the literature suggested that PFM operates within the broader context of 
public sector management. Despite the recent global trend toward the NPM approach, 
which views that the public bureaucracy model in the public sector is dysfunctional 
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 and inefficient, and should be replaced with private sector practices, management 
within the public sector, especially in developing countries, has still been 
characterised by the traditional model of bureaucracy. 
Literature in the field of PFM has also shown that the adoption of an NPM-based PFM 
model does not eliminate the existence of the recognisable structural characteristics 
of bureaucracy (e.g. impersonality, division of labour and hierarchical structure) in the 
area of PFM, including in its operational components. The reliance on budget laws 
and other PFM rules and regulations to govern the PFM operational processes 
demonstrates the impersonal nature of PFM operations. In addition, the fragmentation 
of PFM operations into several components displays the presence of division of labour 
to establish specialisation and develop expertise. In the disbursement process, the 
several layers of hierarchical structure involved in the verification process for payment 
requests provide an example of the existence of a hierarchical delegation of authority. 
This thesis, therefore, has justifiable support from the literature to examine the 
problems of non-compliance in PFM operations by utilising the lens of public 
bureaucracy theory. 
Literature on the theory of public bureaucracy indicates that there are three major 
factors that influence the emergence of non-compliant behaviour among public 
employees: the individual dispositions of public employees, the structural 
characteristics of public bureaucracy itself and external environmental factors. The 
‘individual dispositions of public employees’  refers to the employees’ motives that 
drive their actual behaviour and actions in carrying out their duties within the public 
organisation. The ‘structural characteristics of bureaucracy’ relate to their tendency to 
become dysfunctional and influence the behaviour of the public employees. ‘External 
environmental factors’ refers to the social contexts of politics, technology, economy, 
law, demography, ecology, and culture that have impacts upon the behaviour of the 
public employees. 
Derived from the first two major factors of non-compliance from the viewpoint of public 
bureaucracy theory (i.e. the public employees’ motives and the dysfunctional 
bureaucratic structures), the second part of the findings of this study (Chapters 6, 7 
and 8) further elaborated upon both factors in the specific context of local government 
PFM operations in Indonesia. A single case study method has been utilised to gain 
the perspectives of PFM actors regarding the influences of those factors upon their 
decisions to commit and be involved in any non-compliant behaviour. The case study 
was conducted in West Lombok District, which is a typical local government in 
Indonesia in terms of its PFM operational characteristics. The study utilised content 
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 analysis of BPK’s audit reports and FGD with BPK’s auditors, presented in Chapter 
6, to gain an understanding of the nature of non-compliance problems in West 
Lombok District’s PFM operations. Further, the case study also utilised interviews with 
PFM actors in various components of West Lombok District’s PFM operations to gain 
their perspectives on how the employees’ motives (presented in Chapter 7) and 
bureaucratic structures (presented in Chapter 8) influence non-compliant behaviour 
of the PFM actors. 
9.2.1. PFM Actors’ Motives 
From the interviews with the PFM actors in West Lombok District, it was found that 
their motives in joining the public sector and carrying out their duties were varied, 
ranging from simple financially-related, self-interested motives to more community 
service-oriented, public-interested motives. This finding has exemplified that a mixture 
of motives can influence the behaviour of people who work in public bureaucracies. 
In relation to the examination of the non-compliant behaviours of PFM actors that led 
to the emergence of a number of PFM operational problems in West Lombok District, 
the findings provided illustrations of how both self-interested and public-interested 
motives can facilitate PFM actors to commit non-compliant acts and contribute to PFM 
operational problems. 
Further analysis of the results of interviews with the PFM actors in West Lombok 
District revealed that failure to establish proper institutional arrangements, especially 
for its lower-level employees, has allowed non-compliant behaviours to occur among 
them. Lack of financial compensation and a reward system has encouraged 
employees to pursue their own self-interested motives in order to maximise their 
monetary incomes by having side jobs and by obtaining loans from banks, which 
eventually led to disruption of their performance in carrying out their duties. In other 
instances, these self-interested motives caused some PFM actors to remain ignorant 
in the workplace, weakening their ability to carry out their duties according to the 
provisions stipulated in the rules and regulations. Other than the lack of a financial 
compensation and reward system, this thesis also found that, from the interviewees’ 
perspectives, proper control and monitoring, especially from immediate superiors, 
could prevent them from becoming involved in non-compliant behaviours. In addition 
to the above, rules and regulations that do not support the provision of more effective, 
efficient and timely public services have also influenced the employees, particularly 
those who possess public-interested motives, to break the rules and be involved in 
non-compliant practices. 
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 9.2.2. Bureaucratic Structures 
In regard to the bureaucratic structures of PFM operations in West Lombok District, 
this thesis has identified many shortcomings that exist in all the major bureaucratic 
structures: rules, division of labour, hierarchy and expertise. Firstly, at the 
implementation level, rules and regulations that govern the PFM operations of West 
Lombok District still contain a number of undesired characteristics that diminish their 
effectiveness within the organisation. According to Green Tape Theory (De-Hart 
Davis 2008), effective rules improve the stakeholders’ co-operation, thereby 
increasing the compliance level among the stakeholders. Therefore, conversely, the 
ineffectiveness of rules may decrease the compliance level and make the 
organisation prone to non-compliance problems. This thesis found that non-
compliance in PFM operational practices in West Lombok District was characterised 
by the ineffectiveness of PFM rules and regulations because they were contradictory, 
easily misinterpreted or simply defective. 
Contradictions among derivative regulations of the PFM legal framework, especially 
in the accounting and financial reporting processes, have been in existence 
throughout the period of the study, due to the overlapping roles between the MoHA 
and the Ministry of Finance within local government’s financial management system. 
The lack of more technical detail, in the form of SOPs and other technical guidance, 
and the inadequacy of the dissemination efforts to convey the requirements stipulated 
in the rules and regulations, has caused the misinterpretation of rules among the PFM 
actors. Misinterpretation of rules has led to practices that were not compliant with the 
requirements stipulated in the rules and regulations. There were also situations where 
rules were defective, ambiguous and/or unclear. In such situations, rules could be 
interpreted in multiple ways, causing confusion among the PFM actors about how to 
appropriately comply with the rules. 
Secondly, another bureaucratic structure, the division of labour, has also become 
dysfunctional in the actual PFM operational practices of West Lombok District. 
Vertically, the hierarchical arrangement does not support the development of 
employees’ loyalty towards organisational goals. Instead, there were instances 
among the PFM actors where personal loyalty to their direct superiors was upheld, 
neglecting their obligations to comply with the rules and regulations in order to attain 
the organisational goals. From a horizontal perspective, the division of labour has 
fragmented the mindset of the PFM actors into a silo mentality. Instead of maintaining 
proper co-ordination and communication with other units, the PFM actors have been 
constrained by a focus on their responsibilities within their own units, causing a 
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 number of non-compliance problems at the organisational level. A dysfunctional 
division of labour was also derived from improper distributions of workloads, causing 
imbalances in workloads among individual employees. In this specific instance, 
employees who had greater workloads were more prone to make errors and mistakes. 
Thirdly, inappropriate human resources and personnel management practices and 
policies in West Lombok District have contributed to its failure to establish expertise 
among its PFM actors. Those inappropriate practices and policies have prevented the 
development of employees’ skills, capabilities and knowledge, including their 
understanding about rules that govern their actions and behaviours, hence initiating 
non-compliance problems. In addition to decisions about employees’ placements 
often not being matched with their competencies and educational backgrounds, 
frequent rotation among the employees who were working in the PFM operational 
processes had also hindered the development of expertise among the PFM actors. 
The employees’ promotion system has been influenced by patronage and nepotism 
practices because the merit-based promotion system was not consistently 
implemented. Apart from employees’ unwillingness to improve their own knowledge 
and skills, training programs have also failed to provide relevant training materials for 
employees, including those relating to leadership skills for employees who had been 
promoted. Lack of adequate office facilities has also contributed to the limitations for 
employees to improve their performance within the organisation because it hindered 
them from applying their expertise in the workplace effectively. As a result, the inability 
to establish expertise among the PFM actors and to fully implement the existing 
expertise within the actual practices has contributed to non-compliance problems in 
PFM operations. 
9.3. Contributions and Limitations 
The findings of this study both provide empirical evidence and enrich the literature 
within the fields of PFM and public bureaucracy theory. They also have potential policy 
implication by providing relevant knowledge required for the formulation of practical 
recommendations within the context of local governments in Indonesia, in particular, 
and developing countries, in general, to reduce the practice of non-compliance in their 
PFM operations. 
Firstly, in the PFM field, the presence of non-compliance in PFM operations, 
especially in developing countries, has been widely identified and discussed. In 
countries such as Lesotho, Ghana, Myanmar, the Philippines and Vietnam, efforts to 
ensure compliance did not lessen the risk of non-compliance in the actual PFM 
220 
 operational practices. They have experienced non-compliance issues that have 
caused a number of problems in all components of their PFM operations. Systemic 
problems of the PFM operations in West Lombok District, which were identified by 
this study and have been discussed in this thesis, add more empirical evidence to the 
PFM literature to confirm the presence of non-compliance problems in the PFM 
operations of Indonesia, a typical developing country, especially at the local 
government level. 
Secondly, the findings of this study, especially in regard to the PFM actors’ motives, 
have also contributed to the literature concerning public bureaucracy. They provide 
empirical evidence regarding the presence of both self-interested and public-
interested motives among public employees when carrying out their duties, which 
validates previous findings. Further, the study has confirmed both of the contradictory 
assumptions applied via two different tenets of public bureaucracy theory, the 
viewpoints of public administration and political economy. The latter brings the 
economic point of view into the discussion about public bureaucracy. It assumes the 
dominance of the self-interested motives of public employees to explain their 
behaviour within the public sector organisational context. On the other hand, the 
former assumes that the distinct feature of public accountability within a public 
bureaucracy has directed public employees to behave according to public-interested 
motives. This finding, as a result, complicates the effort to examine the behaviour of 
the individual members of a public bureaucracy. Nevertheless, it justifies Olsen’s 
(2004) suggestion that the area of public bureaucracy demands more studies and 
models that can accommodate the complex nature of human behaviour (Olsen 2004; 
in Wise 2004), including, as has been demonstrated by this study, their multifaceted 
motives that range between self-interested and public-interested motives. 
Thirdly, this study has policy implications that potentially contribute to the solution of 
problems of non-compliance in PFM operations.These implications include the 
formulation of a proper institutional arrangement and design that can be implemented 
to adequately address and accommodate various potential combinations of motives 
of the PFM actors in the workplace and can minimise the dysfunctions within 
bureaucratic structures. A reward system, for example, should be carefully designed 
to ensure that it has covered a number of incentive channels, such as financial 
compensation, conveniences in the workplace, promotion policy, etc., that are aligned 
with different PFM actors’ self-interested motives. The design of the reward system 
should be fair and based upon the actual performances and contributions of each 
PFM actor, instead of being based on their level of employment or tenure. A review 
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 of the details of current PFM operational rules, regulations, standards and guidance 
of practices should be periodically conducted to ensure the correspondence of those 
instruments with the public’s needs and the principles of efficiency, effectiveness, 
transparency and accountability. In addition, effective monitoring and supervision, 
especially by immediate superiors, should be consistently performed to prevent the 
individual PFM actors from being resistant and ignorant about complying with the PFM 
rules, regulations, standards and guidance. 
Efforts to minimise dysfunctional bureaucratic structures should include a policy to 
revisit the overlapping roles of the MoHA and the Ministry of Finance in regard to the 
PFM legal framework, the identification of unclear PFM operational instruments (e.g. 
SOPs and guidance), and a strategy to enhance the effectiveness of the 
dissemination of those instruments. A strategy to ensure the congruence of the PFM 
actors’ personal goals, especially for those who are at higher hierarchical levels, with 
the overall organisational goals, along with a policy to improve the co-ordination 
among workers and the redistribution of balanced workloads to all units within the 
organisation, should also be considered and established. It is also recommended to 
carry out a review of the actual practices of the human resources and personnel 
management policies. Educational background should be considered as an important 
factor for employees’ placements, especially in the early stages of their careers in the 
organisation. Rotation policies and training programs should be designed to enable 
the development of expertise among the employees that will support the attainment 
of the overall objectives of the organisation. Public organisations should also ensure 
that they have adequate and supportive office facilities to enable the PFM actors to 
exercise their expertise effectively. 
In terms of its limitations, this study mainly utilised the assessment of local 
governments’ PFM operational practices that had been conducted and reported by 
the BPK. It excludes a number of other assessments and studies that have been 
conducted by other institutions and researchers. In addition, it has only focused on 
the final audit reports published, excluding any preliminary findings that were found 
and discussed during the audit processes. Those preliminary findings might have 
already been addressed properly and adequately by the local governments during the 
audits, resulting in the findings not being included in the audit reports. As a result, the 
examination of non-compliant behaviours of the PFM actors in this study only related 
to the systemic problems that have been identified and disclosed in the audit reports. 
Despite this limitation, the coverage of this study, which includes all local 
governments’ audit reports from all types of audit published by BPK’s regional offices 
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 throughout Indonesia, has contributed to a comprehensive examination and 
identification of systemic problems in local governments’ PFM operations in 
Indonesia. 
While the identification of systemic problems in the PFM operational practices related 
to the whole of local governments in Indonesia, the study of the PFM actors’ motives 
and bureaucratic traditions, and how they had contributed to those identified systemic 
problems, was only conducted within one local government, i.e. the West Lombok 
District. This limitation may weaken the generalisability of the research findings to 
other Indonesian local government jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the centralised 
approach in the implementation of regional autonomy in regard to PFM operations 
throughout local governments in Indonesia and the similarities in the nature, pattern 
and statistics of non-compliance problems in West Lombok District with those of all 
local governments in Indonesia have provided evidence of the typicality and 
representativeness of West Lombok District. Those facts have increased the 
probability that the findings of this study can be generalised throughout local 
government within Indonesia. Similar studies of different local government offices or 
in other public institutions in Indonesia, such as ministries of central government, 
public service agencies and state-owned enterprises, may also be considered to have 
provided more empirical evidence regarding the influence of both public employees’ 
motives and bureaucratic traditions upon the problems of non-compliance in PFM 
operations in Indonesia’s public sector. 
9.4. Concluding Remarks 
PFM is one essential component of the public sector because finances are one of the 
essential resources of any country. The government’s budget, as the main instrument 
of PFM, is required to be managed in a proper manner to ensure the achievement of 
the PFM objectives. At the operational level, both compliance with budget allocations, 
which have been stipulated in the budget law, and adherence to other PFM rules or 
regulations that govern the detailed arrangements for managing PFM operations are 
critical. Emphasis on compliance in PFM operations can prevent corruption, 
overspending and misallocation of budget from its intended purposes. It can also 
ensure proper control over the overall budget execution processes. However, the 
presence of non-compliance problems in PFM operations must not be concealed. The 
body of literature on PFM, including this thesis, has provided empirical evidence 
supporting the proposition that efforts to ensure compliance are complicated. 
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 This study has shown that the mixed and complex nature of the PFM actors’ motives 
contribute to the difficulty in ensuring their adherence to the PFM rules and 
regulations. Non-compliance becomes more apparent in PFM operations when any 
public institution does not have an adequate reward system and/or control mechanism 
that can conform and align various PFM actors’ motives with the PFM objectives. 
Further, the ideal bureaucratic structures that are required to attain efficiency and 
effectiveness in PFM operations, to some extent, are difficult to establish. Therefore, 
efforts to minimise dysfunctional bureaucratic structures should also be reinforced to 
help improve the level of compliance within PFM operations and to assist in the 
attainment of PFM objectives. 
For future studies, it would be interesting to discover whether the findings of this study 






 Appendix 1 – Hierarchy of PFM Regulatory Framework 
  The State Finance Law 17/2003 
The State Treasury Law 1/2004 
The State Audit Law 15/2004 
The Local Governance Law 32/2004 
The Fiscal Balance Law 33/2004 
  
  GR 14/2005 regarding Government Receivable Write-off 
(revised by GR 33/2006) 
 GR 24/2005 regarding Government Accounting Standard 
(replaced by GR 71/2010) 
 GR 54/2005 regarding Local Government Loan 
 GR 55/2005 regarding Balancing Fund 
 GR 56/2005 regarding Local Government Financial Information 
System 
 GR 57/2005 regarding Grant to Local Government 
 GR 58/2005 regarding Local Government Financial 
Management 
 GR 6/2006 regarding Government Asset Management (revised 
by PP 38/2008) 
 GR 8/2006 regarding Government Financial and Performance 
Reports 
 GR 8/2007 regarding Government Investment 
 GR 39/2007 regarding Government Cash Management 
 GR 60/2008 regarding Government Internal Control System 
 
 Presidential Regulation (PR) 54/2010 regarding Government Procurement 
(revised by PR 35/2011, PR 70/2012, and PR 172/2014) 
 Minister of Home Affairs Regulation (Permendagri) 13/2006 regarding Guideline 
for Local Government Financial Management (revised by Permendagri 59/2007 
and Permendagri 21/2011) 
 Permendagri 17/2007 regarding Technical Guideline for Local Government 
Assets Management 
 Permendagri 32/2011 regarding Guideline for Grant and Social Assistance 
Fund Allocation from Local Government Budget (revised by Permendagri 
39/2012) 
 Permendagri 20/2009 regarding Guideline for Special Allocation Fund 
Management 
 Local government regulations regarding the general provisions on local 
government financial management 
 Head of local government decrees regarding local financial management 
system and procedures 
 Various SOPs that provide more detailed guidelines for carrying out PFM 
operations across local government’s units 
Source: Author’s compilation  
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1 Inadequate and inaccurate transaction records 
2 Inappropriate reporting processes (not following 
the guidance/rules/standards) 
3 Late submission of reports 
4 Inadequate financial transactions and accounting 
information support system 





1 Inadequate planning of a program/activity/project 
2 Revenue management (collection, deposit, 
reporting, and utilisation) do not follow the 
relevant guidelines 
3 Inappropriate process of disbursement and/or 
revenue collection (not following the 
guidance/rules/standard) 
4 Expenditure outside the budget 
5 Policy is not properly managed and implemented 
(resulted in shortage of revenue) 
6 Policy is not properly managed and implemented 
(resulted in increase of expenses) 
7 Inadequate physical management and 




1 No formal and adequate SOPs 
2 The implementation of SOPs is weak and not 
effective 
3 No internal audit unit/function 
4 Ineffective internal audit function 
5 No separation of duties 
Non Compliance  State Losses 1 Fictitious expenses/payments 
2 Third parties do not finish the work according to 
contract 
3 Volume shortage (of works/goods) 
4 Overpayment (other than volume shortage) 
5 Mark up 
6 Personal use of public money/assets 
7 Travel expenses payments exceed the standard 
8 Third parties do not deliver goods/works 
according to the contract 
9 Expenses are not in accordance and exceed the 
provisions 








No. Audit Findings Item 
11 Overpayment of tax returns 
12 Improper assets disposal 
13 State losses have not been properly processed 
according to the rules 
14 Entity has not processed the treasury losses 
according to the rules 
15 Write-off of receivables is not in accordance with 
the regulations 
16 Sales discount is given exceeding the regulations 
17 Improper calculation of production costs 
18 Guarantee of contract work, utilisation of goods 
and the provision of the facility cannot be availed 
19 Fictitious evidence of revenue deposits 
Potential State 
Losses 
1 Overpayment of the unfinished works 
(goods/services) 
2 Third parties do not replace/fix damaged 
goods/services during maintenance period 
3 Public assets are not physically in possession 
4 Acquisition of disputed assets 
5 Public assets’ whereabouts are not known 
6 Guarantee of works is not in accordance with the 
regulations 
7 Third parties have not delivered the works/goods 
yet 
8 Receivables are potentially uncollected 
9 Write-off of receivables is not in accordance with 
the regulations 
10 Budget has been disbursed for the unfinished 
works (at the end of financial year) 
Revenue 
Shortfall 
1 State revenues are not yet received 
2 Direct use of revenues (without budget 
appropriation) 
3 Transfers from central government are not yet 
received 
4 Revenues are used by unlawful institutions 
5 Lower tax rates are used 
6 Overpayment of subsidy 
Administrative 
Weaknesses 
1 Incomplete documentation for 
expenses/payments 









No. Audit Findings Item 
3 Improper procurement processes (not causing 
state losses) 
4 Contract splitting 
5 Pro forma procurements 
6 Non-compliance with public assets regulations 
7 Non-compliance with technical/specific 
regulations 
8 Correction of subsidy/public service obligation 
calculation 
9 Improper calculation of 
depreciation/amortisation/bad debts allowance 
10 Delay in depositing state revenues to state 
accounts 
11 Delay in depositing petty cash to state accounts 
12 Petty cash amount at the year-end is not 
deposited to state accounts 
13 Investments are not supported by adequate 
documentation 
14 Public assets are not supported by adequate 
documentation 
15 No legal bases for budget items diversions 
16 Budget overrun 
3E Weaknesses Waste 1 Procurement more than the needs 
2 Substandard quality of goods/works/services 
3 Higher acquisition cost of inputs 
Inefficiency 1 Quantity of input higher than required 
2 Quality of input higher than required 
Ineffectiveness 1 Budgets are not used for their designated 
purposes 
2 Goods/works/services procured are not used as 
planned 
3 Goods/works/services procured cannot be 
used/utilised 
4 Utilisation of goods/works/services does not 
impact the achievement of the institutions' 
objectives 
5 Limitation in the implementation of 
activity/program hinders the achievement of 
institutions' objectives 








No. Audit Findings Item 
7 Operations of the institutions is not adequately 
managed, including revenue target is not 
achieved 
8 Promotional expenses are not effective 
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